Democratic sanctions meet black knight support: revisiting the Belarusian case

Democracy promotion through economic sanctions has become commonplace. Previous studies argue that an important challenge to the effectiveness of democratic sanctions is the contravening support of black knights. However, these studies underestimate conflicting interests between the target and its black knight. In this paper, I propose a bargaining model for understanding how targets obtain support from black knights. The target’s main source of bargaining power is its threat to defect from the black knight and obtain support from an international rival. However, the credibility of this threat decreases with democratic sanctions because they hinder cooperation with a likely source of support, namely the sender. Therefore, targets take steps towards democracy to improve their bargaining position relative to the black knight. To probe my argument, I conduct a deep single case study of EU sanctions against Belarus between 2004 and 2016 with Russia as a black knight. Sanctions should have no effect in this paradigmatic case of black knight support. Yet, there is substantial evidence that democratic sanctions have increased the cost of electoral fraud and state repression in Belarus. This indicates that the conflicting interests of targets and their black knights provide windows of opportunity for democracy promotion.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence and the Conflict-Repression Nexus in the Northern Ireland “Troubles”

After 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent. In fact, to date, every possible relationship, including no influence, has been found. We argue that part of the problem concerns the current practice of treating every repressive event as if it were substantively equivalent, differentiated only by scope (large/small) or type (violent/nonviolent). We advance existing work by arguing that the influence of repression is contingent on when it occurs within the temporal sequences of political conflict. Using new events data on the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1974, results show that when dissent has been decreasing in the recent past, repressive action inspires an increase in dissident action. When dissent has been increasing, however, repression has the opposite effect, decreasing challenging activity. These results provide important insights into resolving a recurrent puzzle within the conflict-repression nexus as well as understanding the interaction between government and dissident behavior.     

我国民间借贷利率管制法治进路的检讨与选择

现行以《关于人民法院审理借贷案件的若干意见》第6条为中心的民间借贷利率管制进路源于相关机构及法律50年来对民间金融的负面道德评价和金融抑制。该进路在上世纪90年代初曾制止了"金融三乱",但在当前民营经济与民间金融发展的背景下,其扭曲资金市场配置、导致逆向选择、妨碍竞争的缺陷日渐凸出,已成为民间金融发展的制度障碍。当前民间金融市场需求与管制进路之间产生了明显的声音隔离效应,而管制本身却仍在强化。我国未来的民间借贷利率管制法治进路应当主动摆脱对利息的道德偏见,构建以《放贷人条例》为核心的监管制度,推行分类引导、动态调整的民间利率管制体系,实现行政事前监管与事后司法监督的良性互动,以推动正规金融利率的市场化。     

National self-image as an obstacle to ensuring children’s rights in the context of domestic violence and family law – the case of Sweden

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to highlight and discuss contradictions and challenges in the current policy and practice regarding fathers’ violence towards mothers and children in the Swedish welfare state. In particular, professional discourses and understandings of domestic violence in disputes about contact, custody, residence and maintenance, following parental separation, are analysed. My research suggests that abusers find ways to manipulate professionals and get them unwittingly to enable their continued control of victimised mothers and children. One conclusion is that oppression is maintained through processes of familialisation and selective repression. These discursive practices reproduce intersectional inequalities and, in doing so, in many cases result in the administration rather than prevention of further violence.     

Repression,co-optation and insurgency: Pakistan’s FATA,Southern Thailand and Papua,Indonesia

Scholars have long identified state repression as playing a key role in the onset of insurgency. Violence by security forces increases anger against the state and assists with rebel recruitment. Yet scholars have also recognised that repression does not always lead to rebellion: in some cases it successfully quashes movements before they have begun. This study advances an argument for when and why repression leads to insurgency and sometimes does not. We contend that violence by state security forces can fail to trigger rebellion if local elites within the repressed community are simultaneously co-opted with political and economic opportunities. When elites are satisfied with local autonomy and patronage they deprive the dissident movement of local leadership and coordination. When the state uses repression against a community and at the same time abandons this mutually beneficial relationship, the insurgency has both the leadership and grassroots support it requires. We illustrate our argument by examining three cases of state violence in Asia. In two of our cases, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Southern Thailand, repression led directly to insurgency. In the third, Papua in Indonesia, ongoing co-optation of local elites has left the movement factionalised and weak.     

State repression and post-conflict peace failure

This paper provides evidence that state repression is a strong predictor of peace failure following civil war. Existing literature fails to examine the possibility that more repressive states are even less likely than their counterparts to escape the ‘conflict trap’. We argue that when states use repressive tactics to achieve their objectives, it signals to the broader population that the state cannot be trusted; and the regime does not believe their rule is to be questioned. These signals polarise citizens into new or existing rebel factions thereby increasing the risk of another civil war. We test our theory using event history analysis. Our results are robust to a series of statistical models and demonstrate that in the tenuous post-conflict environment states that use repression to police their populous experience shorter periods of peace.     

The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries

While autocracies constitute a third of all signatories of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), very little research has explained why some autocrats join PTAs while others do not. We argue that this variation reflects the leader’s degree of vulnerability to elite-led coups during leadership change–whether a leader enters power legally or extralegally. New extralegal leaders are more vulnerable than new legal leaders, which encourages extralegal leaders to use PTAs to both build support from exporters and pressure disloyal importers. We test our hypotheses using a dyadic data set of 120 autocracies from 1960 to 2014. Our results show that extralegal leaders sign more and deeper PTAs than legal leaders. Moreover, we find that extralegal leaders with a high risk of coups are more likely to form deep PTAs than extralegal leaders with a low risk of coups. In line with our argument, we also provide evidence that extralegal leaders sign trade agreements that are likely to be enforced. Our article has implications for the political economy of trade and for development studies.     

Repression and endurance: anathematized Hindu and Sikh women of Afghanistan

Hindus and Sikhs, longtime minority religious communities in Afghanistan, have played a major role in the social, cultural, and economic development of the country. Their history in Afghanistan has not been faithfully documented nor relayed beyond the country's borders by their resident educated strata or religious leaders, rendering them virtually invisible and voiceless within and outside of their country borders. The situation of Hindu and Sikh women in Afghanistan is significantly more marginalized socially and politically. Gender equality and women's rights were central to the teachings of Guru Nanak, but gradually became irrelevant to the daily lives of his followers in Afghanistan. Hindu and Sikh women have sustained their hope for change and seized any opportunity presented to play a role in the process. Active participants in the social, cultural, and religious life of their respective communities as well as in Afghanistan's government, their contributions to social changes and the political process have gone mostly unnoticed and undocumented as their rights, equality, and standing in the domestic and public arena in Afghanistan continue to erode in the face of continuous discrimination and harassment.     

Disciplined and undisciplined repression: illicit economies and state violence in Central Asia’s autocracies

What explains the use of disciplined repression in some autocratic regimes and undisciplined repression in others? Despite its relevance to these broader debates on authoritarianism, this question remains inadequately explained in conventional approaches to repression. This article proposes that autocrats’ discipline over the use of state repression is a consequence of their differential control over illicit commercial networks. Autocratic regimes that consolidate their control over rents become dependent on security apparatuses to deepen and maintain that control. These regimes invest in and support the development of coercive capabilities, which leads to more disciplined state repression. Where autocratic regimes do not control illicit networks and rents, their dependence on security offices is low. Consequently, their investment in coercive capacity suffers, giving rise to patterns of undisciplined repression. This article explores the empirical implications of these regime trajectories through a controlled comparison of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two drug transit states in post-Soviet Eurasia whose coercive institutions and patterns of state violence have developed in markedly different ways.