工会“两个普遍”方针对促进我国经济增长方式转变的重要影响

全总提出的“两个普遍”方针,其目标要求是,2011年至2013年,全国企业法人建会率达到90%以上,普遍实现企业法人建会;从2011年起用3年时间,到2013年底80%以上已建工会组织的企业建立工资集体协商制度,基本实现已建工会企业普遍开展工资集体协商.“两个普遍方针”深刻反映了工会工作面临的新形势,这一方针的贯彻实行,对于维护广大劳动者的合法权益、促进我国经济增长方式转变、实现经济发展的持续增长,都具有重大意义.     

Empowering Students to Create and Claim Value through the Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument

In a world of problem‐solving lawyering, principled negotiation, and integrative bargaining, to describe a negotiation as “distributional” may strike some as heretical. Still, we disserve our students if we ignore distributional bargaining altogether. Unfortunately, many law students who are drawn to negotiation classes bring with them a fundamental discomfort with claiming value. Contrary to the stereotypes that attribute aggression and “sharp practices” to lawyers, many law students struggle to become more assertive. The Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) is one tool that I have found can help raise students' awareness of, and comfort with, the reflexive responses to conflict that can impede their attempts to claim as well as create value in negotiation. The insights students gain from taking the TKI can be quickly put to use in the next negotiation role play. Although it may help students realize their dominant response to conflict, the TKI highlights that no single approach to negotiation is always best. Thus, the TKI can both encourage the reticent to claim more value in negotiation and suppress the seemingly insatiable appetites for value claiming that drive other students. When administering the TKI, I encourage students to learn at least four major lessons:

• 1 A negotiator has a choice in resolving the dilemma between value claiming and value creating. We are not just stuck with our reflexes.
• 2 Still, it is good to know what our reflexive response to conflict is likely to be so that we are more mindful of the choices as we make them.
• 3 Departing from reflexes requires energy: preparation, planning, mindfulness, and conscious effort.
• 4 Adaptability is desirable. A well‐integrated negotiator might move from one TKI “type” to another as a negotiation progresses.

In this article, I seek to give a very brief overview of the ways I have used the TKI to convey these lessons, increasing students' comfort with, and management of, value claiming. To this end, the article will describe the TKI, explain how I administer and debrief the students' encounter with it, and point out some potential pitfalls of this process.     

Hard Bargaining in the Classroom: Realistic Simulated Negotiations and Student Values

Empirical research into the negotiation practices of lawyers shows that “hard bargaining,” including at least some unethical conduct, is an inescapable fact of a lawyer's life. To prepare students for legal practice, negotiation instructors must expose them to hard bargaining in the classroom. In doing so, however, instructors should be sensitive to the moral and ethical values of their students, so that the classroom experience does not unduly pressure students to compromise their values. The simulation is the primary tool of negotiation instruction. By selecting and manipulating simulations, a negotiation instructor can expose students to a wide range of negotiating behaviors, from distributive negotiations marked by the use of power tactics to value‐creating negotiations in which participants must consider many interests and collaborative strategies predominate. With that flexibility, however, comes the potential for classroom exercises to pressure students, in ways both subtle and overt, to adopt behaviors that feel uncomfortable. In this article, I examine the use of simulations to teach different types of negotiating behavior, including hard bargaining. Referring to a number of widely available simulations, I suggest ways to focus student attention on three dimensions of negotiation behavior — the issues over which the parties are bargaining, the objectives the parties seek, and the tactics the parties use to achieve their objectives — in order to push students to reflect on their own negotiation behaviors and to prepare for the tactics of others. I assess the potential for simulations to pressure students to compromise their values, and I conclude with my own thoughts on the goals of a negotiation course.     

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.     

The Day‐to‐Day Life of a Dean: Engaging in Negotiations and negotiations

This article analyzes the negotiating strategies and tactics that proved useful during my eight‐year stint as dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations during the 1970s. David Lax and James Sebenius have paved the way with their pioneering work on The Manager as Negotiator. By taking this perspective to the academic setting, I have identified a portfolio of tactics that are helpful in understanding how an administrator operates in a complex environment. The examples presented in this article help flesh out the standard categories of distributive and integrative bargaining as well as forcing and fostering strategies for implementing change.     

中俄跨文化商务交际中的语用失误及对策

跨文化商务交际是跨文化交际学范畴的一个新的研究领域。在跨文化商务交际中,因语用失误导致的交际不适、交际中断和交际冲突会直接或间接地影响商务谈判的效果。从跨文化交际和交际—语用的角度探讨中俄商务活动中的语用失误,可以最大限度地减少误解,增进合作。     

Developing Superior Negotiation Case Studies

While a great deal of excellent advice exists for producing case studies on managerially relevant topics in general, negotiation cases have distinctive aspects that merit explicit treatment. This article offers tailored advice for producing cases on negotiation and related topics (such as mediation and diplomacy) that are primarily intended for classroom discussion. It describes how to decide whether a negotiation‐related case lead is worth developing and how to choose the perspective and case type most suited to one's objectives. Finally, in by far the longest part of the discussion, it offers ten “nuts and bolts” suggestions for structuring and producing an excellent negotiation case study.     

Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War

This article explores what strategies rebels use to prepare their ethnic community for negotiated peace. Proposed strategies are distilled from relevant theory and systematically investigated in case analyses of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegal. The empirical findings indicate that although a coercive military capacity underpinned claims to ethnic representation, coercion did not dominate during the prenegotiation phase. During negotiations, noncoercive persuasion, as well as collective and selective incentives, clearly dominated. Moreover, the most important measures were internal to the negotiating rebel group. The successful rebel negotiator appeared to “mobilize in reverse” by initially targeting the core of military leaders followed by competitor groups and constituents. The article systematically examines across cases what measures rebel negotiators have used to “ripen” their own community, how these measures have been sequenced, and against whom they have been directed. The findings have important implications for the concepts of ripeness and prenegotiation and their requirements. The study underscores in particular the relevance of rebels' nonviolent commitment signals, something that has been largely overlooked in the research on nonstate armed actors. The policy implications suggest the possible benefits of third‐party assistance to efforts to promote communication, public outreach, and procedural transparency on the nonstate side in connection with peace talks.     

Assessment Procedures for Skills‐Based MBA Courses Adapted from the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Leadership Development Program

Measuring student progress toward the achievement of learning outcomes in negotiation skills courses is a difficult task. Measuring the effectiveness of the delivery of course instruction can be equally challenging. This article proposes some answers to these questions: How can student performance in skills such as negotiation, leadership, and teamwork (sometimes referred to as “soft skills”) be effectively measured and accurately evaluated? What standards can be used to determine whether student performance is superior, adequate, or inferior? How can teaching effectiveness be evaluated to determine whether students are receiving the instruction necessary to achieve the course learning objectives? This article describes how the authors collaborated on an adaptation of the assessment processes used in the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadet Leadership Development Program for use in an MBA course on negotiation skills. We report on a pilot effort that has demonstrated that the ROTC‐style leadership assessment process can be successfully adapted for use in a graduate course on negotiation and that it provides useful means for evaluating both individual student performance and overall course effectiveness. While our work involved a negotiation course, we suggest that the process could be adapted for use in other skills‐oriented courses such as leadership.     

Structural,Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Preferences are a crucial element for analyzing decision making and negotiations, but knowledge about which factors determine these preferences is sparse. Some quantitative and qualitative studies of European Union (EU) negotiations have assumed that the negotiation conflict dimensions in intergovernmental negotiations reflect market‐versus‐regulation approaches as well as a north–south dimension. In this study, I demonstrate that these findings can be extended to show that the relevant determining factors for negotiation positions are economic structural variables and the degree to which a country benefits from the EU. Furthermore, the domestic interests of EU governments better explain a government's interest in some specific issues, such as consumer protection or fishery policies, than do their partisan preferences. Moreover, I am able to show that in frequent negotiations, such as EU Council of Ministers negotiations, sincere preferences dominate; however, some factors, such as extreme salience, can increase the likelihood that a minister will choose a less sincere strategic position such as an extreme position.