Unpacking Autocracy: Political Regimes and IMF Program Participation

Why do some countries participate in IMF programs while others refuse to do so? We suggest an answer to the question by unpacking one side of the typical democracy–autocracy dichotomy. Specifically, we utilize the growing literature on the varieties of authoritarianism to develop an argument linking the different incentives and constraints that leaders in party-based, personalist, and military regimes face when considering whether to sign agreements with the IMF. Empirically, we demonstrate that distinguishing among autocracies uncovers important variations in the sensitivity of such regimes to the political costs incurred by IMF participation. Party-based autocracies, for instance, respond to both sovereignty costs and the benefits of program participation during severe economic crises. Personalist regimes, however, are not sensitive to the sovereignty costs incurred with IMF participation and thus only participate when doing so provides needed revenue during economic crises. The unique features of military juntas, by contrast, suggests that such regimes are not sensitive to either of these political costs and thus do not respond to economic crises in the same way as their autocratic counterparts.     

The European Union and transnational health policy networks: a case study of interaction with the Global Fund

This article examines the nature of the engagement between the European Union and the Global Fund created to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The authors reveal that in relations between the EU and the Fund, influence is reciprocal although asymmetrical with the EU commanding more leverage. They also contend that the EU considers its engagement with the Global Fund as successful to the extent that the success of this interaction is contingent on the Global Fund's capacity for implementation. They conclude that the relationship between the EU and the Fund will continue for the foreseeable future.     

Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine

Despite rising back to prominence during the global economic turmoil, the International Monetary Fund remains under severe pressure over its lack of legitimacy and effectiveness. It is surrounded by increasingly vibrant and potentially competing systems of regional financial arrangements. But while it is feared that regional arrangements can undermine the global financial order, they can also help buttress the multilateral institutions that are struggling to manage an increasingly complex global economy. The purpose of this article is to draw on trade, exploring the decades-long efforts to ensure compatibilities between regional trade agreements and the multilateral trading system, to offer lessons to financial policymakers.     

统战教学方法孔见

教学方法的基本要义,是针对教者和被教者的互动而采取的一切贯穿教学过程使之效果最佳化的措施。教无常态,法无常形,方无穷尽,运用之妙,存乎一心,显乎人格,体乎人品。     

侦办非法集资案的基本程序及应注意的几个问题

非法集资案件具有涉案人员多、社会影响大、罪与非罪、此罪与彼罪界限不易区分等特点,侦办过程应注意遵循符合其自身特点的程序,坚持以维护社会稳定为首要原则,严格依法办案,各职能部门密切协作。     

New Carrots and Sticks: Proposals for Reform of CPR Part 36

Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules is an important component of English civil procedure's costs apportioning mechanism and its primary means of encouraging early settlement. Two changes to make Part 36 more attractive to defendants have been proposed. Firstly, public and insured defendants would be exempted from the requirement of payment into court. Secondly, the costs protection given to a claimant that betters its Part 36 offer at trial – indemnity costs assessment and enhanced interest – would apply to defendants' offers. It is argued that the payment into court requirement should be abolished. Claimants do not reject settlement offers over doubts as to the defendant's solvency as this risk remains throughout the litigation. The requirement only deters defendants from using Part 36. Awarding indemnity costs under Part 36 creates perverse incentives. Where bettering a Part 36 offer weakens costs scrutiny there is an additional incentive to expend disproportionate resources in achieving a better result.     

冷战后大国关系的调整及其特点

大国地位和大国关系不是一成不变的 ,它随着国际形势的演变而不断变化。冷战以后大国关系与冷战期间相比有许多深刻的变化 ,形成新的特点。当今世界大国关系中一极世界与多极世界之争将是长期的 ;大国之间竞争与合作并存 ,互信、互利、平等、协作的新型关系在一些大国间得到可喜的发展 ;各大国都重视参与各种国际组织的活动 ,在多边外交中谋求更广泛的合作 ,实现各自的战略利益。     

打造中国—东盟自由贸易区升级版的几点建议

本文简单阐述了21世纪海上丝绸之路与中国—东盟自由贸易区的关系、中国—东盟自由贸易区取得的成就和面临的挑战与升级之意义以及中国—东盟自由贸易区升级版的内容,作者提出了打造中国—东盟自由贸易区升级版的几点建议。     

Emerging trends in Asia‐Pacific security: The role of Japan

A multi‐faceted approach, including the efforts (a) to maintain existing security arrangements, (b) to enhance security at the sub‐regional level in Northeast and Southeast Asia, (c) to enhance mutual reassurance among the countries in the region and (d) to deepen region‐wide economic cooperation, is vital for Asia‐Pacific security. Trends in these directions are emerging in the post‐cold war conditions. Japan‐US cooperation will continue to be the key element for the success of this approach. Changes in Japan will have positive implications for it.     

Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF

This paper explores the voting power of hypothetical regional voting blocs in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund. We first discuss the prospect of regionally defined groups becoming more significant in the Fund’s decision-making process. After briefly outlining the IMF’s formal decision procedures, including its weighted voting system, use of special majorities, and the function of voting groups in the Fund’s Executive Board we define three indices of a priori voting power — the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik indices — which are then applied to existing voting groups. Following this we simulate several regionally defined a priori coalitions and their potential to influence outcomes in passing resolutions in the Fund using a simple majority. The coalitions we specify are based on the assumption that members of the IMF will form into voting blocs based on regionally-defined preferences. The procedures employed use existing voting weights to project the relative strengths of alternative regional blocs that could emerge within the IMF. Our results indicate that the United States would have the greatest voting power in almost all scenarios. A voting bloc comprised of European countries, however, would be able to dominate the United States unless the U.S. formed an Asia-Pacific bloc. Japan, the PRC, and other Asian countries appear to be unable to form voting blocs that would provide them with more voting power than the United States.