泰南冲突的文明模式

泰南冲突是文明冲突的典型例子.为研究泰南冲突的文明模式,本文基于塞缪尔·亨廷顿的文明冲突论,并对亨氏断层线战争的一般结构模式进行借鉴和修正,提出泰南宗教与民族冲突的文明模式,认为泰南冲突是冲突双方都没有文明核心国家的宗教与民族冲突.该模式提供了将冲突控制在最小范围和最低烈度、避免升级为国际战争的方法,可以为其它类型的文明冲突提供思维方式和参考模型.     

Unveiling The Headscarf Debate

In March 2004 the French parliament controversially adopted legislation regulating the wearing of symbols indicating religious affiliation in public educational establishments. This note discusses several features of the new law indicating its origins, its rationale and its position within French constitutional discourse on religious freedom and secularity. It is based on a panel discussion held in April 2004 within the Gender Studies Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. Placing the French legislative initiative in the context of recent developments in national and European case law (suggesting clear limitations to freedom of religion), the note explores the complexity of issues of gender, identity and difference in the present debate, especially when considered in the light of reactions to the law in Islamic countries.     

印度尼西亚伊斯兰教政党的崛起及其发展前景

伊斯兰教政党的崛起是后苏哈托时代印度尼西亚政局出现的重要变化之一,标志着印尼政党制度进一步走向完善和成熟。但由于历史和现实种种因素的影响,在未来短时间内伊斯兰教政党还不太可能在该国政治舞台上发挥主导作用。本文分析了印尼伊斯兰教政党的发展历程和未来前景,对其在印尼政治民主化进程中的影响和作用进行了初步探讨。     

Translation and ideology

This article attempts to investigate, in depth, the concept of ideology in translation. That is to say, the extent to which ideology can influence the translator's style and choice of words that will, consequently, shape the receivers’ worldviews. In recent years the issue of ideological leanings and the implications of ideology on translation have received particular attention. Owing to the importance of this issue of ideology, and as an example of the issues that both the translating practitioner and theorist must deal with, this article provides a detailed, comparative analysis of a translation of the first, formal speech delivered by bin Laden on 7 October 2001 concerning the events of September 11 and his conflict with the United States. The analysis assesses the probability of a translator's ideological intervention in the text and other technical, linguistic problems.     

Whole Soyinka and the Poetry of Isolation

This paper provides a glimpse of Islamic scholarship in Mirriah, Niger Republic, at a particular point in time, 1974–1975, before some of the latest currents of religious unrest erupted in West Africa. Through interviews with local scholars, it examines the degree to which they participated in a West African “core curriculum” shared with other Islamic scholars across the Sahel. It also explores the history of the malamai class in Mirriah, noting significant ties to the Bornu empire. Both the ruling dynasty and Mirriah itself also exemplify the process of “becoming Hausa”: people of diverse origins have come to define themselves as Hausa, adopting the Hausa language and the religion of Islam.     

Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt

During the 1990s, Egypt fought a bitter campaign against militant Islamist groups in which over a thousand people died. Since the end of the insurgency in 1997, Egypt's two fiercest Islamic terrorist groups, first the Islamic Group (Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya) and then Islamic Jihad, not only ceased their violent activities but also produced and published texts revising their religious beliefs on the use of violence. Based on the counterterrorism experience of Egypt, this paper defines and describes a counterterrorism strategy of ideological reorientation. We define ideological reorientation as a counterterrorism approach that seeks to change core ideological or religious beliefs of the terrorist group, thus bringing the beliefs of group members in line with societal norms. While we cannot causally attribute the groups' decisions to lay down arms to ideological reorientation versus other regime actions (like repression), the Egyptian experience is highly suggestive. First, it indicates that the ideology of religiously-based groups is not exogenous and fixed, as is often assumed, but rather endogenous and flexible. Second, the Egyptian experience suggests that ideological reorientation may be more effective at stemming militancy in the long run compared to rival approaches.     

Universal soldiers or parochial actors: Understanding jihadists as products of their environments

ABSTRACT

Why did the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)—two groups that shared similar ideological preferences and were both initially part of the Al Qaeda network—take different paths in the Syrian conflict? Part of the answer lies in the fact that JN is primarily a Syrian organization, whereas Iraqis lead ISIS. A jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile (the two are not always the same) helps to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior. Yet no method of categorization based on jihadist-state relations exists. I fill this gap by theorizing an explanatory typology based on a jihadist group’s relationship with its country of origin and/or domicile. This typology consists of two tiers. The first classifies jihadist organizations based on whether they are nationally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether they are based in their country of origin, exile, or multiple locations. The second tier categorizes groups based on the nature of their engagement—collaborative, belligerent, or neutral—with a state. This new typology enables the generation of multiple hypotheses and has practical implications given that most U.S. counterterrorism efforts require cooperation from partner nations.     

Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State

ABSTRACT

Why do women become extremists? To what extent might they have self-agency? This paper examines the motivations and processes of female radicalization into the so-called Islamic State (IS) by drawing on a case study of Indonesian IS sympathizers, including the three migrant workers-turned-female suicide bombers whose radicalization was facilitated by social media. It argues that far from being coerced, most women join IS of their own free will. Prompted by a mix of personal crisis and socioeconomic and political grievances, the women embark on a religious seeking, exploring the various Islamic options available to them. Ideational congruence might spark the initial interest in IS, but it is generally emotional factors such as a feeling of acceptance and empowerment that make them stay. Contrary to common assumptions, women’s subordination in jihadist organizations is not absolute; it can be negotiated after joining. Most women try to conform to jihadist strict gender rules, but some, often with the support of male allies, try to bend the norms, including on female combat roles. The findings suggest that counter-terrorism agencies should abandon the binary view that women are either just brainwashing victims or terrorist provocateurs, and try to understand the gendered nuances of radicalization in order to formulate suitable preventive measures.     

Terrorist learning in context – the case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ABSTRACT

It is astonishing how many researchers adopt a counterterrorism agenda and suggest researching terrorist learning in order to shape security countermeasures. Posing different questions would lead to different answers. One such question would be, “What makes terrorist learning different?” Terrorist groups operate clandestinely, which means the environment in which they learn is different. This paper investigates the context in which Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has learned. Thus, a qualitative case study analysis of the influence of meso- and macro-level factors on AQIM’s tactical and strategic patterns between 1999 and 2013 will shed light on terrorist learning. Meso-level influences are conceptualised as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as government action. The result is puzzling: AQIM has learned tactically from Al Qaeda and strategically from counterterrorism. This is puzzling because scholars commonly question whether it is possible to learn under pressure. Nevertheless, AQIM’s learning has been more profound when faced with pressure than when cooperating voluntarily. The sustainable answer to the question of the political implication thereof is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how to redefine them. If what is different about terrorist learning is above all the context, we need to question the context.     

How the CT Community Failed to Anticipate the Islamic State

This article is a critique of the dominant approach within the counter-terrorism (CT) community that failed to analyze IS’s trajectory as a distinct group since at least 2006. We argue that two factors account for this failure. The first concerns the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the law that was enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, providing options to the U.S. President to authorize the use of Armed Forces “against those responsible” for the 9/11 attacks. We contend that this law served as an incentive to lump regional jihadi groups under the AQ umbrella instead of discerning their differences. The second factor concerns what we term as the “al-Qa‘ida fixation,” it has to do with a post-9/11 bias towards understanding the threat emanating from jihadi groups around the world through the lens of AQ. This translated into falsely constructing a so-called “al-Qaeda Central” in the business of ‘franchising’ its brand and cloning its violent operations by establishing regional jihadi groups that served as its “affiliates” and carried out its orders. In the post-9/11 era, these two factors fed off each other. Our critique is not meant to suggest that the CT community is expected to predict the unpredictable, and we also recognize that one gains greater clarity with the benefit of hindsight. However, we argue that had the CT community given due attention to the differences between jihadi groups, there was ample evidence in the open source realm that was pointing to IS being AQ’s bête noire, and was seeking to outbid it.