Transplanting Active Learning Abroad: Creating a Stimulating Negotiation Pedagogy Across Cultural Divides

For all of the ongoing attention paid by international relations scholars to reevaluating and improving their pedagogy, the effort to engage classes in new and productive ways can be exceptionally challenging when a western professor travels to a non-western society to teach advanced students. Professor Michael Fowler here explores the use of active-learning techniques in teaching international negotiation and conflict resolution abroad. Drawing especially on the author's experiences in working with officials in Laos and Vietnam, the article provides guidance for fashioning an effective active-learning course abroad, while referencing useful literature on negotiation teaching and scholarship. It assumes that certain readers will not be familiar with active-learning methods, but might want to incorporate them into future courses, and that others will be well-versed in this pedagogy, but will be looking to apply their customary techniques to the new circumstances of teaching advanced students abroad. This article includes material of interest to both groups.     

从集体协商到集体谈判的转变

为了与国际接轨建立自己的集体谈判制度,实现从目前的集体协商制度向集体谈判制度转变,我国应当建立强制性的集体谈判程序,确定适宜的谈判单位,发展自己的谈判结构并尊重当事人确定集体谈判代表人权限的权利。     

行政议价的法律性质及其成因分析

当前广泛存在的行政议价大多属于滥用职权或者超越职权的行为。造成行政议价广泛存在的原因主要包括立法过程博弈不充分、部门利益化驱动、法院司法审查权的过度狭小。要禁止行政议价,关键是要消除行政议价的成因。     

WTO多哈回合谈判的发展趋势与中国的对策

WTO多哈回合谈判的中止,是各种因素综合作用的结果。笔者认为目前暂时中止的多哈回合谈判必将在有关国家的努力下得到重新启动并最终获得成功,但其成功有赖于世界经济的稳定增长、各国之间增加互信和谈判的诚意,同时还应采取有效的措施消除导致多哈回合谈判中止的诸多因素。在今后的多哈回合谈判中,我国应在正确处理WTO多边贸易体制与我国主权关系的前提下,将广大发展中国家更加紧密地团结在自己周围,不断提高谈判能力并积极参与谈判,从而发挥一个政治大国和贸易大国应有的重要作用。     

The Meaning of Intuition for the Negotiation Process and Outcome

Intuition is a useful tool for negotiators, as negotiations are often highly complex endeavors in which people make holistic judgments with incomplete information and no time for deliberation. Therefore, one might expect that intuition greatly influences negotiations and their outcomes and that negotiators would use intuition to their advantage. However, there is almost no systematic research into the meaning of intuition for negotiation. In this conceptual paper, drawing on five interviews of experienced negotiators, we apply general research on intuition to the specific case of negotiation and find that negotiators use intuition specifically for attribution and social interaction. We distinguish different intuition attitudes; identify preparation, time, and negotiation stages as relevant drivers for the use of intuition in negotiation; clarify the distinction between intuition and routine; and shine new light on the concept of domain-specific knowledge.     

No Sheriff in Town: Governance for Online Dispute Resolution

Online dispute resolution (ODR), the practice of resolving disputes via the Internet or digital applications, has been developing since the mid‐1990s. As the field has grown and gained traction, it has increasingly received attention from professional associations and industry leaders in the world of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). More recently, it has begun to receive recognition from sources outside of this field — in both the public and private sectors. As the field develops and individual initiatives become widely adopted, the attention it receives from external sources will undoubtedly focus on questions of quality, ethics, practitioner training, service provider qualifications, and monitoring. These questions — already beginning to be heard from within the field — derive, in essence, from one shared overall question, that of appropriate governance for the ODR field. In this article, we will explain what we mean when we discuss a field's governance and suggest that the field itself should investigate issues of its own governance. We explore and explain the current “low‐to‐no” state of governance in ODR — and the developments that are likely, should the field fail to actively address this issue. We discuss the costs of no governance, and the potential costs and disadvantages of employing a higher‐governance model. We ask whether ODR can, indeed, be governed at all, and illustrate why addressing ODR governance is a very complex venture, in terms of the web of factors to be addressed, no matter how beneficial internal governance may be. We do not, in this article, intend to decide any of these questions — but, rather, to pose them to the ODR field and to the wider fields of ADR and conflict management. We point out why the ODR field is at a developmental point that is highly suitable for discussing and deciding these questions — and why these decisions might have far‐reaching implications for a wide range of conflict‐related fields.     

A Network Perspective on Negotiation: What Is New and Why It Matters

The resources that individual negotiators need to solve their problems are not available in a single, concentrated form, and they are certainly not available only within an isolated dyad itself. Instead, the necessary resources are widely dispersed among many actors within networks of business relationships. The best deal is unlikely to be fixed or predetermined, but is rather the outcome of long and time‐consuming negotiations that will then affect further negotiations. In this article, I describe a network perspective on negotiation that considers the relevance and impact of three phenomena that I call (1) vast connectivity, (2) multiple constitutions, and (3) ongoing consent. I further illustrate the applicability of these three factors using examples of real‐life negotiations.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan concluded an "easier" FTA with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved on to negotiate with Singapore. In this article, I analyze these cases and review the literature on bargaining and two-level games to develop a model of how these differences in sequence account in part for the relative differences in each country's bargaining strength in their more difficult negotiations. The preexistence of the Singapore FTA eased domestic pressures to reap the benefits of entry into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no-agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure to get into the free trade "game." This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korea conceded more internationally at the expense of higher side payments domestically.