论辩诉交易对反贪工作之借鉴

在贪污贿赂等职务犯罪案件的侦查起诉工作中引入辩诉交易制度,可以加大反贪力度,达到遏制和预防腐败的目的。首先是辩诉交易的概念与特征;其次,引入辩诉交易可以从体现司法公正性、完善司法豁免体系和提高司法效益;最后是引入辩诉交易后的司法上如何运作及应遵循的主要原则。     

对英国集体谈判制度形成过程的历史考察

英国是资本主义的先行者,也是最早成立工会、最早进行集体谈判的国家。随着工人运动的发展,英国的集体谈判也经历了萌芽、非法到合法的过程,并形成了独特的传统：自由放任。这一传统既是英国资本主义经济政治特征的体现,也是工人与资本家斗争的结果,对英国劳资关系的发展有着深远影响。     

群体劳动争议的隐患与预防实证研究

企业群体劳动争议数量逐年上升,而我国对群体劳动争议的名称、法律规定、行为结果乃至预防制度大都模糊不清。针对劳动关系市场化进程中日益激烈的劳资矛盾,集体协商机制的健全愈发显得有效而重要。观察我国几项典型群体劳动争议的前因后果,研究企业、劳动者、社会共存共亡的发展规律,重新构建集体协商谈判机制、完善工会权责制度、用法律手段处理群体劳动争议,以降低其负面影响的长效机制显得尤为必要。     

Dividing the Oils: Dynamic Bargaining as Policy Formation in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry

In academic studies of the interface between developing countries and large multinational oil corporations, scholars have noted that over time and through repeated interaction, the developing countries tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves: they progress along a learning curve by incrementally improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction. This phenomenon can be demonstrated in a number of oil-rich developing countries. Nigeria's case, however, is more complex. During the two decades following its independence, the state successfully negotiated for more control over—made strides in the developing of the skills necessary to manage—its petroleum industry, as our model would predict. Then, in a puzzling late-1970s-to-mid-1980s change of course, the government abruptly gave back concessions, undermined local entrepreneurial endeavors, and repealed indigenization laws. This paper combines, in the analytic narrative tradition, the case study method with an extensive form game; it applies a dynamic bargaining model to Nigeria's historical experience, demonstrating that Nigeria improved its outcomes and ascended along the "bargaining learning curve," only to reverse policy and "unlearn," with serious consequences for the Nigerian population. Even so, the demonstration of both successful and improved outcomes in past negotiations give evidence that Nigeria could once again ascend its bargaining learning curve if the government were to re-commit to such a policy.     

Between Denmark and Detroit: unionized labour at Ford Motor Company,Copenhagen, 1919–1939

In 1919, Ford Motor Company established its first assembly plant on the European mainland in Copenhagen, Denmark. Based on a Fordist productive model, including technology and materials from Detroit, cars were manufactured and exported to most of Northern Europe. It has been claimed that Ford also transferred its principles of industrial relations to Europe, including a ban on trade unions. But as the article demonstrates, the Copenhagen factory was completely unionized, and the unions were able to establish collective bargaining for a period. On the other hand, several factors, including internal splits among the workers caused by the Fordist production methods, worked against the unions over time. The end result was a hybrid between Detroit methods and Danish traditions of industrial relations. The changing character of this hybrid is traced through the shifting relations of power between unions, local management and the Ford Motor Company.     

Art of the Power Deal: The Four Negotiation Roles of Donald J. Trump

In this article, I mine President Donald Trump’s considerable writing and speaking record to synthesize the key elements of his deal‐making approach to help make better sense of his rhetoric and actions on the world’s diplomatic stage. My argument is that Trump’s coercive negotiation style is best understood through the prism of his four public roles: observer, performer, controller, and disrupter. In this article, I analyze how these roles translate into his negotiating behavior. Spotting and exploiting vulnerability is his trade; leverage and bravado are his tools. After assessing the opposing side, Trump uses leverage to threaten his counterparts’ weaknesses, while using bravado to play up the advantages of reaching an agreement on his terms. This way, he presents a drastic structured choice to his opponents, leaving them the least maneuvering space. In the final section of the paper, I illustrate how the four‐role framework helps explain Trump’s decisions in the nuclear negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. I also consider opportunities for further research.     

“一带一路”视角下的工会问题研究

"一带一路"倡仪实施以来,如何与当地工会合作是中资企业在"一带一路"沿线国家投资和经营管理中,在劳动关系方面必须面临的重要问题之一。"一带一路"沿线国家工会特点明显,差异很大。中东欧国家工会组织率高,集体谈判覆盖率也高;东南亚国家工会组织率相对较低,但组织力量很强。工会与其他非政府组织的各自力量、相互关系也不尽相同,中东欧地区工会组织强大,雇主联合会也强大;西亚北非地区工会组织力量弱,但有其他非政府组织代行部分工会职能。因此,应该从遵守工会相关法律制度,提升对构建和谐劳动关系重要性的认识,找到与东道国工会恰当的合作模式,避免简单移植等方面出发,提高中资企业与当地工会合作的能力。     

Plea bargaining and appraisals of eyewitness evidence by prosecutors and defense attorneys

A sample of defense attorneys and prosecutors from matched California counties participated in a two-part study. Study 1A reports the results of a survey regarding how influential each of the 17 eyewitness factors is in affecting the accuracy of real eyewitness identifications. Generally, both attorney groups considered all eyewitness factors to be influential; on only 6 of the 17 factors were defense attorneys more likely than prosecutors to provide higher importance ratings. In Study 1B, the attorneys answered questions regarding their willingness to plea bargain after reading each of four scenarios in which (1) same- versus cross-race identification and (2) whether the perpetrator was familiar were experimentally manipulated. Both eyewitness factors influenced plea bargaining decisions, and effects were generally consistent for both attorney groups. Results confirm that plea bargaining decisions at least by defense attorneys are made ‘in the shadow of the trial,’ and that appraisals of the strength of eyewitness evidence play a significant role in these decisions.     

Parties' Influence during Government Policy Negotiations: Parliamentary Dynamics and Spatial Advantages in the First Italian Republic

As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing the cabinet bargaining process, although they do not necessarily shape its outcome to the same extent. Being a member of the invested government, for example, should increase the leverage a party enjoys when bargaining over the cabinet programme. Nevertheless, depending on institutional and political conditions, non-cabinet parties may also play a role in affecting cabinet policy positions. Despite being widely recognised in the theoretical literature, this point has received considerably less attention in empirical studies. By focusing on cabinet bargaining outcomes during the First Italian Republic, the article shows that spatial advantages associated with parliamentary dynamics, including those possessed by non-cabinet parties, can be no less significant in capturing policy payoffs than government membership, even after controlling for other relevant institutional and behavioural factors.