贪污罪与死刑的适用

对贪污罪适用死刑违背了刑罚的公正性,侵犯了罪犯的人格,实践中也收不到预防犯罪的良好效果,但就我国现阶段所处的条件而言,又不宜立即予以废除,因此我们只能采取先从技术上严格控制直至最后完全废除的刑事政策。     

贪污罪量刑基准体系的构建及回归分析

应当根据刑法规定,通过贪污罪的犯罪结果与处刑数量之间的线性关系,把定量分析方法应用于贪污罪的处刑实践,并依此建立了贪污罪的量刑基准体系,以准确确定被告人应当承担刑事责任的数量,这样,可以减少司法实践中法官个体之间对贪污罪行为处刑的差异。     

加入WTO后权力腐败的防治

权力是滋生腐败的基础,失去监督的权力与私欲结合便产生腐败。我国现存的官僚作风如与半市场化经济结合,将为权力腐败的滋生留下大量的空间,较之完全市场化国家的反腐败难度更大。我国加入WTO后,正在更加深入地进行经济体制的市场化改革,必将强制性制约政府的行政干预力,为我国从源头上防止权力腐败打下坚实的制度基础。     

官德建设的误区及其对策

官德建设是在反腐败斗争中群众关注的焦点,官员的道德价值趋向和道德表现,具有示范效应和导向作用。当前存在着官德建设过分依赖人性而忽视理性的看待人和分析人;过分依赖自律而忽视他律和制度建设的误区。在官德建设中,要避免官德建设的超前性与社会道德的现实性相混淆;要避免把个人道德置于制度道德建设之上。     

基层检察机关廉政文化建设研究

检察机关作为国家的法律监督机关,既肩负着反腐倡廉的历史使命,又面临着自身建设与反腐工作的巨大挑战。在开展党的群众路线过程中,一些基层检察机关不同程度地暴露出诸如作风不正、纪律不严、执法不实、行为不廉等与党的群众路线不相符甚至对立等问题,一些领导干部、检察人员的形式主义、官僚主义、享乐主义和奢靡之风依然盛行,这既严重损害了检察机关的良好形象和执法公信力,也严重阻碍了检察工作的健康持续发展。因此,检察机关需凝聚反腐工作共识,着力加强检察廉政精神文化、行为文化、制度文化和物态文化建设,努力营造以廉为荣、以贪为耻的检察机关廉政文化氛围。     

Political Corruption and the End of two-party system after the May 2015 Spanish Regional Elections

The autonomous elections held on 25 May 2015 took place simultaneously in 13 of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities (CCAA), leading to the most profound change in the autonomous party system seen in Spain in the last 20 years. A significant number of Spanish citizens hold the two main parties—the PP and the PSOE—responsible for being unable to solve their economic problems and for having pursued their austerity policies and containment of social expenditure to the extent of giving rise to the greatest inequality experienced in Spanish society in history. Furthermore, and as important as the economic crisis, support for the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, has been linked to the emergence in Spanish public debate of party regeneration and the corruption scandals that tainted the main parties and most institutions in the years prior to the elections on 25 May 2015.     

Blurring the line between licit and illicit: transnational corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond

The anti-corruption norm in both scholarship and the policy world has too narrowly focused on the domestic and institutional context of bribe-taking and public corruption. Instead, we argue that corruption in the contemporary global economy requires a multiple set of connected transactions, processes, and relationships that take place within informal transnational networks that blur the line between illegal and legal activities. These networks include multinational companies, elites in host countries, offshore financial vehicles and conduits, middlemen and brokers, and destination financial institutions. We examine how these actors operate in Central Asia, a region that is widely identified as corrupt, yet is rarely understood as embedded in the types of global processes, offshore connections and transnational links specified in our analysis. Examples of offshore centers in tax planning from Central Asia, and partial results from a field experiment based on impersonating high corruption risks from four Central Asian states, provide evidence for how the various actors in transnational financial networks structure their dealings. We then present two brief illustrative cases of how these transnational networks have operated in energy explorations services in Kazakhstan and telecommunications contracts in Uzbekistan. Our findings have theoretical, practical, and normative implications for scholars and practitioners of Central Asian international political economy and other ‘high risk' regions.     

Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement

The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market‐oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co‐development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulation. Extending the conceptual framework of institutional theory about formal and informal rules, and using public procurement in China as an example, this article shows that formal tendering rules and regulations may be modified, circumvented, or replaced by informal ones which facilitate corruption. The article identifies four corruption schemes through which procurement actors may distort competition processes and mechanisms under the guise of formal rules. Consequently, public procurement in China displays the structural outlook of market competition, but not its essential substance.     

行业协会腐败治理及其刑事责任追究

行业协会有一定的行政管理和服务职能,也有经费来源,故有腐败的条件。行业协会腐败形式多样,对行业协会腐败的治理措施主要是政社分开、加强监管以及对腐败活动追究行政和刑事责任。其中,《刑法》对以个人名义进行的腐败活动有相应的罪名惩处,而很多腐败活动以协会名义进行,《刑法》缺乏对这类腐败的罪名规定。要提高对行业协会腐败治理的效果,应在《刑法》中增设相应的行业协会单位犯罪的罪名。     

公共治理视角下的预防腐败体系建构

从权力的角度看,腐败是权力的异化。公共治理具有多元化、网络化、互动性的特征,为建构预防腐败体系提供了新的理论视角。权力、制度、法律和伦理是权力运行过程中对腐败的产生与治理都有着重要影响的四个维度。其中权力与法律侧重于内外互动,制度与伦理侧重于内部整合。四者融汇交织,形成网络式互动,产生对权力运行过程的修正作用。以此建构一套预防腐败体系,是克服传统反腐模式重惩治轻预防、重政治动员轻制度建设等弊端的有力举措。