Realities and Opportunities——Chinese Private Enterprises in Africa

正IN recent years,growing numbers of Chinese enterprises have initiated investment in Africa.From2009 to 2012,China’s direct investment in Africa increased from US$1.44 billion to US$2.52 billion,with an annual growth of 20.5 percent.Over the same period,China’s cumulative direct investment in Africa rose from US$9.33 billion to US$21.23billion.Currently,over 2,000 Chinese     

In Love with Africa

正IN 2013,Chinese President Xi Jinping recounted a story about a Chinese couple’s fondness for Tanzania in East Africa:"There was once a Chinese couple who,fascinated by images of Africa they had seen on the television,chose to go to Tanzania for their honeymoon.They were enchanted by local customs and extraordinary scenery of the wild Serengeti Plains and fell in love with the country.Back home,the young couple posted a record of their journeys on a blog,which received tens of thousands of hits and hundreds of comments.They said,‘We have fallen in love with Africa and our hearts shall never leave this wonderland."This was Li Ling’s story."I have     

LETTERS

正When I was a teen,I saw for the fi rst time a Tang Dynasty clay fi gure of a person with dark skin and curly hair that was obviously not of Chinese ethnicity.Such people were referred to as Kunlun servants(as they worked as domestic help for the aristocracy),but actually came from beyond the mountain range of the same name that traverses Xinjiang and Tibet.Scientists are divided on their origins–Africa,India,Southeast or South Asia.These early migrants traveled to China with foreign diplomats and merchants via the Silk Road,testifying to extensive people-to-people,cultural and economic exchanges between China and the rest of the world more than1,000 years ago,facilitated by the ancient route.     

Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will: Some Lessons from West Africa

The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of work on executive–legislative relations and legislative oversight in West Africa, is that, of the various conditions that promote or prevent the effective use of oversight tools and capacity, political will is the single most important. These claims have both theoretical and practical relevance, for if political will is as important as is claimed for the effective performance of the oversight function, then international organisations may have to reconsider their approach to legislative strengthening.     

Third time lucky? Establishing diplomatic relations between Russia and South Africa

Diplomatic relations between Russia and South Africa were established in 1992, before South Africa's transition to democracy was completed. This move was perceived as a betrayal by many in both countries and beyond. For many decades the Soviet Union supported the African National Congress in its fight against the apartheid regime. South Africa's National Party government, in its turn, presented the USSR as the main force behind the ‘total onslaught’ – an all-out war purportedly waged against South Africa by international communism. Yet it was with the National Party government that the Russians established diplomatic relations. This article looks into the reasons for this change of heart in Moscow and Pretoria, discusses the political forces behind the decision to establish diplomatic relations, and analyses the process that led to this event and the results of establishing diplomatic relations the way it happened and at the time it happened for both countries.     

非洲和平与安全建设：南非的区域大国角色及限度*

作为区域大国,南非在非洲安全秩序构建中发挥着重要作用。1994年民主转型后,南非国家身份定位由西方的"白人飞地"转变为"非洲国家","以非洲为中心"成为南非外交政策的战略优先。南非非国大政府秉持新的国家身份认知,不再将非洲国家视为国家安全的威胁,而是命运与共的合作伙伴。南非通过参与解决非洲国家冲突、加强非洲集体安全机制建设、支持非洲冲突后重建与发展进程、推动联合国与非盟加强战略协调与合作、参与多边维和行动等方式参与非洲和平与安全建设,扮演了区域安全公共产品供给者的角色。南非虽然在非洲和平与安全建设的某些领域发挥了独特的引领作用,但经济增长乏力和国力相对下降,使其越来越无法有效应对日趋复杂的非洲安全形势。域外大国和国家集团加大对非洲安全事务的干预力度、其他非洲区域大国的竞争,也对南非在非洲和平与安全建设领域发挥引领作用形成了制约。在新冠肺炎疫情冲击、经济增长陷入衰退和社会矛盾加剧的背景下,南非政府将把更多精力和资源用于解决国内经济和社会发展问题,直接介入非洲冲突解决的意愿和能力会有所下降。南非在参与非洲安全事务过程中将更加惜用自身国内经济军事资源,进一步提升对外交手段、非洲集体安全机制的依靠。     

Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict.     

Antiforeigner Resentment as a Manifestation of Xhosa Hegemonic Masculinity

Abstract

During a xenophobia and social cohesion research project conducted by the Safety and Violence Initiative (SaVI) of the University of Cape Town (UCT) and Freedom House USA, researchers found an overwhelming perception that foreign nationals were taking things that belong to South Africans. This perception was most prevalent in the male population, and antiforeigner resentment was mainly aimed toward male foreign nationals. This paper uses ethnographic research in the form of qualitative interviews from Motherwell and Makhanda in the Eastern Cape province to find out how constructions of hegemonic masculinities at the local level contribute to antiforeigner resentment.     

China and Africa: economic growth and a non-transformative political elite

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development.     

The spaces of intervention for Mali and Guinea-Bissau

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on interventions by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in Guinea-Bissau and Mali. In the literature, these are often approached in a ‘top-down’ manner, focusing on formal institutions, not accounting for the complex dynamics in and around conflict intervention. This article argues that adopting space as an analytical lens allows new ways to address these issues. It highlights how interventions by different actors and their interactions are influenced by spatial perceptions and framings, which result in the making of different ‘spaces of intervention’ through different practices. The two described here, ‘scaling’ and ‘establishing reach’, enable strategic and continuous formation and negotiation of spaces for action, according to actors’ needs and interests. Thus, shedding light on specific actors and their practices, the article contributes to a better understanding of the complex dynamics in conflict intervention in West Africa.