Foot Patrol in Violent Crime Hot Spots: The Longitudinal Impact of Deterrence and Posttreatment Effects of Displacement

This study revisited the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment and explored the longitudinal deterrent effects of foot patrol in violent crime hot spots using Sherman's (1990) concepts of initial and residual deterrence decay as a theoretical framework. It also explored whether the displacement uncovered during the initial evaluation decayed after the experiment ended. Multilevel growth curve models revealed that beats staffed for 22 weeks had a decaying deterrent effect during the course of the experiment, whereas those staffed for 12 weeks did not. None of the beats had residual deterrence effects relative to the control areas. The displacement uncovered had decayed during the 3 months after the experiment, and it is theoretically plausible that previously displaced offenders returned to the original target areas causing inverse displacement. These results are discussed in the context of Durlauf and Nagin's (2011) recent proposal that prison sentences should be shortened, mandatory minimum statutes repealed, and the cost savings generated by these policy changes shifted into policing budgets to convey more effectively the certainty of detection. It is concluded that if Durlauf and Nagin's proposal is to succeed, then more holistic policing strategies would likely be necessary. Foot patrol as a specific policing tactic seems to fit nicely into a variety of policing paradigms, and suggestions for incorporating them to move beyond strictly enforcement‐based responses are presented.     

World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime

As we head toward the end of the millennium we, as specialists and experts in the field of international criminal justice, must pause to reflect seriously on the issue of global organized crime. Study in this regard requires that more rigorous attention be focused on the future directions of research, the creation of a network of regional and worldwide scholars to perpetuate a collaborative agenda, and data collection for comparison of various activities associated with law enforcement and correctional operations. We must find a more unified systemic approach to crime control. Regardless of whether a nation is large or small, developed or underdeveloped, rich or poor, every society is confronted with the task of controlling organized crime.

Organized crime is indeed a universal phenomenon. It has long been predicted that international organized crime will become a major force in the commercial, financial and military sectors of every country, eventually affecting directly the destiny of all countries. We may soon be confronted with an economic and financial crisis, in that governments everywhere cannot afford to watch events unfold by saying “there is no solution to the problem because it is beyond our ability to control the problem.” We must find a solution.

On June 26, 1995, American President William Clinton, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the United Nations at the ceremony held in San Francisco called for, “Support through the UN of the fight against forces of disintegration from crime syndicates and drug cartels. They cross borders at will. Nations can and must oppose them alone, but we know, and the Cairo Conference reaffirmed, that the most effective opposition requires strong international cooperation and mutual support.”

The original idea for a global high‐level conference on organized crime came from a magistrate who devoted his life to fighting the Mafia, Judge Giovanni Falcone, who died in a bomb attack in May 1992, in Italy. Following Judge Falcon's death, the Minister for Justice in Italy took on the idea of holding this conference in his address to the General Assembly that year. The conference was held in Naples two years later, organized by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the Secretariat of the U.N., under the guidance of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and in accordance with the Economic and Social Council resolution 1993/29 of July 27, 1993, and the recommendation of the Commission was made at the second session. The 142 states represented at the Conference unanimously adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized Transnational Crime, which was later approved by the General Assembly by resolution 49/159 on December 23, 1994.

For further information regarding the topic of international and transnational organized crime and associated issues, see World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, Naples, Italy, United Nations, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, No.26/27, November 1995; speech by President William Clinton on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the U.N., San Francisco, June 26, 1995; A Law Enforcement Source book of Asian Crime and Cultures: Tactic and Mindset, Douglas D. Daye, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1997; Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering: A Handbook for Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators, James R. Richards, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1999; and Global Report on Crime and Justice, by UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Graeme Newman, ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.     

我国区域警务合作机制构建

现在我国的区域警务合作机制不论是在实施的效率、增加合作机会和层次以及警务资源的共享等方面还存在着很多的问题,这就要求我们要从建立新型的合作模式、更新现有的合作手段、转变原有的合作观念等方面努力完善我国的区域警务合作机制,只有这样才能进一步提高我国区域警务合作的工作效率、放大其实际效果,从而实现区域警务合作有效促进系统内部交流合作,控制社会面的目标。     

日本民主党时代的对俄关系及战略性展望

2009年8月,民主党取代了长期垄断日本政坛的自民党,为国内的政治改革送来一缕清新之风。鸠山政权试图摆脱美国对日本的政治束缚,外交政策上强调与东亚国家及地区的合作关系,并暂时缓和了因领土争端而陷入僵局的日俄紧张关系。但是,随着鸠山政权的倒台,以及此后的民主党政权逐渐回归"向美一边倒"的保守主义政治态势,致使日俄领土争端急速升级,双边关系的维系也仅停留于经济窗口的沟通。     

Evolution of the Japanese Political Scene: Toward a Non-Issue-Oriented Two-Party System?

This article examines the nature of the two-party system in Japan. The electoral reform of 1994 has finally led to an alternation of power, but contrary to the predictions of the reformers, the competition between two major Japanese parties is not based on any substantial differences in their political programs. The Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan are mixtures of various groups rather than coherent parties and the main axes of struggle on the Japanese political scene run across party divisions. Both major parties are internally divided with regard to economic as well as defense policy. The most important factor of Democratic Party of Japan's identity has been the goal of achieving an alternation of power and abolishing the Liberal Democratic Party style of policymaking. Nevertheless, the discourse on political renewal has been undertaken also by the Liberal Democratic Party. While the struggle between the partisans and the opponents of Koizumi reforms continues in the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Japan is torn apart between the proponents of ‘big’ and ‘small’ government.     

The Impact of Rural Votes in Foreign Policies: The FTA Policies under the DPJ Government in Japan

The recent trend of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) has pressured the governments of many countries to make such arrangements with their trade partners. Since its foundation in 1998, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has advocated free trade policies, partly because the party was an urban-based party. Thus, many expected that, when the DPJ assumed power in 2009, it would implement free trade policies as it had promised in the past. However, the DPJ government failed to deliver on its promise after spending three and a half years in office. It contrasts sharply with the Korean government under the leadership of Lee Myung-bak, which managed to conclude FTAs with its major trade partners, including the United States and the European Union. Both governments' free trade policies faced strong opposition from the agricultural industry, as farmers in Japan and Korea lacked international competitiveness. What explains the reasons why the Japanese government has been struggling to implement its free trade policies, while its Korean counterpart succeeded in signing a number of FTAs? Focusing primarily on the case of Japan and using the Korean case as reference, this study tries to provide an explanation for this puzzle by analyzing the impact of rural votes in the policy-making process.     

Democracy and the multinationals

The relationship between western multinational corporations' perceived commercial interests and democratic quality in developing markets is more varied than habitually argued. While autocratic policy making and low-intensity democracy have been judged to provide benefits to investors, they are also increasingly recognized to generate features prejudicial to commercial operations. Many investment trends reflect the adverse impact of democratic limitations in developing markets. Multinational companies can be faulted less for a uniform effort to frustrate democratic improvements than for a failure to develop a coherent or proactive engagement in relation to the international democracy promotion agenda.     

Democratic innovation beyond deliberative reflection: the plebiscitary rebound and the advent of action-oriented democracy

This article investigates democratic innovations of a plebiscitary and action-oriented type that diverge from a predominantly transformative and reflective definition of democratic innovation. Conceptually, the article offers a balanced, extended framework that serves to recognize and understand a range of democratic innovations that includes non-deliberative besides deliberative models and methods. Empirically, the article offers a closer look at three exemplary cases focusing on the rebound of aggregative democracy through the (quasi-)referendum, the advent of collaborative democratic governance through concerted action, and of do-it-ourselves democracy through pragmatic activism. Ultimately, the article calls for a practice and theory of democratic innovation aware of and sensitive to the reality of democratic hybridization.     

The legislature and agenda politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of authoritarian and democratic regimes in South Korea

The article mainly seeks to explain the legislature’s preferences in social welfare before and after democratization using South Korea as a case study. Based on an original dataset that consists of all executive and of legislative branch-submitted bills between 1948 and 2016 – roughly 60,000– legislative priority on social welfare is compared over time, and tested using logistic regressions. The key focus of analysis is whether and how the level of democracy affected the degree and universality of social welfare priority. The findings show that the promotion of social welfare is positively related to higher levels of democracy in a continuous fashion, which clearly points to the need to avoid applying a simple regime dichotomy – authoritarian or democratic – when seeking to understand social welfare development. Going further, the article examines the legislature's priority in welfare issues within a presidential structure and under majoritarian electoral rule, at different levels of democracy. The result shows that the higher levels of democracy are, the more the legislative branch contributes to the overall salience of social welfare legislative initiatives as compared to the executive branch. Moreover, the legislative branch itself prioritizes a social welfare agenda – alongside democratic deepening – over other issues.     

发挥民主党派对权力运行的监督作用

民主党派对共产党的权力运行进行监督既是民主党派的重要职能,也是多党合作的重要形式。针对民主党派对权力运行监督中存在的主要问题,我们要提高民主党派的政党意识,健全对权力运行的监督机制,增加民主党派担任实职的机会。只有充分发挥民主党派对权力运行的监督作用,才能让权力在阳光下运行,才能正确用好权力这把"双刃剑"。