Effect on Eyewitness Accuracy When Witnesses Are Told versus Not Told That They Will Be Allowed a Second Viewing

Lindsay, Lea, and Fulford (J Appl Psychol 76:741–745, 1991) found that false identifications increased, correct rejections decreased, and correct identifications minimally increased when witnesses were allowed a second viewing of a sequential lineup. We conducted a similar study in which we allowed mock witnesses a second viewing of a sequential lineup. Results indicated that participants who were allowed a second viewing made mostly incorrect identifications. Participants correctly identified the perpetrator more often when they were not told in advance that they would have a second viewing than when they were told. Additionally, those participants who were told that they would be allowed a second viewing incorrectly rejected the lineup more often than those who were not told. The findings yielded conclusions similar to those of Lindsay et al. (J Appl Psychol 76:741–745, 1991) suggesting that witnesses should not be allowed to view the lineup a second time. The results also suggest that, if a repeated lineup is used, witnesses should not be informed of that in advance.     

Judging guilt and accuracy: highly confident eyewitnesses are discounted when they provide featural justifications

Jurors are heavily swayed by confident eyewitnesses. Are they also influenced by how eyewitnesses justify their level of confidence? Here we document a counter-intuitive effect: when eyewitnesses identified a suspect from a lineup with absolute certainty (‘I am completely confident’) and justified their confidence by referring to a visible feature of the accused (‘I remember his nose’), participants judged the suspect as less likely to be guilty than when eyewitnesses identified a suspect with absolute certainty but offered an unobservable justification (‘I would never forget him’) or no justification at all. Moreover, people perceive an eyewitness’s identification as nearly 25% less accurate when the eyewitness has provided a featural justification than an unobservable justification or simply no justification. Even when an eyewitness’s level of confidence is clear because s/he has expressed it numerically (e.g. ‘I am 100% certain’) participants perceive eyewitnesses as not credible (i.e. inaccurate) when the eyewitness has provided a featural justification. However, the effect of featural justifications – relative to a confidence statement only – is maximal when there is an accompanying lineup of faces, moderate when there is a single face and minimal when there is no face at all. The results support our Perceived-Diagnosticity account.     

Influences of accent and ethnic background on perceptions of eyewitness testimony

Abstract

The purpose of the present work was to investigate the effect two eyewitness factors, accent and ethnic background, have on the perceived favorability of eyewitness testimony and case disposition in criminal trials. Six variations of testimony were created and videotaped. The videotapes varied by accent and ethnic background of the eyewitness; the testimony text was identical. Four eyewitness favorability variables, (a) credibility, (b) judgment of accuracy, (c) deceptiveness, and (d) prestige, as well as their relationship to case disposition, were measured. One hundred and seventy-four undergraduate participants viewed one of the six videotapes. Results indicate that there was a significant main effect of accent for the four eyewitness favorability variables. Accent by ethnic background interactions also yielded significant findings for the four variables as well as for the defendant's degree of guilt. Results were interpreted using the Elaboration Likelihood Model. The potential importance of these results for judicial settings is discussed.     

Co-witnesses talk: A survey of eyewitness discussion

Abstract

The objective of this study was to obtain a quantitative measure of the discussion behaviour of real eyewitnesses. Undergraduate psychology students were given a questionnaire to determine if they had witnessed a serious event. Results from the questionnaire showed that the majority of respondents had witnessed a serious event at some point in their lives, and the majority of witnesses were not alone when they observed the event. Respondents who had experienced a serious event for which there was more than one witness present were invited to fill out a follow-up questionnaire. The follow-up study showed that when there is a co-witness present, most people (86%) report discussing the event with the co-witness. This is potentially problematic if the witnesses are contaminating one another's memories of the event. The results are discussed in terms of psychological research and policy implications.     

目击辨认中被辨认犯罪嫌疑人权利问题探析

刑事诉讼法关于目击辨认制度各方面的规定比较粗疏、操作性差．尤其是被辨认犯罪嫌疑人的相关权利的缺失以及难以得到充分的、有效的保障。可借鉴域外两大法系尤其是英美两国的相关成熟的做法和经验，并在此基础上综合考虑我国的传统法律文化、诉讼制度、经济发展水平、侦讯技术水平等因素，弥补、完善我国刑事诉讼相关法律这方面的不足．以求达到目击辨认程序中控辩双方的大体平衡。     

宪法权利视角下的美国目击者辨认证据规则

自1967年的United States v．Wade案开始，美国最高法院逐步发展出目击者辨认证据（排除）规则。在各时期主流司法理念的影响下，律师帮助权和正当程序权利这两项宪法权利共同见证着该规则盛极而衰的历史演变。尽管正当程序正经受国际化浪潮的影响，但是却受到当前美国主流司法理念的抑制．于是很难再产生一次新的“革命”，目击者辨认证据规则的这一重要理论基础从而也大为削弱。该规则很难再单纯地继续因循修补加完善的传统套路，而是同时需要另辟蹊径采取成文法化的路径来规制辨认程序．这是美国司法界目前及未来面临的一项重要课题。     

Are accurate witnesses more likely to make absolute judgments?

The present study tested the Two-Judgment Theory of Eyewitness Identification Accuracy. Specifically, the extent to which participants were able to engage in an absolute judgment strategy was manipulated by varying the time available to view a lineup. Providing a limited exposure to a lineup should “interrupt” decision making, whereby witnesses can only engage a relative strategy, thus leading to higher false positive responding given a target-absent lineup. Seventy-four adults viewed a 1-minute video that exposed them to an unknown target and subsequently viewed the lineup for a limited (2 s) or an unlimited amount of time. Although false positive rates were similar across conditions, accurate witnesses were more confident than inaccurate witnesses. Confidence was negatively correlated with response latency such that witnesses who took more time to make a decision were less confident in their decisions compared to witnesses who made more rapid decisions. Response latency did not differ for accurate and inaccurate witnesses. Limitations and suggestions for future research on the Two-Judgment Theory are discussed.