From ‘Judicial Mind’ to ‘Democratic Soul’: Law and Politics on the Bureaucratic Frontline

This article considers the relationship between law and democratic politics as manifest in the practice of ‘street‐level bureaucracy’. By glancing back to debates about citizenship and public administration between the two world wars, it sets contemporary concerns about the political constitution in broader context. In doing so, it discloses a fundamental division between conceptions of the state derived from Roman jurisprudence on the one hand, and ancient Athenian political practice on the other. It finds in the tragic dilemmas posed for street‐level bureaucrats—by the competing claims on their values—a test of individual moral agency and of democracy as the management of diversity. It concludes that what is at stake in our estimation of street‐level bureaucracy is not so much the purity of the ‘judicial mind’ as the complexity of the ‘democratic soul’ and the ‘connected society’.     

宪法：从政治法到治政法

将宪法称为政治法,虽然由来久、流传广,但弊病多、危害深,不宜继续提倡。政治事务虽然由宪法集中规范,但宪法不只是规范政治事务。单纯从宪法与政治的关系上讲,宪法不是政治统治法、被政治控制之法,而是控制政治之法、治理政权之法。人民是政治与治政的主体,宪法是人民治政的依据与准则。将宪法作为治政法,体现了民主与民治的要求,有利于增强宪法的法律属性与价值理性,有利于实现宪治、实现民主、实现自由。     

Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing (and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility

Doug Husak frames a worry that makes sense in the abstract, but in reality, there is not much to worry about. The thesis that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility (IIP) is a straw man. There are reasons to think that the moral significance of intentions is not properly registered in criminal law. But the moral basis for criticism is not nearly as extreme as the IIP, and the fixes are not that hard to make. Lastly, if they are not made, some people may not get the punishments they deserve, and there will be some extra inequities in the criminal law as a result. But these inequities are not so great that change must be made now. The moral categories that are used may be too crude, but they are also familiar and easy to work with, and that counts for something.

Theorizing Criminal Law Reform

How are we to understand criminal law reform? The idea seems simple—the criminal law on the books is wrong: it should be changed. But 'wrong’ how? By what norms 'wrong’? As soon as one tries to answer those questions, the issue becomes more complex. One kind of answer is that the criminal law is substantively wrong: that is, we assume valid norms of background political morality, and we argue that doctrinally the criminal law on the books does not embody those norms. Another kind of answer is that the criminal law as it stands presupposes certain empirical facts, and yet those facts do not hold. Traditionally, criminal law reform has been informed by both these answers. Analytical theorists examine doctrine for its conceptual structure, and social scientists examine the actual workings of the criminal justice system. This tidy picture is, however, challenged by social constructivist accounts of the criminal law. They challenge the stability and conceptual purity of doctrine, and they challenge the objectivity of social science. On the basis of these challenges, they undermine the ambitions of traditional criminal law reform, and argue that the only reforms to the criminal law that matter are politicized ones—that criminal law reform is pointless unless it serves the interests of the marginalized and the dispossessed. It seems undeniable that in some sense our perceptions of crime in our society are indeed moulded by social forces, and that crime does not exist independently of the social structures and processes that help to define and control it. But why should those insights have the implications for our understanding of criminal law reform that they are alleged to have? How could it follow from those insights that criminal law reform either becomes radicalized or valueless? The aim of this paper is to show that what can legitimately be taken from the emphasis on the social constructedness of crime does not require wholesale abandonment of the traditional picture of criminal law reform, even though it may require some modifications of that picture.     

法律哲学的社会—政治基础——论马克思法律理论建构的“社会—政治法律哲学进路”

受从"哲学批判"到"政治经济学批判"之转变的影响,马克思法律理论的建构遵循了"社会—政治法律哲学进路"。这种进路的选择不仅不是马克思的疏忽,更是包含着马克思本人促进人类解放的伟大担当和理论旨趣。而且,这种进路触及到了法律的一个特征,即法律的非自主性(法律的社会—政治基础),对当下中国法律哲学的建构具有跨文化的普适性。     

“依党章治党”的必要性、现状及实现路径

党章是立党、治党、管党的总章程。“依党章治党”不仅是党的自身建设从思想建党到制度建党的逻辑必然;也是在贯彻落实科学发展观和构建社会主义和谐社会过程中加强党的领导的现实需要;更是统一全党思想和行动,实现党的奋斗目标的根本要求。在现阶段,“依党章治党”在观念上还显得滞后,实践上偏重于形式,工作思路也尚未完全理顺。要真正实现“依党章治党”,必须加强以党章为基础的党规、党法建设,增强党内法规体系的科学性;必须在全党范围内强化党章意识的养成,提高“依党章治党”的自觉性;必须抓好党章的贯彻执行,解决“依党章治党”的有效性。     

民法典体系化的哲学——评王利明教授的“民法体系化”思想

民法典的体系化就是法典化。民法典体系化的哲学问题至少应该回答如何使我国民法典回应社会需要、如何在守成与创新中发展自己的民法典、如何克服19世纪法典中心主义所带来的挑战,如何使民法典适应中国本土需要的同时与国际接轨等问题。《民法典体系研究》对此进行了系统探讨。     

论美国联邦宪法的程序规则

美国联邦宪法规定了完备的程序规则制度,为规范权力,保障公民权利奠定了坚实的基础。美国宪法的哲学原理见之于其繁复的权力运行程序细节之中。宪法的程序规则具有权力的正当化功能、规范化功能和形式合理化功能。作为宪政基石和宪政基本内涵的法治,是一种以正当程序为主要内容的人们服从规则治理的过程,而法治的正当程序则以宪法程序为根本。     

现代司法理念下的检察权——司法改革背景下检察权的定位

从现代司法理念出发,认为作为法律监督权的检察权与审判权一样在司法过程中处于重要地位.检察机关的基本职能是法律监督.检察机关与法院一样肩负着推进司法公正的重任.     

论制宪权与立法权的分离及其宪政意义

制宪权与立法权的分离是宪法学与宪政学说的一个重要命题.制宪权与立法权分离的法律前提是"根本法"与"普通法"的分离;制宪权与立法权分离的社会基础是市民社会的兴起及其与政府的分离.制宪权与立法权的分离解决了卢梭的"三不"难题,使得人民主权与有限有效政府并行不悖且相得益彰,它对我国的宪政建设具有启示意义.