Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments

Over 30 years ago, Eric Browne and Mark Franklin demonstrated that parties in a coalition tend to receive portfolio payoffs in almost perfect proportionality to their seat share. Even though this result has been confirmed in several studies, few researchers have asked what the underlying mechanism is that explains why parties receive a proportional payoff. The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanism linking party size and portfolio payoffs. To fulfil this aim, a small-n analysis is performed. By analysing the predictions from a statistical analysis of all post-war coalition governments in 14 Western European countries, two predicted cases are selected, the coalitions that formed after the 1976 Swedish election and the 1994 German election. In these case studies two hypotheses are evaluated: that the proportional distribution of ministerial posts is the result of a social norm, and that parties obtain payoffs according to their bargaining strength. The results give no support to the social norm hypothesis. Instead, it is suggested that proportionality serves as a bargaining convention for the actors involved, thus rendering proportional payoffs more likely.     

Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining

Charge bargaining is a potentially important form of discretion in criminal sentencing that is obscured in many studies of sentencing outcomes. Our procedure to measure the difference in sentencing outcomes caused by plea bargain emphasizes the amount, in months, that the sentence length is reduced. Using this measure, we compare prosecutorial discretion across counties in two different states. We conclude that charge bargaining plays an empirically important role in determining sentencing outcomes. Furthermore, we find that measuring the distance (in months of prison time) moved during a charge bargain may provide a very different estimate of the discretion than is given by the rate of bargaining, which is the usual measure used. Although the rate of charge bargaining was higher in the voluntary guidelines state, its impact on sentences was greater in the presumptive guidelines jurisdiction, as predicted by Reitz (1998). We further observe a dramatic difference in predictions from shifting the case characteristics underlying the summary measure. This result reveals that distributional differences (either due to the underlying criminal activity or due to the overall level of severity of punishment) can easily obscure the inferences necessary for understanding the operation of the systems. Our finding of differential charge bargaining in these two jurisdictions should provide a caution when comparing the results of studies of disparity in sentencing across jurisdiction types.

浅析辩诉交易制度及其在我国的确立

辩诉交易是美国刑事诉讼文化的重要组成部分。有高效、实用、民主等特色。当今世界各国都面临着社会犯罪压力巨大和司法资源有限的两难处境，众多国家，包括一部分大陆法系国家转而借鉴美国的辩诉交易制度，并在实践工作中取得了良好效果。在社会转型时期，中国具备了适用辩诉交易制度的司法环境，建立一套适应我国国情的行之有效的、具有中国特色的辩诉交易制度是极为重要的。     

Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining

Plea bargaining has become a central feature of criminal procedure in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. This paper explores an area seldom discussed in the economic literature on plea bargaining: the influence of the defence lawyer's fee contract on the terms of the bargain. In particular, it uses data from one jurisdiction of the impact on case trajectories of changes in publicly funded defence lawyers’ contracts to test the proposition that the nature of the lawyer's contract influences how cases are managed. An event study methodology on a pooled time-series cross-section data set of case trajectories before and after the change in the nature of the contract is used to examine whether the new payment regime significantly changed the trajectories of cases through the summary criminal justice system. Overall the results seem to suggest that the behaviour of defence lawyers may be influenced by financial incentives. This implies that the terms of plea bargains reached between prosecution and defence lawyers may be affected by the defence lawyer's remuneration contract. Consequently, the authors conclude that the role of defence lawyers has been under-researched in the literature on the economics of plea bargaining.     

Unanimity and exposure in the EU Council of Ministers – or how the Dutch won and lost the ICTY debate

How are unanimity negotiations commonly settled in the EU Council of Ministers? Important contributions have been made to our understanding of the ‘consensual’ decision‐making dynamics in the Council, but most studies focus on explaining the sheer absence of votes in legislative decision making under the qualified majority rule. This study seeks to explain how vetoes are averted, or curtailed, in unanimity decision making. These unanimity negotiations are explained as attempts to induce or prevent high‐level exposure. The degree of exposure in turn depends on the degree of lower level contestation. A process tracing analysis of one prolonged debate is performed from the perspective of one Member State – the Netherlands – which played a very prominent obstructing role. By analysing when, why and where (at what level) the Dutch won or lost, one can come closer to understanding the dynamic interplay between the different Council levels.     

Collective Bargaining in the Twenty-First Century: A Negotiations Institution at Risk

Collective bargaining, a core social institution, faces a fundamental transformational challenge. National survey data provide unique insights into the current status of the bargaining process — revealing challenges and opportunities. Awareness and use of interest-based bargaining principles is widespread but complicated by underlying tensions between labor and management. The findings illustrate the value of conducting an institutional-level analysis of a negotiations process.     

我国刑事特别程序之取舍——从诉讼效率的角度

刑事特别程序是当今刑事诉讼制度建构中的一种发展趋势,它实现了诉讼效率的价值目标。我国的刑事司法制度改革也在摸索之中。辩诉交易和普通程序简易审的形式应运而生。通过对西方国家刑事特别程序实践的介绍以及对我国相关方面司法改革现状的分析,可以看到在我国建立刑事特别程序、重建简易审判程序有其必要性与可行性。     

浅析“刑事和解”制度

刑事和解"作为一种新型的刑事诉讼纠纷解决机制,它是应时代的发展产生的较为人性化、注重人道主义、适度宽松灵活、诉讼成本低廉的现代纠纷解决制度。它不同于"辩诉交易""恢复性司法"等相近的制度,是社会转型时期新型矛盾层出不穷时的一种制度。它在带给轻微刑事案件更加便捷处理方式的同时,也可能因为没有立法对此制度的规定,侵害着其他的法益。本文就针对此制度在实践中的适用及使用过程中呈现出的弊端提出相应的完善建议,以期为制度改革完善提供参考。     

Labor Market Institutions and Outward Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries

ABSTRACT

Concern among voters in the United States and elsewhere about jobs moving overseas has spurred significant research into outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), which can depress employment and economic growth. Recent research shows that labor market institutions play a prominent role in influencing inward foreign direct investment in developed economies, but little is known about how such institutions influence OFDI. We argue that increasing labor union density or centralized wage bargaining threatens firms’ profitability and thus leads to higher OFDI flows. Yet union density and coordination of wage setting moderate each other’s effect on OFDI since firms can expect wage moderation, fewer strikes, and labor skill protection that offset labor costs. Our tests using data on 27 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries between 1971 and 2013 suggest this is the case. The findings indicate that a highly stable and institutionalized labor market can lead firms to stay and to return if they have left.     

Empowering Students to Create and Claim Value through the Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument

In a world of problem‐solving lawyering, principled negotiation, and integrative bargaining, to describe a negotiation as “distributional” may strike some as heretical. Still, we disserve our students if we ignore distributional bargaining altogether. Unfortunately, many law students who are drawn to negotiation classes bring with them a fundamental discomfort with claiming value. Contrary to the stereotypes that attribute aggression and “sharp practices” to lawyers, many law students struggle to become more assertive. The Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) is one tool that I have found can help raise students' awareness of, and comfort with, the reflexive responses to conflict that can impede their attempts to claim as well as create value in negotiation. The insights students gain from taking the TKI can be quickly put to use in the next negotiation role play. Although it may help students realize their dominant response to conflict, the TKI highlights that no single approach to negotiation is always best. Thus, the TKI can both encourage the reticent to claim more value in negotiation and suppress the seemingly insatiable appetites for value claiming that drive other students. When administering the TKI, I encourage students to learn at least four major lessons:

• 1 A negotiator has a choice in resolving the dilemma between value claiming and value creating. We are not just stuck with our reflexes.
• 2 Still, it is good to know what our reflexive response to conflict is likely to be so that we are more mindful of the choices as we make them.
• 3 Departing from reflexes requires energy: preparation, planning, mindfulness, and conscious effort.
• 4 Adaptability is desirable. A well‐integrated negotiator might move from one TKI “type” to another as a negotiation progresses.

In this article, I seek to give a very brief overview of the ways I have used the TKI to convey these lessons, increasing students' comfort with, and management of, value claiming. To this end, the article will describe the TKI, explain how I administer and debrief the students' encounter with it, and point out some potential pitfalls of this process.