The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Financial Condition of Municipal Government

This study examines the effect of fiscal decentralization between states and their local governments on the financial condition of municipal governments. There are strong theoretical arguments on both sides of the federalism debate about the benefits for and against decentralization. Most of the research in this area investigates economic and social welfare consequences of fiscal decentralization. There is limited research, however, on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the financial health of local governments. Using data from the nation’s 150 largest cities, this study finds that intrastate fiscal decentralization results in weaker financial condition for municipalities in those states.     

The Correlates of Local Government Responsiveness Under Decentralization: Do Performance Ratings Matter in the Philippines?

To improve local service delivery under decentralization, performance ratings are often introduced. In this article, performance ratings and other correlates of the citizens’ assessment of the responsiveness of their local governments are investigated with a regression analysis of survey data collected during the pilot test of a performance rating scheme in 12 Philippine cities and municipalities in 2001–2003. The local governments in the eight sites where the ratings were announced are assessed less responsive by their own constituents than those in the four control areas by theirs. Possibly, the citizens exposed to the ratings expected better performances from their officials.     

Politics-as-usual on trial: regional anti-corruption campaigns in Indonesia

Abstract

This article explores to what extent to local pro-reform actors matter in Indonesia through the prism of anti-corruption campaigns in the country's regions. I argue that the rash of anti-corruption campaigns and related trials involving legislative members, especially from mid-2004 onward, can be attributed neither to the resources lavished on anti-corruption organizations based in Jakarta, nor to the popularity of President Yudhoyono's anti-corruption rhetoric. Instead, it can be traced to a particular anti-corruption campaign that began in earnest in 2002 in Padang, West Sumatra. Using a multi-dimensional approach, a small group of activists relentlessly pursued their newly elected provincial legislators to be accountable to their democratic mandates and as important, to respect the rule of law pursuant to new national anti-corruption legislation. The guilty verdicts of May 2004 galvanized similar groups across the country to investigate their respective legislative bodies. This exemplary case of societal accountability also demonstrated the leverage activists can gain over local politicians when they forge coalitions with other elite actors, especially those in Jakarta. I further explore two anti-corruption cases in the province of West Kalimantan to place post-Padang developments in their proper perspective. If hopes were raised that regional anti-corruption movements–based on the Padang model–might accomplish more than sensational trials but help consolidate democracy at the regional level by holding elected officials accountable, these two examples show how fleeting these expectations might be. The trials that took place but which produced no convictions resulted from the fallout of local political tussles, and not from local civil society organizations galvanized by the ideals of transparency and good governance.     

Democratic agency in the local political sphere. Reflections on inclusion in Bolivia

Numerous arguments have been advanced in the academic and policy literature as concerns the democratizing potential of decentralization reforms in third-wave developing and transition countries; numerous also have been the case studies signalling the short-comings of these reforms. In addition, analysis of local political participation has become an important dimension of studies of democratization. Taking the case of Bolivia as an example, this article addresses an issue which has been generally overlooked in this literature, that is the process of constitution of local political agents. Where do political agents come from in the context of democratization of local politics? Additionally, this article raises questions regarding the relationship between greater inclusion and deepening democracy in the local political sphere.     

财政分权、地方财政赤字与土地财政

基于地方财政赤字的视角,研究财政分权与地方政府土地财政策略的内在作用逻辑,通过理论分析发现:地方财政赤字激励了地方政府在利益觉醒后利用预算制度缺口,用"扭曲之手"来攫取预算外财政收益,进而驱动地方政府实施积极的土地财政策略来实现财政增收的政策目标。省际面板数据的实证结果进一步验证了财政分权、地方财政赤字对土地财政的正向驱动作用。土地财政的治理从深化分税制改革、改善地方财政收入结构、变革土地财政形成机制、完善行政绩效考核体制、加强预算监管等方面入手。     

Who benefits? Intergovernmental transfers,subnational politics and local spending in Ecuador

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at the intervening role that local political elites play to translate government transfers into effective public spending. We want to know whether mayors spend IGTs to provide basic public services or infrastructure works, and whether such investments are instrumental to secure their advantage as incumbents. To test these arguments, we use a combined dataset of local public finances between 2001 and 2015 and electoral results for the 2009 and 2014 municipal elections in Ecuador. We find that mayors do respond to political incentives and make strategic spending decisions to invest on public services and visible infrastructure projects. However, we find selective spending was insufficient to secure incumbency advantage in the 2014 election. We argue that the executive intervened to block or limit the impact of spending decisions at the local level, thus creating an incumbency disadvantage for mayors. Further research is needed to explain this.     

Fiscal Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Analysis of the Intergovernmental Grant Systems in Indonesia and Thailand

Decentralization can inadvertently lead to local fiscal disparity. One type of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, the general-purpose grant, can help equalize local fiscal imbalances. This article examines the extent to which the general-purpose grant systems in Indonesia and Thailand help mitigate local fiscal disparity. The findings show that the general-purpose grant system in Thailand does not effectively address disparities in local fiscal conditions. Localities with more own-source revenues and higher per capita income receive more general-purpose grants than those with weak fiscal capacity. In contrast, Indonesia’s general-purpose grant allocation system provides more resources for economically disadvantaged and conflict-ridden provinces.     

中央—地方吏制范式分析与改革趋向

中央—地方吏制主要有三种范式:"地方分权式"、"中央集权式"和"还权于民式",其各有优点与缺点。若实行法治,要求"中央集权式"取代"地方分权式";如果要推行民主,则要求"还权于民式"取代"中央集权式"。或许最佳的中央—地方吏制是普选基础上的地方分权与中央集权的混合。     

论我国“分税制”的宪法性质

我国1994年实行分税制改革的目标是在中央政府与地方政府之间建立起制度化的财税分权体制,然而时至今日这一目标并未实现,改革的结果演化为中央政府与地方政府的财税分工,导致这一结果的根源在于我国缺乏宪政国家意义的地方自治制度这一中央政府与地方政府（联邦政府与组成部分政府）财税分权的制度基础。或许具有高度地方自治性质的人民代表大会制度,能够作为实现我国未来分税制改革中央政府与地方政府财税分权目标的制度前提。     

The Janus‐Face of Negociation Democracy. The Effects of Consensus Democracy,Direct Democracy and Decentralization on State Intervention in Swiss Cantons

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Varianzen der quantifizierbaren Staatstätigkeit in den 26 Schweizer Kantonen der 1980er und 1990er Jahre. Im Mittelpunkt der erklärenden Grssen stehen dabei Formen der Verhandlungsdemokratie, insbesondere der Konkordanz, dezentraler Entscheidungsstrukturen und direktdemokratischer Beteiligungsrechte. Wir zeigen, dass die Erweiterung des Konzeptes der Verhandlungsdemokratie auf weitere Staatsorgane neben der Regierung zur analytischen Unschärfe fhrt, da die verschiedenen Ausprägungen der politischen Machtteilung mit unterschiedlichen Wirkungen auf den Umfang des ffentlichen Sektors verbunden sind. Während die Konkordanz im Sinne der parteifrmigen Organisation politischer und sozialer Konflikte tendenziell die staatliche Intervention begnstigt, zgeln konstitutionelle Vetospieler die Staatstätigkeit, indem direktdemokratische Mitwirkung und dezentrale Machtteilung dem Staat Fesseln auf der Einnahmen‐und Ausgabenseite anlegen.