合宪性推定的正当性

合宪性推定是宪法审查中一种重要方法。其最初起源于美国，尔后逐渐被德国、日本、澳大利亚等法治国所采用。国内目前对于合宪性推定方法的认识尚有不足，在一定程度上影响了宪法审查制度的有效运作。对于合宪性推定方法的借鉴，不在于简单移植，重点在于从一般原理的角度来探求其所存在的正当性基础。从人权价值、规范体系、经济理性等多角度对合宪性推定的正当性进行论证，可发现合宪性推定是一种原理性的宪法方法，根基于宪法的最高性、法官的经济理性、人权的目的性、国家权力的手段性等。合宪性推定的正当性论证，在折射出目前宪法方法的贫瘠的同时，也有助于摆脱宪法文本浪漫主义的方法论困境，进而体现出宪法方法兼具政治与法律的特性。     

宪法权利规范的结构及其推理方式

对宪法权利的理解、解释和落实必然遇到的一个核心问题是，宪法权利能否因其他宪法上的利益、公共政策以及与之相冲突的权利而受到限制。从规范法学的观点来看，宪法权利具有一种复杂的结构，既内含排他性层次，又内含权衡的层次。因此，宪法权利推理呈现一种衡量与不衡量结合的双阶结构。宪法权利之作为权利，是一种对公共权威作出某种行为时所依凭的理由的限制。对某些政府行为的理由，宪法权利能将其坚决排除出去，而对另一些政府行为的理由，包括为了公共利益，则需要和权利仔细加以权衡而做出取舍。这样的宪法权利规范及其推理体现的是一种理性的、民主的政治慎思机制。     

日本“立法不作为”与宪法诉讼

对“立法不作为”的宪法审查涉及到国会与法院的分权问题，日本学术界存在争论，法院则试图在保障当事人救济与避免和国会的冲突中保持平衡，对相关国家赔偿问题长时间内予以否定，违宪确认诉讼则是值得肯定的一种诉讼方式。     

肯尼亚宪法改革模式与埃及革命模式——非洲两国模式比较及启示

肯尼亚在特殊的历史背景和机遇下，进行了宪法体制改革，确立了主权在民、人权自有等的思想和原则，并建立了切实的保障制度，不但完善了肯尼亚的政治体制、对既有利益触动较少、对经济的破坏较小，还有力地推动了肯尼亚“宪法意识”、“公民意识”的大发展。埃及在社会矛盾集聚后爆发了革命，在短期内对政治、经济的破坏都比较大，也并未尽如革命前埃及人的愿望，建立一个真正的民主国家。     

我国健康权宪法保护的实现

世界卫生组织1946年在世界卫生组织章程首次这样确认健康权是“获得最高可能达到的健康标准的权利是一种基本的人权”。从宪法的角度研究健康权，保护健康权已经成为世界的潮流。宪法保护健康权，防止公权力非法侵害，“入宪”应当是健康权保护的第一步，国家机关遵守宪法义务是必然要求，建立违宪审查制度是关键所在。     

理性范式及其对中西宪政的文化制约

文化作为一种生活方式,是基于原始习得和传来因素而形成的、有支配力的精神统一体,其社会功能主要在于为文化共同体成员提供交流平台。文化研究是以认识论为核心的思维结构研究。从发生学和文化本质论的角度分析现代立宪主义可知:西方宪政文化是普遍理性在人类社会结构的表现形式,儒学文化由于普遍理性的缺失并未自生自发形成宪政文化。从一种过程和事业的角度看待宪政法律,应该从理性培育和法制保障两个角度践行宪政。     

公民宪法义务与相关概念的关系

公民宪法义务已经得到世界上绝大多数国家的肯定和国际社会的普遍认同。对公民宪法义务的深入研究有助于中国宪法学向纵深方向发展。在回答了公民宪法义务是什么、他国宪法义务如何规定后,公民宪法义务与宪法权利、道德、其他部门法义务等概念的关系成为宪法义务研究无法回避的问题。     

Conserving the Constitution? The Conservative Party and Democratic Renewal

In 2008 David Cameron declared that the Conservative party was 'ready for government' and suggested that 'the change we need is not just from Labour's old policies to our new policies… It's about a change from old politics to new politics'. This 'new politics' narrative is something of a cliché: British constitutional history reveals a regular pattern whereby opposition parties renege upon implementing far-reaching constitutional and democratic reforms once they win power. It is in this context that this article draws upon documentary analysis and a number of interviews to examine the Conservative party's position on constitutional reform and democratic renewal. It concludes that although the Conservative party has spent the last decade decrying the 'destruction' of the constitution it has undertaken little detailed preparatory work in relation to how it might seek to alter the governance of Britain. As a result the research presented in this article provides a number of insights into elite politics, strategic game-playing and executive veto capacities within a context of growing political disengagement from politics and falling levels of trust in politics.     

Stretched but not snapped: constitutional lessons from the 2010 coalition government in Britain

Taking as its point of departure Matthews' (2011) ‘Constitutional stretching: Coalition governance and the Westminster model (Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 49(4), 486–509), this article draws on the experience of coalition government in Westminster to review, categorise and consider how power sharing has necessitated a rethink of what is the British constitution. Defining constitutional stretching as being about the sustained operation of two-party government within the Westminster model, it shows that traditional practices around manifestos, collective responsibility and the prerogative have been adjusted since 2010 in order to facilitate functioning administration. The article observes that some stretching is not entirely novel with precedents to be found in earlier single party administrations. It further argues that while conventions have been strained, the Cameron/Clegg government survived, suggesting a need to adjust our understanding of constitutional concepts. Given the likelihood of future hung parliaments, this could mean more permanent constitutional change and the article makes some modest suggestions for updating guidance.     

Democracy,development and the executive presidency in Sri Lanka

This paper examines the developmental causes and consequences of the shift from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential system in Sri Lanka in 1978, examining its provenance, rationale and unfolding trajectory. Drawing on a wide range of sources, it sets out an argument that the executive presidency was born out of an elite impulse to create a more stable, centralised political structure to resist the welfarist electoral pressures that had taken hold in the post-independence period, and to pursue a market-driven model of economic growth. This strategy succeeded in its early years, 1978–93, when presidents retained legislative control, maintained a strong personal commitment to market reforms and cultivated alternative sources of legitimacy. In the absence of these factors, the presidency slipped into crisis from 1994–2004 as resistance to elite-led projects of state reform mounted and as the president lost control of the legislature. Between 2005–14, the presidency regained its power, but at the cost of abandoning its original rationale and function as a means to recalibrate the elite–mass power relationship to facilitate elite-led reform agendas.