新经济与出口商品结构的软化趋势

“新经济”使产业结构逐渐软化和高级化,高新技术成为经济增长的动力。新经济对国际贸易内容和国际贸易效率的影响,使出口商品结构出现软化趋势。新经济时代下出口商品结构变化的原因主要是信息技术的引进及现代高新技术对传统产业的渗透。对新经济时代下解决我国出口商品结构低级性和滞后性提出思考。     

论收货人是否有必须提货的义务

结合各国国内立法、国际航运公约以及最新的《运输法草案》的相关内容,通过对贸易法上买方的拒收权、运输合同的性质以及航运实践进行分析,对运输合同下收货人是否有必须提货的义务进行了探讨。     

道路危险货物运输事故原因分析与对策研究

近年来，我国道路危险货物运输事故频繁发生，给国家经济、人民生活和环境保护造成极大的影响。本文在介绍典型事故案例的基础上，对我国危险货物运输事故原因进行了深入分析，认为法规制定不完善、管理和监督不到住、从业人员素质低下、运输车辆技术状况差及路况与环境影响等方面是导致事故频发的根本原因，并针对原因给出了相应的对策。     

政府职能内涵的理论阐释

政府职能是为社会提供公共物品和公共服务,但是,政府职能为什么是为社会提供公共物品和公共服务、为什么仅仅是为社会提供公共物品和公共服务这一基本问题,却一直缺乏理论上的论证和阐述。探讨这一理论问题,对于我国转变政府职能、深化行政管理体制改革、建设服务型政府等具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

Regional public goods and international organizations

This article focuses on the provision prognosis for regional public goods (RPGs) and the role of international organizations in fostering supply in developing countries. All three properties of publicness—i.e., nonrivalry of benefits, nonexcludability of nonpayers, and the aggregation technology—play a role in this prognosis. The paper highlights many provision impediments, not faced by national or global public goods. When intervention is necessary, the analysis distinguishes the role of global, regional, and other institutional arrangements (e.g., networks and public-private partnerships). The pros and cons of subsidiarity are addressed. JEL codes H87 · O18 · R58     

因输血感染所致损害的法律救济探析

在因输血使患者感染疾病的场合,如果血液提供者存在过错,由于过错责任原则的存在,患者可获得的法律救济较为简单。如果血液提供方没有过错,患者会求助于货物销售、默示担保、产品责任法律制度,诉讼前景不容乐观。货物与服务的二分法排除了在医疗输血领域货物销售法律制度的适用。血液提供的必要性、不可替代性和风险的不可避免性否定了默示担保和严格责任的适用余地。要获得产品责任制度的益处,患者要跨过"产品"、"缺陷"、"发展抗辩"三道关口,结果可想而知。     

Technological Distribution in Uganda: Information and Communications Technology and the State in an Eastern African Nation

Information and communications technologies (ICTs) include old technologies—such as the radio and the television—as well as newer technologies—such as the Internet and wireless telephony. This study considers the process that the government of Uganda has used to adopt and implement ICT policy. This study also considers the techniques which the government of Uganda has used to distribute ICTS in public locations such as government offices, schools, and hospitals. In particular, this study attempts to consider the political motivations for distribution. The Ugandan government's attempt to distribute this technology reflects strengths in the area of distribution of artefacts, particularly to rural areas. Information and communications technologies are an important part of the Ugandan economy. In addition, ICTs strengthen the ability of citizens to communicate with each other across regional and language borders through shared access points. Methodologically, this paper uses the case study method. Semi‐structured interviews were conducted with politicians, policy makers, civil society activists, citizens, academics, medical personnel, regional government officials, and business people. This paper argues that politicians use ICTs as a component of a basket of goods and services that they can distribute to witnessing publics. This paper argues that ICT should be viewed as a type of infrastructure, and that as a public good, it can be used as a “club” good or “pork.” Although several authors discuss the potential of ICTs as democratizing, this paper documents that the Ugandan government has employed ICTs in oppressive ways, including for the surveillance of opposition leaders, and for social control.     

试论警务社会化的路径选择

警务社会化是新时期有效供给安全社会秩序的科学合理的途径选择。当前我国实行警务社会化很有必要。应当采取多种路径加以推广。     

论高速公路危险化学品运输泄漏事故应急处置机制

危险化学品运输一旦在高速公路发生泄漏事故，轻则引发长时间、大面积交通堵塞，中断交通，重则严重危害人民群众生命财产安全，影响社会大局稳定。及时、得当和有效处理危险化学品运输泄漏事故，需要建立健全分类管理、分级负责、紊块结合、属地管理为主的应急管理机制，建立高速公路危险化学品运输泄漏事故应急救援机制和常备方案，妥善应对危机每个阶段。     

Public goods, taxes, and takings

Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro [Blume, L., Rubinfeld, D., & Shapiro, P. (1984). The taking of law: When should compensation be paid? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 71–92] first showed that compensation for takings can lead to a moral hazard problem that results in overinvestment in land suitable for public use. To the contrary, this paper shows that when compensation is financed by a proportional property tax, the compensation rule is irrelevant regarding the level of investment landowners make in their property, as well as the amount of land they authorize the government to acquire, both of which will be efficient. Intuitively, landowners recognize the equivalence of taxes and takings in budgetary terms, causing the distortionary effects of compensation and property taxation to cancel each other out through the balanced budget condition.