自然资源国家所有权三层结构说

宪法上规定的自然资源国家所有权不是专属于公法的所有权概念。它包含三层结构：第一层结构是私法权能。在这一层面上,它与物权法上的所有权无异。第二层结构是公法权能。其主要包括国家对于自然资源的立法权、管理权和收益分配权。第三层结构是宪法义务。国家应当为全体人民的利益行使其私法权能和公法权能。公共信托理论是描述国家作为自然资源所有人的宪法义务的法律理论,应当引入中国,或者对中国宪法第9条作公共信托理论式的解释,确立国家与人民在自然资源国家所有权结构中的地位。在中国的现实中,自然资源国家所有权最为薄弱的层面是其宪法义务。 “自然资源人民基金”的模式和尝试对中国有借鉴意义。宪法规定的自然资源所有权具有“不完全规范”的特质,直接转化为物权法上的物权存在困难。在目前宪法控制制度尚不健全的情况下,民法解释学可以发挥控制自然资源国家所有权肆意扩张和扭曲的准宪法功能。     

The Constitutionalisation of Party Unity: The Origins of Anti-defection Laws in India and Israel

In spite of a pronounced increase in the number of states that have adopted anti-defection laws over the past several decades, the literature on party unity in democratic legislatures has paid scant attention to understanding the conditions that lead to the adoption of such restrictive measures on the mobility of elected deputies. This article seeks to fill this gap. The authors provide a simple game-theoretic model to explain the passage of anti-defection measures in India, in 1985, and Israel, in 1991. These two democratic states were among the first to experiment with the constitutionalisation of anti-defection measures. Moreover, their comparison is important because although these laws were adopted under seemingly very different circumstances, they were supported with a strong consensus by both the government party, or coalition, and the opposition. It is argued that the reasons for the passage of the anti-defection laws in these two states were rooted in the strategic consequences of the changes that took place in the format of their party systems. The Indian and the Israeli cases show, respectively, that a dominant party system (India) and a tightly balanced bipolar party system (Israel) provided equally compelling incentives for rampant party switching between government and opposition, which therefore created an incentive for both sides to agree to, and adopt, a strict legislative measure to curb defections.     

浅议大陆法系违法性理论与我国犯罪论体系

违法性在大陆法系的三阶层犯罪成立体系中,仅是判断一个行为是否构成犯罪的一个层次,与我国刑法理论中的刑事违法性存在着本质的区别。但是三阶层的犯罪论体系与我国的犯罪论体系中的部分概念存在着某种程度的一致性。虽然我国的犯罪论体系并未对违法性进行独立判断,但是在整体上亦可以起到与大陆法系三阶层犯罪论体系中违法性层次相同的出罪作用。     

Machinery of government and standards in public service: teaching new dogs old tricks

Abstract

For much of the last thirty years the main leitmotif animating Civil Service reform in the UK has been that efficiency and effectiveness in public services can be achieved by adapting management methods and practices derived from commercial enterprise. In the process of making the dreams and schemes of that plural singularity we have come to call ‘managerialism’ operational though, something valuable appears to have been lost, and that something is the Civil Service as a unified ‘constitutional bureaucracy’. In this article I explore some of the unfortunate governmental and administrative consequences of these managerially minded reforms. In particular, I seek to highlight the continuing relevance of what have been routinely characterized as outmoded and anachronistic machineries of government, and to stress the importance of the increasingly forgotten core business of public administration: the running of a state and of a constitution.     

Fixed‐Term Parliaments and the Challenges for Governments and the Civil Service: A Comparative Perspective

The Fixed‐term Parliaments Act significantly reduces the powers of the Prime Minister to manage the risk of government termination and to time elections to his or her party's advantage. In this paper we ask how the Act is likely to change the way in which governments terminate, their durability and opportunities for planning in government and departments. In answering these questions we draw on quantitative comparative evidence from other European countries that operate with fixed‐term parliaments. Our analysis suggests that fixing the parliamentary term can be expected to convert some opportunistically called elections into regular elections and to stabilise governments toward the end of the parliamentary term. But the Act is also likely to have unanticipated consequences in increasing governments’ vulnerability to failure before they reach the final sessions of Parliament. We explore these unanticipated consequences and outline their implications for governing style and Civil Service planning.     

论国际法与宪法的效力关系——《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的视角

在有关国际法与宪法的效力关系的国内法制度中,有规定宪法的效力优于国际法的,也有规定国际法的效力优于宪法的.根据有关国际法与宪法效力关系的国际法,国际法的效力优于各国宪法,每个国家都有义务依据宪法或法律采取履行国际义务的措施、不得以宪法及其他国内法为理由不履行国际义务,但各国可以利用条约保留机制处理国际条约与宪法或法律的冲突.在国际关系中,违背国际法的宪法或法律规定不具有法律效力,削定或实施违背国际法的宪法或法律规定构成国际不法行为,产生国际责任.关于违背国际法的宪法或法律规定在其本国国内的效力,应当具体情况具体分析,违背一般国际法强制性规范、违背对整个国际社会的义务或违背<公民权利和政治权利国际公约>中的缔约国在紧急情况下也不得克减保障义务的强制性条款的宪法或法律规定,应当是自始无效的.     

宪法解释的功能、原则及其中国图景

作为一种实践智慧,宪法解释是宪政理想现实化的必由之路,其核心功能就在于宪法的适用,由此而产生的其他方面的功能只能是第二位的、派生的。历史解释原则和共时解释原则皆有其存在的合理空间,但它们在我国目前所能发挥的功能都是非常有限的,且难以得到实证支持。"宪法该由谁来解释"这样的问题只有在宪法得以真正适用之后,才能够顺理成章地得到解决。     

司法审查与维护宪法权威

在解决立法冲突和认定法律、法规的有效或无效方面,我国采用的是上级立法机关审查和行政审查,而不是司法审查。这种审查机制的问题在于以下两个方面:第一,由制定法律的机关进行审查,下级立法是否无效上级立法机关说了算,缺乏监督;第二,审查的标准通常是自己制定的法律或立法机关自己确立的标准,不能维护宪法的权威。我国应确立以宪法为最高标准的法律审查制度,并且,不能由制定法律的机关进行审查;否则,无法保证审查的客观性和公正性。     

国民待遇与宪法权利

近年来 ,我国市场经济中诸如证券市场上违规违法操作黑幕、企业利用虚假广告欺诈消费者等问题相当突出 ,严重损害了市场经济的公开、公平、公正原则 ,践踏了宪法和法律的尊严。呼吁要回归宪法所赋于的本位 :“一切权利属于人民” ,向人民提供人民应拥有的“国民待遇”。     

政府预算与宪政转轨

宪政是保证现代社会文明的基本手段。文通过宪政产生的历史渊源分析,探讨和阐述了政府预算这个表面上几乎不具有政治敏感度的经济形式,最终演化成为民间力量施展影响并公开伸张的兴奋点,促成了宪政转轨。