Does regulating remuneration affect the market value of European Union banks? Large versus small/medium sized banks

The aim of this paper was to analyze equity market reactions to the mandatory European Union regulation of remuneration policies in financial institutions. Using event study methodology, we investigated market reactions to the first European Directive on compensation policies after the financial crisis using a sample of 124 banks operating in the European Union. We divided the sample into two groups according to bank size considering four criteria: the US Dodd‐Frank Act 2010, the Liikanen Report 2012, Global Systemically Important Banks 2011, and the European Central Bank 2014. We found strong evidence of an average negative market reaction to compensation regulation. Moreover, this negative reaction is stronger for large banks than for small/medium sized banks.     

The impact of EU intervention on political parties’ politicisation of Europe following the financial crisis

Abstract

This article examines the effect of the financial crisis and economic intervention by the European Union on political parties’ politicisation of the EU within national elections. Data from the Manifesto Project for elections between 2002 and 2017 in 12 Eurozone countries is used to assess how the crisis and intervention altered the saliency, position and clarity of parties’ EU policies. The analysis shows that the crisis only led to an increase in EU saliency in those states not subjected to intervention whilst intervention is actually associated with a decrease in the saliency of the EU. In terms of increasing Euroscepticism, intervention appears to exhibit a greater effect than the crisis although the results display marked asymmetry between different parties on the left and right. The same is observed to be the case for the level of blurring that parties are engaged in to mask their EU positions. The implications of the findings suggest that economic intervention within the EU has negatively impacted democracy in intervened-in member states by reducing the manoeuvrability of parties to provide voters with clear choices on the direction of European integration.     

Tracing leadership: the ECB’s ‘whatever it takes’ and Germany in the Ukraine crisis

Abstract

Political scientists face problems when assessing a leader’s impact: how can we know that a policy outcome or institutional change is caused by leadership? This article argues that in addition to relying on comparisons and counterfactuals, we need to trace the causal mechanisms by which leadership affects outcomes. Therefore, the article proposes a way to trace leadership and applies it to two cases of EU crisis management: the European Central Bank’s role in announcing Outright Monetary Transactions in the eurozone crisis, and Germany’s role in shaping the EU’s response to the Ukraine crisis. Systematic process-tracing shows that both actors provided leadership ‘by default’. However, while the ECB had to combine the provision of knowledge with unilateral action in order to overcome the eurozone crisis, Germany could use manifold bargaining-based strategies and thus became the EU’s de facto agenda setter and main representative in managing the Ukraine crisis.