Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand

Abstract

This article argues that widely used ideas such as bureaucratic polity, constitutional monarchy, transitional democracy and political reform fail to characterize accurately the recent politics of Thailand. Instead, Thai politics are best understood in terms of political networks. The leading network of the period 1973–2001 was centred on the palace, and is here termed ‘network monarchy’. Network monarchy involved active interventions in the political process by the Thai King and his proxies, notably former prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. Network monarchy developed considerable influence, but never achieved the conditions for domination. Instead, the palace was obliged to work with and through other political institutions, primarily the elected parliament. Although essentially conservative, network monarchy also took on liberal forms during the 1990s. Thailand experienced three major legitimacy crises after 1992; in each case, Prem acted on behalf of the palace to restore political equilibrium. However, these interventions reflected the growing weakness of the monarchy, especially following the landslide election victories of prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 and 2005. Thaksin sought to displace network monarchy with new networks of his own devising. This article suggests that conventional understandings of the power of the monarchy need to be rethought.     

Digital evidence from peer-to-peer networks

In this paper we examine the legal aspects of the forensic investigation of peer-to-peer networks. Organisations may encounter instances where employees have used peer-to-peer software for a variety of types of computer misuse including the dissemination of copyrighted materials or indecent images, or instances where peer-to-peer software has been involved in the transmission of malware for malicious or criminal purposes. In this paper we examine the process of the forensic investigation of peer-to-peer networks, and the issues relating to obtaining digital evidence from such peer-to-peer networks.     

关系特质与社会支持——以北京市城市贫困家庭为例

本文考察了城市贫困家庭社会网络的关系特质与其提供的社会支持内容之间的关系。研究发现:在城市贫困家庭的社会关系网络中,家庭经济条件较好者更倾向于提供经济方面的支持,职业声望较高者更倾向于提供就业和经济方面的支持;见面频度与所有支持项目都有显著关系,即见面频度越高,提供支持的可能性越大;在关系类型方面,亲属,特别是近亲,是城市贫困家庭获取多种社会支持的最主要来源。     

ZANU PF politics under Zimbabwe's ‘Power-Sharing’ Government

Using informal network analysis to understand ZANU PF politics, the key significance of the Inclusive Government (IG) is twofold. First, competition between ZANU PF and the ‘opposition’ parties in the IG helps informal networks to cohere sufficiently to run a parallel government that effectively sabotages the IG. Second, the parallel government itself operates to a significant degree through informal networks, further entrenching this form of politics. Informal networks that rely on violence and patronage – or consent and coercion – capture the dynamic shaping contemporary politics in Zimbabwe.     

Is It Who You Know,or How Many That Counts? Criminal Networks and Cost Avoidance in a Sample of Young Offenders

The aim of the current study is to assess whether criminal networks can help young offenders avoid contacts with the criminal justice system. We examine the association between criminal network and cost avoidance specifically for the crime of cannabis cultivation in a rural region in Quebec, Canada. A self‐report delinquency survey, administered to the region's quasi‐population of high‐school students (N = 1,166), revealed that a total of 175 adolescents had participated in the cannabis cultivation industry (a 15% lifetime prevalence rate). Forty‐seven respondents (27%), including 29 who were arrested, reported having participated in a cultivation site that was detected by the police. Results indicate that “who you know” matters in the cultivation industry, and is an important independent predictor of arrest: very few young growers who were embedded in adult networks were apprehended. Conversely, embeddedness in a youth network emerged as an independent risk factor, especially embeddedness in larger networks.     

Establishing Connections: Gender,Motor Vehicle Theft,and Disposal Networks

Motor vehicle theft is an offense typically dominated by male offenders. As with all other major forms of criminal activity that are male dominated, women do participate in the theft of vehicles; yet, few studies have endeavored to examine their involvement in auto theft and even fewer have directly compared women's experiences alongside that of men's. This paper examines the gendered nature of motor vehicle theft through direct comparison of in‐depth interviews with 35 men and women actively involved in auto theft in St. Louis, Missouri. By tracing similarities and differences between men's and women's initiation into auto theft, enactment methods, and access to networks for vehicle and parts' disposal, we provide a contextual analysis of offender's perceptions and behavior. The findings indicate that while initiation into auto theft and property disposal networks are both governed by male gatekeepers, women experience greater barriers in gaining access to disposal networks than they do entry into auto theft offending which, in turn, leads to some key similarities in techniques between men and women.     

The Crime Reduction Effects of Public CCTV Cameras: A Multi‐Method Spatial Approach

Public Closed Circuit TeleVision (CCTV) initiatives have been utilized as methods of monitoring public space for over two decades. Evaluations of these efforts to reduce crime have been mixed. Furthermore, there has been a paucity of rigorous evaluations of cameras located in the USA. In this analysis, crime in the viewshed of publicly funded CCTV cameras in Philadelphia, PA, is examined using two evaluation techniques: hierarchical linear modeling and weighted displacement quotients. An analysis that incorporates controls for long‐term trends and seasonality finds that the introduction of cameras is associated with a 13% reduction in crime. The evaluation suggests that while there appears to be a general benefit to the cameras, there were as many sites that showed no benefit of camera presence as there were locations with a positive outcome on crime. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

What do Alternative Measures of Peer Behavior Tell Us? Examining the Discriminant Validity of Multiple Methods of Measuring Peer Deviance and the Implications for Etiological Models

Deviant behavior tends to be more strongly correlated with respondents’ perceptions of peer deviance than with actual peer deviance. However, research has yet to discern between two interpretations of this finding. On one hand, respondent perceptions of peer deviance may simply be “biased” indicators of actual peer behavior or alternative measures of one’s own deviance. On the other, respondent perceptions and actual peer deviance may reflect fundamentally separate constructs. The present study uses two separate statistical methods to discern the empirical validity of each interpretation. It then illustrates the importance of the measurement results with a series of cross-lagged panel analyses assessing how a researcher’s operationalization of peer deviance impinges upon conclusions about the bidirectional relationship between personal and peer deviance. Measurement results across two separate behavioral domains (property crime and substance use) suggest that actual peer deviance items reflect a construct fundamentally separate from both personal and perceived peer deviance. Likewise, results fail to support the claim that peer deviance items are simply alternative measures of one’s own deviance. Cross-lagged structural equation results are consistent with the notion that personal deviance affects both later perceptions of peer deviance and actual peer deviance. Yet, null or very weak effects of either peer deviance measure on personal deviance are observed. In light of our findings, we discuss the necessity for new theorizing concerning the complex relations among personal behavior, perceived peer behavior, and actual peer behavior.