试论职务犯罪侦查制度的立法完善

职务犯罪是隐秘性极高的犯罪,同时由于其犯罪主体具有一定的社会地位,使职务犯罪侦查呈现出取证难、干扰多、阻力大的特征。实践中,法律对职务犯罪侦查规制的局限制约了检察机关职务犯罪侦查效能的发挥,使职务犯罪侦查工作举步维艰。根据职务犯罪侦查的特殊需要,完善相关法律制度,对提高检察机关职务犯罪的侦查能力,充分发挥其打击与预防职务犯罪的职能具有重要的现实意义。     

协商民主的优势与作用

协商民主不仅充分体现了中国社会主义民主政治的特色,而且是我们党深化政治体制改革的有力措施。协商民主有助于改进党的领导方式和执政方式;有助于拓展公民有序政治参与的渠道;有助于国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。推进中国特色社会主义民主政治的发展,必须发挥协商民主的优势和作用。     

我国检察权属性应然定位之探讨

我国检察机关法律监督地位不仅是由宪法的实然法条规定确定的,更为重要的从应然视角看有其深厚的法理基础。我国检察权定位于法律监督权,这一定位深深地根植于我国的宪政结构体制、历史文化传统以及具体国情之中。如果不能立足于这些视角冷静理性地看待检察权,那么就必然误入西方学术分析框架隐含的"三权分立"学说的先验假设的逻辑中,从而得出错误结论。此外,要准确理解检察权属性,还必须正确厘清其与法律监督权、公诉权、职务犯罪侦查权之间的具体关系。     

关于一人公司规制完善的若干建议

新《公司法》确立了“一人公司”制度,但一人公司在运行过程中存在一些问题。应通过立法对其在法律上加以有效地规制,加强对一人公司内部活动的监督和限制,对一人公司注册资本制定更加严格的保障措施,建立一人公司的信用体系,最终达到促进公司管理和市场运作规范化建设的目的。     

Influence of eco-product innovation and firm reputation on corporate social responsibility and competitive advantage: A mediation-moderation analysis

Eco-product innovation is a response to environmental legislation and social responsibility movements. Established agricultural manufacturers must figure out how to use green ideas and reputation to compete for business excellence. This study adopted a knowledge-based approach to examine corporate social responsibility and competitive advantage. This study also examined how eco-product innovation and reputation affect firms' competitive advantage. The proposed model was tested on 427 Nigerian agro-allied manufacturers using causal pathways and structural equation modeling. Business competition is directly and indirectly affected by corporate social responsibility, eco-product innovations, and firm reputation. Additionally, eco-product innovation partially mediated the nexus between corporate social responsibility and competitive advantage, while reputation moderated the influence of eco-product innovation. The findings suggest that manufacturers pursuing green initiatives should strive to participate in an eco-friendly competition and deal with policy pressures in order to meet environmental standards. Overall, this study adds the environment and business competition to the idea of innovation.     

A second chance elsewhere. Estimating the effect of winning (vs. being the runner-up) on future electoral prospects

The effect of being the winner (vs. being the runner-up) on winning subsequent elections has been estimated across a series of countries using regression discontinuity design. We contribute to this literature by incorporating politicians who move across constituencies. The US and the UK are our case studies. UK–US differences are not apparent when comparing estimates of the individual incumbency advantage, i.e., winning the same office in the same constituency. UK–US differences in the career advantage of winning office are almost entirely driven by the ability of the UK’s close-race runners-up to win elsewhere subsequently. Runners-up are more likely to move to safer seats. Marginal winners become locked-in to their seat. In the US, we observe negligible movement across constituencies.     

Does the early bird always get the worm? First round advantages and second round victories in Latin America

Runoff systems allow for a reversion of the first-round result: the most voted candidate in the first round may end up losing the election in the second. But do voters take advantage of this opportunity? Or does winning the first round increase the probability of winning the second? We investigate this question with data from presidential elections since 1945, as well as subnational elections in Latin America. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that being the most voted candidate in the first round has a substantial positive effect on the probability of winning the second round in mayoral races – especially in Brazil –, but in presidential and gubernatorial elections the effect is negative, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. The positive effect in municipal races is much stronger when the top-two placed candidates are ideologically close – and thus harder to distinguish for voters – but weakens considerably and becomes insignificant when the election is polarized. We attribute these differences to the disparate informational environment prevailing in local vs. higher-level races.