先秦儒法两家的社会矛盾调处思想及其时代意义

社会矛盾是任何社会形态之下都客观存在的社会现象。先秦时期的春秋战国时代面临着急剧的社会转型和社会变迁,社会矛盾十分激烈突出,因而儒法两家的先哲们从当时的社会矛盾现实状况出发,对社会矛盾的成因及解决之道进行了深入的剖析。＂轴心时代＂的这些中华民族文化的思想智慧,不仅成为此后传统中国社会建立社会矛盾调处机制的思想资源,而且对转型时期当代中国社会矛盾调处机制的建设也具有重要的启示意义。     

THE KIDS' TURN PROGRAM EVALUATION: PROBING CHANGE WITHIN A COMMUNITY‐BASED INTERVENTION FOR SEPARATING FAMILIES

We provide evaluation results for Kids' Turn, a community‐based divorcing parent education program. Based on pre‐ and post‐test results from 61 parents, we found that parents reported improvements over time in interparental conflict, the number of topics parents argue about, parental alienation behaviors, parent anxiety and depression, and children's internalizing behaviors. These changes over time remained after we accounted for child sex, parent and child age, and time since separation. However, we did not observe any change in parenting behaviors. We discuss these results in light of factors influencing the ability of community‐based programs to affect change in families after divorce.     

RAISING THE BAR: WHY SUPERVISED VISITATION PROVIDERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO MEET STANDARDS FOR SERVICE PROVISION

The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC) has provided a supervised visitation program (SVP) for high‐risk families for almost two decades. Parents needing supervised visitation often have histories of domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, mental illness or substance abuse, therefore providers delivering services must be adequately trained and supervised in order to protect the child from further harm during the visitation process. This article describes the need for SVP's, parental issues warranting consideration, the special needs of children in these circumstances, policy recommendations for provider standards, and a certification process to be developed and adopted in New York State.     

Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory,identity, and authority: the contested territorial aspirations of the Banyamulenge in eastern DR Congo

The closely intertwined notions of territory, identity, and authority are at the heart of conflict dynamics in the eastern DR Congo. Focusing on the territorial aspirations of the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu, this article looks at the ways in which the nexus of territory, identity, and authority shapes and is shaped by armed mobilisation. Excluded from a customary chiefdom in the colonial era, the Banyamulenge, a community framed as ‘migrants’, have been striving for a territory of their own for decades. These aspirations have fed into armed activity by both Banyamulenge and Mai-Mai groups linked to opposing communities, providing deeply resonating mobilising narratives that are employed to justify violent action. Yet, as this article demonstrates, the links between armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authority are both contingent and reciprocal, as violent conflict also impacts the meanings and boundaries of identities, authority structures and territory.     

Capability,Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence

Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of extended deterrent threats with different characteristics. We find that defense pacts with more capability and more credibility reduce the probability that a member state will be a target of a militarized dispute. We also find that states can affect the capability and credibility of their extended deterrent threats through alliance design. Members of defense pacts that include higher levels of peacetime military coordination are less likely to be attacked. This analysis provides support for deterrence theory in the context of extended general deterrence. It also provides evidence that should aid policymakers in designing security structures to meet their goals.     

Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set

This article introduces individual-level microdata on victims of violence in Nepal’s civil war (1996–2006). The data being presented in this study are unique in that they are a census—not a sample—of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of analysis is the individual victim, and the data provide information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where they were targeted; their permanent home addresses; the circumstances of the attack (combat, extrajudicial, etc.); socioeconomic information; whether they had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant. After describing the data, an application of the data is performed and some preliminary findings are discussed on the differences in targeting behavior between the government and the Maoist rebels.     

Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Expectations Theory

Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace.     

A Quality of Government Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1985–2001

That democracies do not wage wars against each other is one of the most widely accepted claims within the study of international relations, although challenged lately by the capitalist peace argument. In addition to confirming both the democratic and capitalist peace effects, this article finds that the impact of quality of government—that is, having an impartial, nonpoliticized, and noncorrupt bureaucracy—on the risk of interstate conflict is at least on par with the influence of democracy. This result draws on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data in 1985–2001 and holds even under control for incomplete democratization and economic development, as well as for fatal MIDs, the Cold War era, and within politically relevant dyads. I argue that the causal mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government reduces information uncertainty among potentially warring parties and improves their ability to credibly commit to keeping their promises. Both democratic and capitalist peace theory needs to be complemented by theories “bringing the state back in” to the study of interstate armed conflict.     

You’ve Got to Know When to Fold ‘Em: International and Domestic Consequences of Capitulation, 1919–1999

This article explores the effect of acquiescing to compellent threats on the probability that a leader loses office and on the probability that he or she is targeted in a subsequent international crisis. Using a leader-specific punishment (LSP) model that corrects for the endogeneity between domestic and international politics, an analysis of over 9,000 observations during the period 1919–1999 suggests that backing down generally increases both the risk of becoming a target and the probability of losing office. Leaders who back down to coercive threats without a fight are almost twice as likely to become targets in subsequent crises and much more likely to lose office than those who do not. Democratic leaders are more at risk than their autocratic counterparts for loss of office and becoming targets if they acquiesce to coercive threats.     

Fragmenting states,new regimes: militarized state violence and transition in the Middle East

Scholars working in the transitology tradition assume that authoritarian breakdown leads to movement towards democratization after an initial period of uncertainty. If a transition falls short of democratization, there is an assumption that a return to authoritarian normalcy has transpired. Yet, whether one looks at Egypt, Libya, Syria, or Bahrain, the emergent trend is neither democratization, a return to the old authoritarian order, or a delayed transition. Rather, the weakening and fragmenting of regimes by popular mobilizations stimulated elites’ militarization of the state apparatus and unprecedented levels of state violence against ordinary citizens in a process of regime re-making.