试论国际法的“公共物品”属性

国际法是国际关系的产物,它反映了各国的共同利,体现了各国的共同意志,是指导国家对外交往、和平解决国际争端的共同规范.国际法规范的非竞争性、非排他性特点,使之具有"公共物品"的属性,是实现全球治理、维护世界和平与发展的重要保障.     

从the “DG Harmony”案看英美法下海上危险货物托运人归责原则之演进

从the＂DG Harmony＂案中美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院的轰动性判决入手,对英美法有关海上危险货物运输下托运人归责原则和承托双方责任分担的相关立法和司法实践的演进作一梳理,即从《海牙规则》与美国COGSA1936前普通法和一般海事原则下托运人严格责任的确立,到对《海牙规则》及COGSA1936相关条款下托运人严格责任的解析,再到以the＂DG Harmony＂案为代表的英美目前司法实践对突破托运人严格责任的探索。在此梳理的基础上,总结概括出目前英美法下裁判海上危险货物运输纠纷的思路与原则。这种以托运人严格责任原则为基础,以通过＂知识权衡＂与因果分析确定的＂未能提醒＂的过失责任原则为补充的思路,对中国的立法和司法实践具有一定的借鉴意义。     

《刑法修正案(六)》对赃物犯罪规定的完善

为维护刑事司法的正常活动秩序,更有效地打击赃物犯罪,《刑法修正案(六)》对刑法中有关赃物犯罪的规定作了修改。为了贯彻和执行新的规定,有必要对修改的部分进行认真思考,以作出符合立法精神的法理解释,从而更好地指导司法实践。     

Why should we care about competition?

Abstract

Most people believe that competitive institutions are morally acceptable, but that there are limits: a friendly competition is one thing; a life or death struggle is another. How should we think about the moral limits on competition? I argue that the limits stem from the value of human sociability, and in particular from the noninstrumental value of a form of social connectedness that I call ‘mutual affirmation.’ I contrast this idea with Rawls’s account of social union and stability. Finally, I show how these ideas provide the basis for a powerful argument in favour of social provisions for public goods: for example, a strong public health care system moderates the stakes in labour market competition, preventing the competition from descending into a life or death struggle.     

Why the intrinsic value of public goods matters

Abstract

Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on citizens’ preferences, therefore, means that non-universal public good are at a constant risk of under-provision, and has negative implications for human flourishing. The paper, therefore, develops a complementary justification for the distribution of public goods, that decouples the distribution of public goods from ad hoc preferences, and grounds the distributive justification in the intrinsic value of these goods. There are three reasons to include intrinsic-value considerations in public-goods distribution: responding to crowding-out effects; promoting shared heritage and cross-fertilization. Finally, the intrinsic-value justification may indirectly promote solidarity. Thus, the intrinsic-value and the solidarity justifications need not be mutually exclusive, rather they can be mutually reinforcing.     

Equality and family values: conflict or harmony?

Abstract

This paper provides a critical commentary on the claim advanced by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift in their book Family Values: The Ethics of Parent–Child Relationships that there is an ineliminable conflict between relationship goods and fair equality of opportunity. I argue there need be no conflict between family values and equality of opportunity in a suitably non-hierarchical society. I also argue that the idea that equality of opportunity might be served by abolishing the family is mistaken. Egalitarian justice does not provide an obstacle to the realization of family values.     

公共物品多中心供给模式探究

公共物品的复杂性向单中心供给模式提出了挑战;公共物品多中心供给模式正是在此基础上发展起来的,多中心内含着参与主体相互独立、地位平等、自愿参与一系列同时发生的博弈,达到非均衡平衡状态的性质;多中心的特性满足了公共物品供给复杂性的要求,多中心供给模式是公共物品有效供给的最好选择。     

论无单放货下承运人赔偿责任的例外

文章针对国际海商货物运输中长期存在的无单放货问题,结合联合国贸法会目前正在审议的《UNCITRAL运输法草案》,对特殊情况或符合一定条件的可转让运输单证下的无单放货,承运人无需承担赔偿责任的情况进行探讨。     

What is the opposite of corruption?

Corruption has turned out to be difficult to define and what should be counted as the opposite to corruption remains widely disputed. If the goal for a post-conflict society is not only to become democratic and prevent a return to violence but also to reduce systemic corruption, we need to know what it is that should be fought and how the opposite to systemic corruption should be conceptualised. To define the opposite to corruption, choices have to be made along four conceptual dimensions. These are universalism vs relativism, uni- vs multidimensionality, normative vs empirical and whether the definition should relate to political procedures or policy substance. As a result of this conceptual analysis, it is argued, a universal, one-dimensional, normative and procedural definition should be preferred. The suggested definition is that of impartiality as the basic norm for the implementation of laws and policies. This conceptual analysis ends with a discussion of why such a norm has historically and in the contemporary world been hard to achieve and why it is especially problematic in post-conflict societies.     

Political Risk: The Institutional Dimension

The argument developed in this paper is that the political arrangements and institutions that help leaders stay in office are not necessarily the ones that promote economic growth and prosperity. Indeed political leaders can remain in office more securely by rewarding the groups that keep them in power with privileged access to public resources. The net result is that the leadership remains in office but at the price of poor economic performance. It is not that the consequences of mismanaging the economy are unforeseen; rather the increased chances of an economic crisis are an acceptable price to pay if it means avoiding a political crisis which challenges the leaders' hold on power. Political survival, not peace and prosperity, is what determines the choice of policies. In this way bad economics can be good politics. The principal hypothesis addressed is that the smaller the size of the winning coalition the more the leadership depends on distributing private goods to the coalition members in order to purchase their loyalty, and, therefore the greater is the level of political risk. The ultimate effects of coalition size and the corruption attending the competition for private goods are the reduction of foreign direct investment per capita. These hypotheses were tested in a three stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous estimation. The results generally supported the theoretical expectations.