Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their militaries undertake several substitution policies in order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. These policies include pursuing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and forging alliances. We find support for these theoretical predictions in quantitative tests on data with global coverage between 1970 and 2001.     

(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

What explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.     

Disowning Fukushima: Managing the credibility of nuclear reliability assessment in the wake of disaster

This paper reflects on the credibility of nuclear risk assessment in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima meltdowns. In democratic states, policymaking around nuclear energy has long been premised on an understanding that experts can objectively and accurately calculate the probability of catastrophic accidents. Yet the Fukushima disaster lends credence to the substantial body of social science research that suggests such calculations are fundamentally unworkable. Nevertheless, the credibility of these assessments appears to have survived the disaster, just as it has resisted the evidence of previous nuclear accidents. This paper looks at why. It argues that public narratives of the Fukushima disaster invariably frame it in ways that allow risk‐assessment experts to “disown” it. It concludes that although these narratives are both rhetorically compelling and highly consequential to the governance of nuclear power, they are not entirely credible.     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.     

Ceci n'est pas une…American nuclear weapon in Belgium

There is hardly anybody in Belgium who publicly defends the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on Belgian territory. The longer these weapons stay, the more the existing nuclear weapons policy and by extension North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will be regarded as illegitimate. While one should not expect massive demonstrations similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, the pressure to protest increases. By describing the different societal and political actors in Belgium and their respective views on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons, this article tries to explain the gap between policymakers and citizens on this issue. The main explanatory variables are a low-profile diplomatic culture and the lack of a strong link between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power, resulting in the absence of political leaders at the governmental level, who clearly speak out in favor of withdrawal.     

Nuclear Terrorism: What Can We Learn from Los Alamos?

ABSTRACT

The international security community is increasingly concerned about the nexus between indiscriminate terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. Many nuclear terrorism threat assessments focus primarily on terrorist motivations to employ an atomic bomb, the availability of nuclear know-how and technology, and the opportunity for clandestine organisations to acquire fissile material. Scholars and experts, however, often neglect to elaborate on the challenges for terrorist organisations in organising and implementing the construction and detonation of a crude atomic bomb. This will most likely be a complex project. This article will therefore explore the organisation of such an endeavour. To be precise, we will highlight the impact of the organisational design of the terrorist group. The organisational design determines the division of tasks and how coordination is achieved among these tasks. It therefore has a strong impact on the functioning of any organisation, especially an innovative and complex terrorism project. Building on a case study of Los Alamos, we inductively infer that terrorist organisations face an inherent effectiveness-efficiency trade-off in designing a nuclear armament project.     

Triad of terror: post-START reductions in broader context

Abstract

This paper considers the present condition and future prospects for post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (post-START) nuclear arms reductions in the following sequence. First, we review the essential features of the agreement between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in July 2009, for a START follow-on agreement. Second, we discuss the larger political and military-strategic contexts within which these post-START negotiations will play out. Third, we perform an analysis to determine whether the START follow-on guidelines would meet prospective requirements for mutual deterrence and, in addition, whether US–Russian reductions could safely go even lower. Fourth, we take a specific look at the estimated impact of defenses on deterrence stability under post-START reductions. Fifth, pertinent conclusions are summarized.     

Money can't buy you love: the European Union member states and Iranian nuclear programme 2002–2009

The controversy of the Iranian nuclear programme divided the European Union (EU) member states. Whereas some states preferred confrontation, others were in favour of the accommodation. Policy commentators frequently ascribed this difference to diverging economic interests of Europeans, but this link remained underexplored. In this article, the empirical link between the economic interests and positions towards Iran is explored. The analysis rests on the evaluation of both overall and strategic trade flows. The results suggest that while trade played a certain role in the shaping of the policies, the effect of the strength of the alliance with the USA explains a large part of the puzzle. The article thus casts shadow on the established policy narrative of economic interests being the driver of the EU members' Iran policy. In addition, the theoretical implications cast shadow over the applicability of commercial liberalism on instances of confrontation short of war.     

俄罗斯国防建设浅析

俄罗斯国防建设的主要做法是：重估国家的安全环境,调整国防安全战略;实施＂现实遏制＂核战略,维护国家安全和利益;加快军事改革,推进质量建军;加强军事信息系统建设,打造＂统一信息空间＂。     

Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010

Abstract

This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor.