论国际法条件责任原则的最新发展

二次世界大战之前,国际社会普遍坚持条件责任原则,认为执行上级命令在一般情况下可以作为免除刑事责任的辩护理由;二战之后,纽伦堡审判确立了绝对责任原则,强调无论在任何情况下都不能将执行上级责任作为免除刑事责任的理由。《国际刑事法院规章》第33条是两种责任形式的融合。9.11事件后,恐怖主义的出现使国际社会对于执行上级命令能否免责的问题再次进行了思考。本文认为条件责任原则的存在,一方面是考虑到了军事社会的特殊性质,一方面也顾及到了当代对于战俘、普通民众的保护,并不会削减国际法的基础,是当代国际社会应当努力达成的目标。     

The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid

This article attempts to measure the direct costs that the terrorist attacks of 3/11 had on the economy of the region of Madrid. The evaluation has been made applying conservative criteria, and the results obtained have to be considered as minimum. The result indicates that the terrorist attacks caused a loss of nearly 212 million euros to the regional economy of Madrid, equivalent to 0.16 percent of the regional GDP (0.03 of the national GDP). This confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist attack such as the one of 3/11—apart from human catastrophic consequences—is relatively low.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: A Data‐Driven Analysis,

This article provides an in‐depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre‐attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open‐source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re‐evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.     

The African state and the failure of US counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa: The cases of Nigeria and Mali

Counter-terrorism initiatives are failing across the African continent. A major reason for this failure lies in the state-centric and military-focused nature of many counter-terrorism initiatives. In Africa, the state is often the source of insecurity for ordinary citizens. Any military strengthening of an illegitimate African state by the international community not only serves to bolster a predatory state but also undermines the human security of citizens. More importantly, such an approach conflates sub-state and international terrorism and serves to bolster the latter, thereby undermining regional and international security further. Put simply, current counter-terrorism initiatives are counter-productive. This paper focuses on counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria and Mali with a special focus on US initiatives to combat terrorism in the region.     

Comparing trends in infanticides in 28 countries, 1960–2009

The term ‘infanticide’ refers to the homicide of a child younger than one year old. In this article, we describe infanticide trends in 28 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2009. The analysis is based on the cause of death data from the WHO Mortality Database and national materials. The purpose is to compare those trends in all these 28 countries not to compare countries per se. Cause of death statistics are based on ICD classification. During the review period, ICD classification changed three times. In addition to describing infanticide trends, we will analyse the impact of those changes on statistical infanticide levels, to be sure that changes in trends could be seen as real, not statistical artefacts. According to our analysis, the change from ICD-7 to ICD-9 in 1968–1970 seems to have had some impact on registered infanticide mortality levels in three of the studied countries. In other countries, the changes did not have any general impact on registered infanticide levels. During the period, infanticide rates decreased in almost all European countries, and increased or were stable in most non-European industrialized countries. Even in Europe, there were significant differences in the decreasing trend between countries. We also found some structural variation behind the trend figures, which raised the question of whether the aggregated infanticide levels really describe an identical phenomenon in different countries.     

恐怖犯罪中的推定

恐怖犯罪属于故意犯罪,按照我国法律规定,故意犯罪必须证明犯罪嫌疑人主观上具有明知、故意或目的,而明知、故意、目的属于内部证明对象,很难用证据证明。为了依法打击恐怖犯罪,必须借助推定的方法,根据犯罪嫌疑人携带的物品、接近的地点、是否受过恐怖组织培训等因素,综合推定其是否意图实施恐怖犯罪。     

Dynamic Attenuation: Terrorism,Transnational Crime and the Role of the US Army Special Forces

This article analyses the ability of the US Army Special Forces to combat illicit networks (criminal and terrorist) through ‘dynamic attenuation’. It is argued that a process of dynamic attenuation, where network ties and not the actors in the network are targeted, should replace the current US strategy of ‘killing or capturing’ criminal agents threatening US interests. By dynamically attenuating (not destroying) the ties between and among criminal actors and criminal organisations, the US can effectively reduce the capability of criminal organisations to operate and achieve their missions (profit and/or terror). This argument is substantiated by assessing the environments where criminal networks thrive, the characteristics of criminal networks, the utility of targeting networks instead of individual actors, and through a comparison of criminal organisations' and US Army Special Forces' strengths and weaknesses. This article concludes with implications and recommendations for US policy in the fight against criminal organisations.