Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.     

Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the ‘democratic peace’ and the ‘failed democratization’ approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states.     

From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux

ABSTRACT

Recent Turkish foreign policy (TFP) under the successive AKP governments has seen different populist turns. A clear distinction can be made between the thin and thick populisms of TFP, based on the status of the West. The first decade of AKP rule, when foreign policy was thinly populist, was characterised by steady de-Europeanisation, increasing engagement with regional issues and a decentring of Turkey’s Western orientation. The turn toward thick populism has been characterised by anti-Westernist discourses in which the West is resituated as the ‘other’ of Turkish political identity.     

The 15 July abortive coup and post-truth politics in Turkey

Contemporary developments throughout the world have been marked by post-truth politics. Epitomized by a disregard for truth coupled with a reliance on emotive arguments, the term ‘post-truth politics’ has not yet been adequately reflected upon by political or social theory. This article uses Turkey’s 15 July (2016) abortive coup as an entry point to address this gap and argues that the post-truth has altered both the grammar and vocabulary of politics. The term denotes the contemporary shift from a ‘regime of truth’ to a ‘regime of common sense’, which also operates as the discursive ground of new populisms. While treating three contending narratives of 15 July – ‘kamikaze coup’, ‘staged coup’ and ‘controlled coup’ – this article focuses on the post-truth elements in the government’s narrative performance that obstructed the pursuit of truth and set the conditions for a particular interpretation of the events of 15 July.     

碎片化网络舆情下主流意识形态话语权探析

意识形态话语权是社会思潮中引导民心、决定社会舆论走向的能力。网络技术的扩展、网络社会的民粹化走向及个别地方意识形态工作的虚化、弱化、仪式化,导致碎片化网络舆情逐渐占据社会舆情场,甚至出现主流意识形态被碎片化网络舆情“牵着走”的混乱局面。泛滥的网络舆情催生“鸡毛蒜皮效应”、“长尾效应”“羊群效应”“晕轮效应”和“尺蠖效应”,加剧了主流意识形态丧失话语权的风险。网络时代建构主流意识形态话语权已迫在眉睫,需要增强意识形态吸引力、提高网络空间治理能力、控制舆情事件并进行专业化处理、加强网络舆情有效预判和政策的合理统筹等。     

‘Enoch Powell Speaks for Britain’: The Press,the Public and the Speech

This article explores popular reactions to Enoch Powell's speech in Birmingham on 20 April 1968. It describes the protests by sympathetic workers, such as the Smithfield meat porters, and the responses of the press, both nationally and in the West Midlands. It considers the speech's impact on immigrants themselves and it makes the case that Powell's real significance was as an early champion of a particular kind of anti‐Establishment populism, which has now become a very familiar feature of our political landscape.     

Welfare-Consequentialism: A Vaccine for Populism?

This article is about two ideologies. Welfare-consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximise aggregate welfare. Populism holds that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and asserts that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human wellbeing. The article argues that welfare-consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism’s claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare-consequentialist government. Finally, welfare-consequentialism’s sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism’s dark story has proven to be.     

论齐鲁文化的道德传统

齐鲁文化的道德传统在当今既有积极的一面,也有诸多不适应甚至制约现代经济、社会和人的发展的一面。它体现着浓郁的酒性特征,内含着较多的民粹主义思想因素,阻滞着山东各方面制度的现代化,强化着山东传统的生产方式和生活方式。齐鲁文化精神传统的现代提升和创新发展,需要正视和反思这些消极因素。     

Romania is a family and it needs a strict father: conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses

Investigating Romanian radical right populism, I evidence the gendered nature of conceptual metaphors and provide insights on the specific masculinities that they underpin in such political discourses. With the 2004 presidential elections as a backdrop, the analysis focuses on how the radical right populist candidates articulated in their discourses the conceptual metaphor of the “strict father.” At first, the theoretical standpoints on conceptual metaphors are corroborated with the conceptualization of populist charismatic leadership. Subsequently, a gendered perspective is added to the populist conceptualizations. The leaders' self-representation as messianic fathers of the national family is evidenced by investigating their discursive appeals to protect, discipline and punish the people. Furthermore, I elaborate how conceptual metaphors may be employed to consolidate a position of uncontested leadership and moral superiority of the radical right populist leaders.     

How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders

It is often argued that right-wing populist party leaders are dependent on the media for their public image, which in turn is key for their electoral success. This study tests this assumption by comparing the effects of the media coverage of 2 Dutch right-wing populist leaders with the effects of the coverage of leaders of established parties, in a real-life setting, by tracking campaign developments in the Dutch 2006 national election campaign. We combine panel survey data (n?=?401) with repeated measurements of the party leaders' public images with a systematic content analysis of 17 media outlets (with a total of 1,001 stories), on the basis of the media consumption of individual respondents. Our results show significant effects of the content of media coverage on the public image of political leaders. However, only in 1 case (out of 10) is there a significant difference between right-wing populist party leaders and leaders of other parties in the strength of media effects. It thus seems that leaders of right-wing populist parties are just as dependent upon the media as leaders of other parties. The findings are discussed in the light of extant research on right-wing populist parties and media populism.