日本海洋国家战略与北极地缘政治格局演变研究

日本的海洋战略经历了扩张——收缩——再扩张的发展阶段。出于对北极地区的资源、环境、战略价值、经济价值的多方面考量,日本政府近年在海洋国家战略框架下积极参与北极事务,谋求北极权益。日本对北极事务介入力度的加强,也将引起北极地缘政治格局的较大变化。文章首先分析了日本国家海洋战略的发展历程以及未来趋势,指出日本的海洋战略主要受其国家身份认知(发展成为海洋国家或是大陆国家)、东亚大陆地缘政治格局及海洋霸主国——美国的影响,并得出未来日本的海洋战略将呈现出对外扩张的趋势,进而探究了日本国家海洋战略受北极地缘政治格局的影响以及日本海洋战略的未来发展趋势,得出日本未来将制约中国的北极参与战略、缓和对俄关系、并增强其军事力量,最后从俄罗斯、日本、中国、美国4个国家为出发点分析北极地缘政治格局的演变。     

Beyond Dyads: Regional Democratic Strength’s Influence on Dyadic Conflict

Over the history of modern international relations research, we have moved from systemic and regional studies to empirical explorations of dyadic interactions. However, our statistical models have put the details of dyadic interactions under a microscope at the expense of ignoring the relevant regional context that these dyads interact in. This development has been in part due to computational limitations, but do we really believe that decision makers interact with one another while ignoring the regional power balance and the wishes of regional powers? In this article, I take a look at the well-researched relationship between democracy and peace by using a multilevel approach to dyadic interactions and the regions they are embedded in. The findings suggest that when the regional power balance favors democracies, it influences conflict between dyads, especially mixed dyads, by increasing the costs of aggression by autocracies and establishing regional norms of cooperation and compromise.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches

Abstract

Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.     

Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy

The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, presented at the European Council on 24 June 2016 by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, was drafted by Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and co-editor of The International Spectator. 

Given the importance of the document, we asked Nathalie for an interview and 18 foreign policy experts from around the world to comment on it.     

Securitising Migration: The European Union in the Context of the Post-2011 Arab Upheavals

The migration-security nexus, already at the heart of EU policymaking before the 2011 Arab uprisings, became acute after the forced displacements from Syria and the deterrence measures introduced. The internalisation by broader publics of “security knowledge” regarding migration contributed to the securitisation move. However, the construction of migration into a security-laden notion goes beyond both the adoption of deterrence measures and the straightforward association of migration with state as well as societal (in)security. Through the lens of its cooperative tools with its southern neighbours, the EU has built complex interdependencies between migration, post-2011 regional stabilisation and security. In order to read the EU’s securitised migration politics properly, the migration-security nexus must be embedded in its social, geopolitical and temporal fields. Perceptions of geopolitical threats, concurrent strains and divergences over European integration and immigration constitute an enabling terrain for the politics of securitisation.     

Moving from nos/otros to nosotros: a transcendent approach to sustainable development

Traditional top-down approaches to community development reinforce nos/otros binaries within provider/recipient relationships; transcendent approaches, on the other hand, create space for nosotros collaborative development. This article describes an instance of the nos/otros binary, in which a foreign volunteer in a rural community in Ecuador assumed the role of practitioner and limited community members’ roles to recipients or beneficiaries of her development projects. Inspired by findings from this experience, the article presents a case study highlighting an alternative, transcendent, nosotros approach in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where community members work together to imagine, implement, and sustain projects.     

政治领导与大国崛起安全

道义现实主义国际关系理论的核心原理是:决定大国兴衰的根本原因是大国的政治领导力,其本质是一国政府为适应不断变动的国际国内战略环境而进行改革的方向、决心与能力。根据道义现实主义原理,中国综合国力居世界第二位是中国制定崛起目标和策略的基础,符合国力基础的目标和战略就易于成功,而超越实力基础的目标和战略则会削弱中国的实力。道义现实主义认为,外交承诺与实力保持一致有利于提高国际战略信誉,从而减少国际社会对崛起国的恐惧和反对;为周边国家提供安全保障可获得对崛起国的战略支持;为减少崛起的国际阻力,崛起国应在新兴领域拓展利益范围而尽量避免在传统领域的利益冲突。在信息化时代,在网络空间拓展中国国际战略利益应成为中国主攻方向,网络战略应采取"走出去"原则而非为了安全的防御原则。在外部威胁不足以颠覆中国崛起的情况下,为防止中国的崛起半途夭折的重点将是防范国内的极左陷阱。"台独"正在成为中国崛起面临的首要威胁,中美在南海的战略竞争将长期化,朝鲜拥核是中国的东北亚地区政策无法回避的既成事实。     

中国崛起与全球安全治理转型

中国崛起与全球安全治理转型是21世纪初国际关系领域两个备受瞩目的全球性现象。文章以全球安全治理体系中的安全制度安排和安全规范设定为主要分析路径,以全球政治安全治理和全球经济安全治理为主要分析单元。一方面,自二战结束以来全球安全治理体系可分为"单边全球主义"和"全球单边主义"两个阶段,并且每一阶段的全球安全治理体系均可分解为政治制度、经济制度、政治规范和经济规范四个领域;另一方面,运用比较研究法,对各个时期全球安全治理体系在上述四个领域所体现出来的差异性进行剖析,可以发现,这种差异性集中表现为正在进行中的全球安全治理体系转型,崛起的中国在此次转型过程中开始发挥参与者、建设者和贡献者的作用。在传统全球安全治理体系陷入危机之时,中国崛起在相关领域所带来的制度效应和规范效应正在逐渐潜移默化地嵌入到全球安全治理体系中,中国的政策和实践也将相应日益形成规范化的趋势。     

The discursive construction of intervention: selves,democratic legacies,and Responsibility to Protect in French discourse on Libya

This article analyses French executives' and lawmakers' legitimisations of the intervention in Libya with the aim of understanding the discursive construction of intervention. It investigates the arguments in favour of intervention and the oppositions they were confronted with. To these arguments belong a re-evaluated democratic legacy of France, an identification with the Libyan people, and a debate on Responsibility to Protect and the rule of law in world politics, which have a broader relevance for French actorness abroad. The article applies the Essex School discourse theory and techniques from Interpretive Policy Analysis on executive speeches and parliamentary documents for structuring the debate and for estimating the strength of ideas in their interdiscursive configuration. An ideal-typical explanation of the legitimisation of intervention and of the choice of one policy over another is made. The article argues that going to war in Libya equated to a question of cultural appropriateness.