Crises of confidence: Rhetorical constraints for incumbent party successors

Crises of confidence have plagued the American presidency since the introduction of television into the political sphere. Recognizing from previous research that unpopular incumbents use rhetoric in an effort to regain their credibility, this study looks at these rhetorical choices to see how they constrain or provide opportunities for the incumbent party's successors. Specifically, the study looks at the rhetoric surrounding instances where presidents have dropped 20 points in Gallup approval ratings within the last two years of their terms.

The study reveals that an unpopular incumbent's interest in regaining the public's faith is frequently at odds with his successor's interests. Incumbents need to remove themselves as the cause of the crisis, convince the public that they have the solution to the problem, and bide enough time to affect the situation. These choices tend to constrain the simplicity, flexibility, and timeliness of the successor's choices for rhetorically resolving the crises.     

*美国与伊朗在阿富汗的共同利益与利益矛盾

阿富汗战争前,伊朗就一直视塔利班为敌人。“9·11”事件是由被塔利班所庇护的基地组织所为,因而塔利班也成了美国的敌人。反对塔利班是美伊两国在阿富汗的共同利益。阿富汗的毒品交易在塔利班政权倒台后愈益猖獗,它继续支撑着塔利班的生存并严重威胁到伊朗的边境安全,也对美国重建阿富汗的努力构成重大挑战。反对毒品交易是美伊两国在阿富汗的又一共同利益。美伊两国在阿富汗的第三个共同利益是阿富汗的安全与发展。但是,美伊两国的对阿富汗政策是基于它们相互关系及各自的地区乃至全球战略。因此,两国在阿富汗存有巨大的利益矛盾,这使两国在阿富汗的共同利益难以导致两国的切实合作。     

不扩散全球治理:现实主义视角

在全球化时代,民族国家奉行主权防务的传统没有改变。基于现实主义的视角,所有大规模毁伤性武器的扩散主要都有安全动因的驱动,解决扩散问题必须提供可信的替代安全产品,集体防御以及合作安全都具有这种功效。霸权可能导致一时的稳定,但更会引起大规模毁伤性武器扩散所带来的长期性的不稳定。同时,扩散不仅容易产生地区失稳,它也不无平衡霸权从而产生新的稳定。然而所有个体的理性,未必保证系统的整体理性。在平衡国家安全和国际安全之间,经由全球治理来交换国家安全利益从而促使人类社会分享更为普遍的安全,乃是一种更为理想的出路。     

Critics Within: Islamic Scholars' Protests Against the Islamic State in Iran

Islamic scholarship, in Iran and elsewhere, has a long tradition of debate and critique. This tradition has come to pose a challenge to the constitutional order of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a number of seminary-trained scholars have applied their critical methods to basic issues of state legitimacy, in particular the state's right to insist on interpretive closure. The regime has responded with force, convening special clergy courts to silence and imprison scholars, in violation of seminary norms of scholarly debate. These conspicuous acts of discipline seem to have backfired, as each escalating punishment has generated new critics within.     

沙特什叶派问题探析

沙特什叶派政治地位低下,经济大多贫困,并遭到多种歧视和限制。自现代沙特建国后,什叶派中间长期没有出现有组织的反政府活动。在1979—1980年之交,什叶派两度发起大规模抗议活动,迫使沙特王室调整政策,什叶派的经济状况有所改善。20世纪90年代初,什叶派反对派与沙特王室实现和解。以和平形式促使政府进行改革,成为什叶派改善处境的主要途径。然而,除非修正瓦哈比主义,什叶派问题不可能获得根本解决,而伊拉克战争引发的教派冲突则为这一问题增添了新的变数。     

Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's Economic Role: The Case of Iran

It is commonly believed that Islamic fundamentalism is responsible for the low female employment rate in the Middle East and North Africa. I earlier presented evidence from Indonesia indicating that the deteriorating conditions of women's economic role in the 1990s was related to the economic circumstances of the Asian Crisis, not to the rise of political Islam (Bahranitash, 2002). In fact, in Indonesia, increasing support for the Islamic movement was itself spurred by the Asian Crisis. As a contrasting case, I here examine Iran, a country where political Islam has been in power for over two decades. If commonly held views about the impact of the Islamic religion on female employment were true, one would expect a steady or sharp decline of the female employment rate in postrevolutionary Iran. The empirical data show the reverse. Women's formal employment rates increased in the 1990s and did so much faster than they had during the 1960s and 1970s, when a pro-Western secular regime was in power. This sharp increase in women's employment seriously challenges the view that religion explains women's economic status in Muslim countries. The evidence from Iran indicates that the situation of women's employment there has followed a common pattern of elsewhere in the South—an overall increase in female employment. This fact then suggests that the forces of international political economy, rather than religion, appear to be a determining factor in the state of women's economic role in Iran.     

Bread and justice in Qajar Iran: the moral economy,the free market and the hungry poor

In 1971, E. P. Thompson published a seminal article on eighteenth century English bread riots which was to become a foundational text for the study of such protests. Challenging older elite notions of the irrationality, illegitimacy and even criminality of the ‘mob’, Thompson situated popular direct action in times of food crises within a very specific historical, economic and, most importantly, cultural context. This context produced a deeply held adhesion among the poor to the concept of a ‘moral economy’ and an equally profound rejection of the free market as enshrined in the new political economy of the eighteenth century. This article returns to Thompson's original text in order to assess to what extent his paradigm may be useful in understanding bread riots in Iran. In particular, it examines the evidence which supports the notion that Iran experienced a ‘golden age’ of bread riots in the 1890s and early 1900s, just before and indeed contributing to the outbreak of the constitutional revolution.     

Iran's Tortuous Path Toward “Islamic Liberalism”

This article provides an overview of the intellectual and sociopolitical roots of Iran's tortuous path toward Islamic liberalism and reform. It analyzes the shift in the ideological orientation of a major faction within the political elite from a radical to a relatively moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam. The authors trace the roots of this ideological shift to a series of political developments since the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 1979, including various failures of the revolutionary regime to fulfill its populist and egalitarian promises; a considerable erosion in the legitimacy of the ruling clerics; the successful (though largely silent) resistance of the youth and women against the culturally restrictive policies of the Islamic Republic; the rise of a distinctly anti-fundamentalist, liberal-reformist interpretation of Islam by a number of Iranian theologians and religious intellectuals; and the precipitous decline in the popularity of revolutionary ideas in the 1990s. In spite of the increasing appeal of liberal-democratic ideas of individual freedom, pluralism, and political tolerance in the new reform movement and the overwhelming endorsement of these ideas in four recent national elections, including two presidential polls, the authors argue that the movement has had but a limited and, for the most part symbolic, influence on Iran's objective, and still repressive, political conditions.