‘Just three Skittles in a bowl will kill you. Would you take a handful?’ Evidence,public policy and Islamist-inspired violent extremism

ABSTRACT

Saggar’s article is concerned with the use of evidence by the UK policy community to tackle Islamist-inspired terrorism. It focuses on how evidence for such terrorism is generated, interpreted and organized, in particular pinpointing the challenges of reliability and prediction facing those with responsibility for tackling terrorism and its associated causes. Counter-terrorism policy is heavily exposed to risks of bias and distortion, but it is also vulnerable to various kinds of institutional group-think and vested interests. This article scrutinizes three such aspects of counter-terrorism evidence-based policymaking. First, there are imperfections in the evidence base, mostly arising from data limitations and practical shortcomings. These include factual gaps in knowledge, difficulties in comparing evidence about Muslims with non-Muslims, methodological weaknesses and difficulties in measuring profoundly subjective feelings about alienation and grievance. Second, the scope of the problem to which policy is addressed (and the policy paradigms that are alluded to) shape the priorities placed on the evidence base. How much weight should be given to evidence about the narrative of oppression or dissent used by extremists? Background oppositional identities are extensively researched and yet policymakers may choose to concentrate instead on factors in the foreground that have to do with actual violent conspiracies. Third, important nuances in the evidence–policy nexus arise from the implicit generalizations that are held by policymakers. Evidence describing the problem of terrorism is better accompanied by an appreciation of (and perhaps evidence about) the behavioural situation of decision-makers and decision-making structures. This involves trade-offs, bargaining and accommodations to carry different constituencies, and has a bearing on the kind of evidence that is used in counter-terrorism. Saggar closes with a discussion of the above distinctions, and concludes that there is a risk of naivety in evidence-based policymaking that is not alive to the politics of radicalization and extremism.     

Cut from the Same Cloth? A Comparative Study of Domestic Extremists and Gang Members in the United States

Despite calls for research on the similarities and differences between violent extremist groups and criminal street gangs, there have been few empirical comparisons. We develop a comparative model that emphasizes explicit, spurious, and indirect linkages between the two groups and use national sources of data on domestic extremists and gang members—the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)—to compare them across group involvement, demographic, family, religion, and socioeconomic status characteristics. Six percent of domestic extremists in PIRUS have a history of gang ties, which constitutes a minimal proportion of domestic extremists and is likely the rare exception among the population of gang members. Gang extremists more closely resemble non-gang extremists in PIRUS than they do gang members in the NLSY97. While these groups have some similarities, one of the major differences is that gang members are younger than domestic extremists. This likely contributes to many of the other differences between the groups across the life course, including marriage, parenthood, unemployment, and education. Given that the evidence is most consistent with the independence model, further comparative testing is needed before generalizing gang-related policies and programs to domestic extremism.     

Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from ‘accidental’ diaspora to rebel movement

Abstract

The article examines different types of macropolitical identities in Ukraine and their interaction in establishing political order in the country. The authors argue that political institutional design was unfavourable to the Russian diaspora in eastern and southern regions. It hindered stable development of post-Soviet identity between Russians in the country. But during the Euromaidan protests, the Russians reacted to unpleasant political situation by exploring who they were and what social and political goals they had. Having been incipient for decades, the identity of the diaspora evolved in a soaring way within three or four months. The violent actions of the newly established government in Kiev radicalized the Russian diaspora. Diasporants started establishing alternative authorities in regions where government had no monopoly on the use of force. The involvement of Russia and international volunteers complexifies the situation in Donbass and the identity formation process in unrecognized republics also known as DNR and LNR.     

End of moderation: the radicalization of AKP in Turkey

Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, AKP, was for many years believed to be paramount in ushering in a new era of moderate Islamism. However, in recent years, AKP has troublingly reversed course. From violent repression of the Gezi protests of 2013 to the 2016 abortive coup and subsequent crackdown on opposition, the party has lost all semblance of moderate Islamism and radicalized. If AKP had truly moderated, how could the party have changed in such a short period of time? What explains the radicalization of AKP? First, we argue that the strategic benefits of moderation far outweighed its costs, rendering it analytically improbable to determine whether AKP’s actions were genuine or merely strategic. Second, we show that AKP has been in a process of radicalization characterized by the adoption of anti-system, anti-democratic, and violent tactics and rhetoric since 2011. The disappearance of domestic and international structural constraints created the requisite background conditions for the party’s radicalization. Radicalization was facilitated by what we call ‘Erdoganization’, an ongoing de-institutionalization process within which Tayyip Erdogan gained complete control over the party. Additionally, a series of four “external shocks” threatened the party’s primary goal of gaining hegemony and caused the party to radicalize.     

CORRELATES OF VIOLENT POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES*

Although research on terrorism has grown rapidly in recent years, few scholars have applied criminological theories to the analysis of individual‐level political extremism. Instead, researchers focused on radicalization have drawn primarily from political science and psychology and have overwhelmingly concentrated on violent extremists, leaving little variation in the dependent variable. With the use of a newly available data set, we test whether variables derived from prominent criminological theories are helpful in distinguishing between nonviolent and violent extremists. The results show that variables related to social control (lack of stable employment), social learning (radical peers), psychological perspectives (history of mental illness), and criminal record all have significant effects on participation in violent political extremism and are robust across multiple techniques for imputing missing data. At the same time, other common indicators of social control (e.g., education and marital status) and social learning perspectives (e.g., radical family members) were not significant in the multivariate models. We argue that terrorism research would benefit from including criminology insights and by considering political radicalization as a dynamic, evolving process, much as life‐course criminology treats more common forms of crime.     

Criminology Theory and Terrorism: Introduction to the Special Issue

In this short essay, we introduce readers to a special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence on criminological approaches to the study of terrorism. In addition to summarizing the eight articles in the issue, we outline some general points about the relationship between criminological thinking and our understanding of terrorism. Our goal is to place the special issue's contributions in context and highlight under-explored issues that future research could address.     

Coming to Believe “Truths” About Islamist Radicalization in Europe

This article addresses four assumptions behind many of the current theoretical and policy approaches to individual processes of Islamist radicalization in Europe: the association with terrorism and extremism; determinism; the extraordinary nature of radicals; and the reification of the grievance and collective identity discourse. It argues for an intentional and developmental, rather than structural and socio-economic feature-focused, approach to the explanation of the radicalization process, with the consideration of framing and socio-psychological mechanisms having an impact on individual decision-making processes, and for an overall, broader conceptual understanding of radicalism.     

Transnational Radicalization,Diaspora Groups,and Within-group Sentiment Pools: Young Tamil and Somali Canadians on the LTTE and al Shabaab

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Tamil and Somali diasporas have come under intense scrutiny by the media and national security agencies in Canada. This is due to concerns that members of both communities may hold political grievances associated with their respective homelands that could be acted upon by joining or supporting transnational terrorist groups. Drawing on 168 in-depth interviews with youth and young adults in Toronto’s Tamil and Somali diasporas, we provide a comparative analysis of the varying ways that existing sentiment pools can operate to mobilize broad-levels of support for, or vilification of, the framing strategies of the LTTE and al Shabaab, respectively. Our findings show that frames that portray the LTTE in a positive light resonate deeply with the young Tamil-Canadians we interviewed, characterizing a “narrative fidelity” between these frames and the existing sentiment pool. By contrast, there exists considerable disconnect between the framing strategies of al Shabaab, their supporters, and existing sentiment within the Somali diaspora – a divide that illustrates the notion of “framing failure”. We conclude with a discussion of the dynamic nature and inherent malleability of group-level sentiment pools, and highlight why this may be important from a national security standpoint.     

Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State

ABSTRACT

Why do women become extremists? To what extent might they have self-agency? This paper examines the motivations and processes of female radicalization into the so-called Islamic State (IS) by drawing on a case study of Indonesian IS sympathizers, including the three migrant workers-turned-female suicide bombers whose radicalization was facilitated by social media. It argues that far from being coerced, most women join IS of their own free will. Prompted by a mix of personal crisis and socioeconomic and political grievances, the women embark on a religious seeking, exploring the various Islamic options available to them. Ideational congruence might spark the initial interest in IS, but it is generally emotional factors such as a feeling of acceptance and empowerment that make them stay. Contrary to common assumptions, women’s subordination in jihadist organizations is not absolute; it can be negotiated after joining. Most women try to conform to jihadist strict gender rules, but some, often with the support of male allies, try to bend the norms, including on female combat roles. The findings suggest that counter-terrorism agencies should abandon the binary view that women are either just brainwashing victims or terrorist provocateurs, and try to understand the gendered nuances of radicalization in order to formulate suitable preventive measures.