The UN system's contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture

Although it has been the major states of China, the former Soviet Union and especially the United States that have made the major contributions to shaping the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region since 1945, the UN system has played a useful, adjunct role. This is especially the case in the post-Cold War era when its principal bodies, together with its various specialized agencies, have provided vital support in moving warring societies into a period of relative peace and stability. The UN peace-building operations in Cambodia and East Timor were some of the most demanding ever undertaken by this universal institution. But beyond these particular examples, the United Nations has been influential in the region in other, more indirect, ways. It has set standards, its charter has been a powerful source of ideas when it comes to composing parallel documents at the state or regional levels, and it has helped with the negotiation of global arms control treaties, making up to some degree for the absence of such arrangements at the regional level. The UN has also had a legitimating function, providing an arena where Asia-Pacific states can publicize their grievances, and receive approval or reprimand for their behaviour. It has played a valuable role, too, as third-party mediator. However, the UN's political structure constrains the contribution it can make to the security order since it is reliant on major state agreement before it can act. Veto power - not its actual use but simply its anticipated use - gives China, Russia and the United States a controlling function with respect to a potential UN role in the management of conflict. Beijing and Washington would work, and have worked, to exclude the United Nations from major involvement in conflicts in which they have direct security interests: the Taiwan and Korean issues being the two most obvious in this regard. Thus, the United Nations is a useful buttress but not a central pillar of the region's security architecture.     

Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither ‘unipolar’ nor ‘multipolar’ designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role.     

Mediterranean Security Revisited

At the dawn of the last century, the European and Mediterranean countries failed to reach a consensus on building a cooperative security system. This article is an attempt at revisiting the concept of the Mediterranean security system and assessing the conditions for restarting security dialogue in the region. Upon recognition of the need for taking into account the new dimension of risks along with the traditional dimension of threats, the article reviews the insecurity factors of the Mediterranean region and the lesson learned in the security dialogue of the Barcelona Process. Some proposals about rehearsing that dialogue are advanced in the concluding section.     

Medieval systems of representation

Text Reviewed:

A. J. Gurjewitsch. Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Menschen, Verlag der Kunst, Dresden 1978.     

The Pacific and the Global economy

Abstract

This paper asks: ‘is ASEAN powerful?’ The argument is made that there is a divide over this question between two broad groups of scholars who are referred to as ‘neo-realists’ (including realists) and ‘constructivists’. Focusing attention on this question is useful because it helps to bring into view three, not always explicit, points of argument between constructivists and neo-realists in their assessments of ASEAN. First, the two groups draw different empirically based conclusions about ASEAN's efficacy in East Asian affairs. Neo-realists are generally sceptical about the Association's role in the region because they view it, along with multilateral organizations more generally, as peripheral to great power politicking, what they see as the real stuff and substance of international affairs. A second, conceptual, point of argument is over understandings of power. For neo-realists, power is frequently used interchangeably with force and coercion. Scholars influenced by social constructivist ideas offer a challenge to this equation of power and dominance on the grounds that power is neither necessarily negative-sum nor limited to conflictual situations. Third, we suggest that closely related arguments are marshalled by both sides in debates over ASEAN's future role and organizational structure. Neo-realists argue that a shift to a more rules-based institutional form is in order, while constructivists place their emphasis on identity building.     

Viet Nam’s No-Win Game

正Recent days have witnessed serious violence against foreign investors and businesses in Viet Nam,under the guise of anti-China protests.Victims included investors from China’s mainland,Hong Kong and Taiwan,Singapore and South Korea.A rampage of arson,destruction and looting in and around factories has led to casualties and loss of property.These riots have affected Viet Nam’s international image,     

The Philippines’ Arbitration Pleading Bodes Ill for SouthChina Sea Disputes

正THE Philippines submitted on March 30 a memorial to the arbitral tribunal at The Hague,urging it to invalidate China’s"nine-dash line"in the South China Sea.The Philippines first initiated arbitral proceedings against China over the     

我国地方政府债务的区域差异比较及影响因素分析北大核心SSCI

从债务规模、偿债能力和财政压力三个方面,通过均值法和比较分析方法,对我国东部地区、东北地区、中部地区和西部地区的政府债务进行区域间和区域内比较,结果显示我国地方政府债务风险的区域分布具有很大差异性。主要体现为东部地区负债率低、财政压力小,中部地区偿债能力强,西部地区债务规模增速快,东北地区偿债能力堪忧等区域特征。影响我国地方政府债务空间分布特征的经济因素主要是区域经济体量、经济增速和财政赤字率。地方政府债务监管部门应加强对地方政府债务资金使用的绩效管理,实行区域差异化的债务风险防控措施。     

Exchanges

正Danish Queen Margrethe II Visits China President Xi Jinping held talks with Queen Margrethe II of Denmark in Beijing on April 24,2014.Sino-Danish relations have never been better,said Xi Jinping,on the occasion of the Danish Queen’s visit.China has become Denmark’s largest trade partner in Asia and     

World Leaders' Gatherings: From APEC to G20

正From Beijing to Naypyitaw and then Brisbane,world leaders had a tight schedule from November 7 to 16 that entailed attending several major international conferences in the Asia-Pacific region.On the global stage,Chinese leaders announced the country’s new proposals on international governance.