论我国反收购条款的规制限度

在我国,反收购条款对上市公司因应敌意收购具有特殊价值.但实务部门对反收购条款的特殊价值与运用策略还缺乏清晰认识,相关理论研究也不足.我国反收购实践中被广泛应用的反收购条款主要有分期分级董事会条款与董事资格限制条款,绝对多数条款等其他反收购条款则未被采用.就被采用的反收购条款来看.存在许多问题,或规定不当或违反法律.因此.应从理论上明确各种反收购条款的制度空问,以便寻求合理的法律规制限度.     

领导干部宪政意识之现状、成因及对策研究

宪政是以良宪为基础,民主为基石,法治为载体,人权实现为宗旨的一种政治理念、政治形态或政治过程。中国正走在通向宪政的路上,可是要实施宪政,必先要研究宪政意识,特别是领导干部的宪政意识;因为宪政意识是实现和实行宪政的思想基础,也是进行宪政建设的思想条件。本文着重分析了领导干部宪政意识薄弱的四大表现,并对其深层原因作了探寻。最后,对如何培育和提升领导干部宪政意识提出了对策建议。     

Constitutional authority and prospects for social justice for high-tension religious communities

By regulating religious practice, the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment challenges the authority of religious communities who may not have adopted American pluralism in favor of their own religious particularism. While the power of the Constitution is manifested in physical modes, its historic symbolic and socially constructed meaning elevates it as a competing transcending authority that challenges religious communities. Often labeled American civil religion, this authority either coerces non-mainstream religious communities to adopt modes of religious expression that mirror those of the dominant culture, or requires them to adopt a strategy for coping with its overwhelming social and political power. The Constitution's mechanism for guaranteeing religious free exercise thus serves as a method to limit religious particularism by coercing limited cultural orthodoxy through legal orthopraxy.Teach the [Constitution's] principles, teach them to your children, speak of them when sitting in your home, speak of them when walking by the way, when lying down and when rising up, write them upon the doorplate of your home and upon your gates. John Quincy AdamsRepeated by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger (Franklin, 1987). The passage is a slight alteration of Deuteronomy 6:7–9.     

我国限制知识产权滥用的法律思考

知识产权性质上是一种私权垄断,在市场经济条件下易于被滥用。我国反垄断法应将限制知识产权滥用作为其重要组成部分,充分考虑权利各方的利益,特别注意权利人与社会公众利益的协调,同时,设置独立的反垄断执法机构,并适当考虑法律的成本与收益之间的关系。     

Ex Ante and Ex Post Allocation of Risk of Illegality: Regulatory Sources of Contractual Failure and Issues of Corrective and Distributive Justice

The pursuit of welfare objectives through contract law rules could be exemplified in the case of illegality and subsequent nullity sanctions attached to a contract that violates certain regulatory rules. The effectiveness of contractual allocation of risk of illegality (regulatory prohibitions), therefore, varies, depending on which contract theory prevails. Maintaining the validity of a prohibited and failed contract, and allocation of the relevant risks, is crucially dependent on whether we adhere to a welfare or rights-based theory of contract. In this paper we argue that impossibility of ex ante and ex post allocation of risk of illegality is the logical outcome of the adherence to a welfare theory of contract law, as maintaining even a minimum validity of the failed contract would result in some welfare losses. According to this approach unjust enrichment could not be rectified because it would diminish the optimal enforcement of welfare objectives. On the other hand, and despite such prohibition and illegality, a rights-based theory would resist opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviour and would ensure the validity of the contract and just allocation of losses and gains, which arise from the failure of the prohibited contract.     

传统行政法与政府管制法的关系

政府管制是现代社会的一种普遍现象,也是政府的一项重要职能。政府管制与行政管理、政府管制法与传统行政法的关系是共性与个性的关系,这种关系可以通过各种要素得到展现。从政府管制法与传统行政法、传统经济法关系的角度对行政法学体系进行再认识,可以将政府管制法作为建立在行政法一般理论基础上的一个重要分支来(亚部门法)开展研究,这对于推进政府管制法治化具有重要意义。     

哈耶克政治制度理论研究:关于自发秩序理论下普通法法治国建构路径之探讨——兼评《规则·秩序·无知——关于哈耶克自由主义的研究》

哈耶克的理论以其论战式的理论建构风格和否定性的进化认知方法对其论战的对手———唯理性主义构成了强大的冲击。然而,以批判的路径进行建构,是否可以成为普适之经验,应是值得探讨的学理问题。主要探讨以下两方面:其一,哈耶克的否定性认知方法,是否足以回避其批判对象之弊病;其二就哈耶克的标志性社会理论,尤其是自由秩序而言,在本书所指的两类秩序中,作为规则的秩序之进化,究竟是为受何者规定之变革,以及其对于处于以制度移植为代表特征的现代化进程中的中国社会所具有之意义。     

Public Choice at the Intersection of Environmental Law and Economics

Management of environmental assets begins with a commons and ends with various legal institutions that assign property rights and control. Each step in the evolution of these legal institutions involves collective decision making. Public Choice analysis helps to explain the decision making process and institutional characteristics that emerge. A survey of Public Choice literature that addresses environmental issues illustrates how Public Choice sheds light on outcomes for the U.S. experience. In the absence of Public Choice theory, law and economics scholars would be hard pressed to explain why costly forms of environmental regulation seem preferred to apparently more efficient institutions and why the body politic seemingly accepts a high-cost, low-output outcome.     

Demand Created by the Growing Digital Economy for Innovations in Regulation from the Perspective of the Rule of Law

The digital economy can significantly deepen supply-side reform and upgrade consumption and lifestyle in the new era. While having made great achievements, the digital economy has also introduced many regulatory risks and troubles. The basic logic of the digital economy is the eco-industrial chain based on data and big data resources. Since the current data property rights system is unclear, various forms of competition based on data resources have seriously challenged existing laws and their implementation mechanisms. To address the problems of an insufficient institutional supply and weak implementation, and to facilitate the growth of the digital economy, we should update the regulations’ concepts and methods, establish a new logic of system regulations, improve the implementation mechanisms by using the overall and multi-level regulation thinking, and build a multi-dimensional, diversified and all-round economic rule of law regulation system led by the government with the participation of operators, consumers and social organizations. This regulation system relies on the synergy between top-level design and top-level promotion, respects the balance of multiple interests, and finally realizes the three-dimensional integration of efficiency, fairness and security.