理性上瘾、劣值品与瘾性物品的最优管制

在理性上瘾的分析框架下,已有文献探讨了政府对瘾性商品管制的必要性。但从瘾性商品具有劣值品的性质这一角度分析对其管制的文献尚付之阙如,因此本文从此一角度加以探讨。在此分析视角下,政府的管制有多种方式。若政府通过课征从量税对瘾性商品进行管制,则最优管制原则如下：当瘾性商品的存量对个人身心健康的影响较大,真实的上瘾概率与个人主观认定的上瘾概率差距较大时,瘾性商品课征的从量税应较高;当时间偏好率较大,折旧率较大,或瘾性商品的价格弹性较大时。瘾性商品课征的从量税应较低。     

The case of the camera in the kitchen: Surveillance,privacy, sanctions,and governance

In the summer of 2007, a member of the Rationality Center at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem took it upon himself to install a closed‐circuit TV camera in the Center’s kitchen. An email explained that the camera was installed in an effort to solve the problem of cleanness in the kitchen. The camera was removed a week later: within this week, the members of the Center exchanged close to 120 emails among themselves, expressing their opinions for and against the camera, and discussing related issues. Taking off from this exchange, this article explores some of the surprisingly rich set of normative concerns touched upon by the kitchen camera incident. Among them: public surveillance and people’s polarised attitudes to it, the invasive gaze and the argument that “if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to worry about,” the efficacy of disciplining behavior through sanctions along with the problem of shaming sanctions, the notion of privacy and its arguable relevance to the kitchen case, and more. In an epilogue, I offer some reflections in the wake of the incident, connecting it to the incipient literature on regulation through observation. I find that it is precisely the smallness, concreteness, and seeming triviality of this incident that helps bring a large set of interconnected, vexing normative concerns into sharp relief.     

On the optimal complexity of law and legal rules harmonization

This paper analyses the determination of the complexity of legal rules in a context of harmonization between different countries. We first assume that there are no harmonization gains. We show that if the optimal complexity levels of legal rules are equal across countries, their common level will stick when legal rules are harmonized. When these levels are different, one nation-state may lose to the determination of a uniform level of complexity. However, when there are harmonization gains we show that if these harmonization gains are large enough, complex legal rules are optimal. Moreover, we show that each nation-state could gain from the determination of a uniform level of complexity, even if this level is not its preferred one.

试论我国监狱行政处罚的种类

监狱机关的行政处罚仅仅包括警告、记过、禁闭三种,已经不能满足现代行刑与狱政管理工作的需要。从理论和实践两方面来考虑,有必要增加新的处罚手段,应增加罚款、没收非法财物和违法所得、降低处遇级另4等三种处罚方式。     

美国单边经济制裁的法理检视及应对

单边经济制裁具有单方性、目标性、强制性、多样性的特点。WTO对单边经济制裁的实施采取了限制的态度,但依然无法阻止一些成员依据其法律制度对他国或地区实施单边经济制裁。近年来,美国依据其国内法,对中国启动调查并实施了相应的单边经济制裁举措,这些措施违反了WTO规则,背离了联合国大会决议的精神和国际法的基本原则。中国政府采取的适当反制措施契合国际法的基本原则,符合WTO规则,是维护多边贸易体制、反制美国单边主义的合法选择。     

有限的回击：2010年以来中国的经济制裁行为

通过对中国经济制裁事实的梳理,本文指出2010年后中国实施经济制裁的意愿上升了。研究表明,2010年后中国的经济制裁呈现出"有限的回击"的特征,即经济制裁的强度较低、实际运用的范围有限,且经济制裁仅用于对他国侵犯中国国家利益时的回应。中国运用经济制裁的逻辑在于,中国国家利益所面临的外部挑战增加,推动中国在传统的外交与军事手段之外寻求新型反击方式,而经济制裁因其有效性、和平性、灵活性等优势成为重要的政策选项,促使中国实施经济制裁的意愿上升。然而,中国与目标国之间相互依赖的对称性、目标国的低脆弱性与升级战略的可行性等因素,又导致了中国经济制裁的有限性。经济制裁已经逐渐成为中国一项重要的强制性外交政策工具,但迄今仍处于辅助性地位。     

The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Biased Sanctions? Methodological Change in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered and Its Implications

We investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on economic sanctions: the Peterson Institute database reported in Hufbauer et al. (second edition in 1990 and third edition in 2007, often identified by their abbreviations HSE and HSEO). The Peterson Institute has not transparently reported about these changes. These changes make it more likely to find sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration, and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies, and cost to the sender.     

When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance

In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance.     

International sanctions against Iran and Tehran's responses: political effects on the targeted regime

This article seeks to explain the combined political effects of international sanctions against Iran and Tehran's domestic responses on the power structure of the targeted regime. It contends that although sanctions have contributed to elite infighting in Iran, they have not weakened the targeted regime. The Iranian leadership's modified reading of the imposed sanctions from targeted United Nations, US and European Union (EU) nonproliferation sanctions as an opportunity to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities to the perception of comprehensive and coordinated US and EU sanctions as regime change efforts marked a critical juncture. Tehran's adjusted responses to these sanctions, shaped by the interplay between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, affected Iran's balance of power to the detriment of the outgoing president and his faction. This impact sheds a light on the workings of a targeted hybrid regime under intensive sanction pressure.