税收协定的国内适用——基于《企业所得税法》第58条的考察

《企业所得税法》第58条试图全面解决税收协定在国内适用的三个问题,即条约的国内法效力、适用方式和法律位阶。对于如何理解第58条中的"不同规定"与"办理",存在"绝对主权说"和"国际条约说"之争。虽然两种学说的理论依据和具体主张有所不同,但它们均以维护法律体系的纯粹性为最高目标。这两种学说并不符合中国的混合一元条约适用体制。当前,中国应采取更具实质主义导向的方法适用税收协定。     

Tax Disputes under Institutional Instability: Theory and Implications

This article aims to offer the first structural analysis of tax disputes under institutional instability using a core element of the international tax regime as an example. It offers a theory grounded on Mancur Olson's seminal contribution to group dynamics, the logic of collective action. It also suggests implications of this theory that might help to address key enforcement issues faced by the international tax regime in a frequent context worldwide: institutionally unstable countries.     

理性与宽容：逃税罪罪状的新设计

随着2009年2月《刑法修正案（七）》的颁行，偷税罪罪状内容发生了重大变化。通过对偷税罪罪状设计的历史考察，结合分析《刑法修正案（七）》中偷税罪条文内容的修改，不难发现，逃税罪罪状的新设计透射出理性与宽容的光芒，这与当下宽严相济刑事政策相契合。这反映出我国刑事立法的科学性与进步性。另外，逃税罪罪状的重新设计使得人们重新审视逃税行为的本旨等问题，因此，逃税罪罪状的新设计是刑事立法史上里程牌式的标志并非是“过誉”之词。     

俄罗斯税制改革的政治影响分析

普京上台伊始,即把发展经济、建立强大的国家确定为俄联邦的首要任务。普京认为,使俄罗斯失去其国际强势地位和独立性的很大原因是国家税收乏力,因此俄罗斯当务之急是尽快改革原有的税制结构和税收制度①。在普京的大力推动下,俄罗斯进行了大规模税制改革。以简化税制、减少税种、降低税率、减轻税负为核心的税制改革取得了很大成功,使俄罗斯“成为一个建立了良好税收制度的国家”。在此基础上,普京提出了进一步深化税改,在今后两年内全面完成税收改革的新的奋斗目标。     

税收优先权初论

税收征管法第45条确立了税收优先权制度,这对于保障国家税收的实现起到了重要作用。我国税收优先权的种类和适用范围,包括税收及滞纳金。税收优先权制度建立的理论基础包括税收人公益性、风险性要求等。由于我国税收优先权与其他债权的关系欠缺一定的公示性,将导致债权人设置抵押、质押时无法查清债务人在此之前具有欠缴税款的情形,同时税收优先于留置权的规定违反了物权法的规定。可借鉴日本和我国台湾地区的有关做法,在税收征管法修正时予以改进。     

税收优先权初论

税收征管法第45条确立了税收优先权制度,这对于保障国家税收的实现起到了重要作用。我国税收优先权的种类和适用范围,包括税收及滞纳金。税收优先权制度建立的理论基础包括税收人公益性、风险性要求等。由于我国税收优先权与其他债权的关系欠缺一定的公示性,将导致债权人设置抵押、质押时无法查清债务人在此之前具有欠缴税款的情形,同时税收优先于留置权的规定违反了物权法的规定。可借鉴日本和我国台湾地区的有关做法,在税收征管法修正时予以改进。     

税务行政中的契约理念及其体现——以平等、协商为核心

税收的本质是人民与国家间的“契约”,而契约所蕴涵的平等、协商等理念正是我国当代税务行政中的稀缺品质。平等理念拓展了长期局限于纳税人间的传统平等观,将平等延伸至税务机关,重视实质平等。协商理念蕴涵双向交流与沟通之意,体现了对行政相对人意志表达的尊重倾向,也将为单一的权力行政手段增添活力与弹性。平等、协商理念对于提升纳税人主体地位、增进税收公平、改善征纳关系、实现高效行政都颇具现实意义。     

The grapes of rent: A history of renting in a country of owners

Abstract

In a recent study of neighborhood development, Goetz and Sidney (1994) found an “ideology of property” separating the interests of homeowners from the interests of lower‐income tenants. According to this ideology, owners are better citizens than renters, and therefore public policy should benefit owners at the expense of renters. In spite of continuing research that shows this allegation to be false, a widespread bias against renters persists. Why is this so?

A deliberate bias favoring property owners and harming renters has been prominent in American public policy from colonial times to the present, although its exact form has varied over time—property requirements for suffrage, land redistribution schemes promising ownership but delivering tenancy and poverty, and tax policies that privilege ownership and punish tenancy. Public policy that stigmatizes renters represents a bias as pernicious as other biases of gender, race, religion, and nationality.     

Comment on Jean L. Cummings and Denise DiPasquale's “The Low‐Income Housing Tax Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years”

Abstract

The Low‐Income Housing Tax Credit (housing credit) that Cummings and Di‐Pasquale portray is effective, efficient, and healthy. However, rapid changes in the industry have turned some of their data stale, and the absence of suitable context and information invalidate some key analyses and findings. Moreover, the researchers sometimes seem to see the glass as 10 percent empty instead of 90 percent full. A practitioners’ perspective is more positive.

The housing credit generates an array of public benefits while harnessing private investors’ business discipline. Genuinely low‐income tenants occupy the housing. The housing revitalizes low‐income communities. Properties are in good financial and physical condition. The housing credit is also cost effective. The economic fundamentals of producing low‐income rental housing, not the housing credit, necessitate substantial subsidies. A remarkably high proportion of the federal tax‐credit subsidy goes into the housing, and investor returns are modest. Nonprofit‐sponsored production appears to cost more because nonprofits are prominent in high‐cost locations and for other similar reasons, not because nonprofit developers are inefficient.