Nomination rules and the calculus of mobilization: Theory and evidence from Mexico

Does party organization shape candidates’ electoral mobilization efforts? I develop a novel theoretical account linking candidate selection rules to electoral mobilization. Nomination rules that require aspiring candidates to compete in electoral races, such as primary elections, create incentives for them to make considerable investments in order to win the party’s nomination. Using a decision-theoretic model, I show how these initial investments at the nomination stage shape the candidates’ mobilization expenditures in the general election. The main theoretical result establishes that primaries increase candidates’ mobilization efforts only when the general election is not expected to be competitive; when a close race is expected, candidates mobilize at the same rates regardless of how they were nominated. Analysis of an original dataset on candidate selection and electoral mobilization in Mexico provides strong support for the theory.     

Do voters prefer educated candidates? How candidate education influences vote choice in congressional elections

Previous research shows that democracies are more likely to produce educated politicians, but is this because voters prefer educated representatives or because of other features of the democratic process? Education may serve as a signal of candidate quality to voters or it may simply be associated with other factors, such as access to campaign funds, that help candidates win elections. We address this puzzle by analyzing head-to-head matches between candidates in US House elections from 2002 to 2012 along with a conjoint experiment. We find evidence that candidates with higher levels of education win more votes than candidates with lower levels of education, even after we account for standard indicators of candidate quality and campaign spending. This education premium not only garners more votes, but it also translates into higher probabilities of winning. The experimental results and sensitivity analyses show that it is unlikely that these results are explained by a hidden confound. The experiment also illuminates that the education premium flows from perceptions of candidate qualification and ability to pursue respondent interests.     

The Limits of Mobilization: Turnout Evidence from State House Primaries

Many analysts have lamented the decline of political mobilization efforts. They suggest that the cause of worsening voter turnout may be traceable to the failure of political candidates and political parties to target and activate nonvoters. This research explores the effects of face-to-face mobilization efforts in a sample of September 5, 2000, Florida state house primary races. Controlling for their voting history, the face-to-face mobilization effort did increase turnout by about 8% among those contacted. However, the effects were weakest among those who voted least regularly. The results suggest that implementing more face-to-face mobilization efforts would increase turnout—mostly by encouraging occasional voters to go to the polls. However, those same mobilization efforts would not substantially affect the turnout of chronic nonvoters.     

Political Business Cycle in Taiwan—Evidence from Central Government Expenditures

The political business cycle (PBC) refers to the phenomenon of an incumbent utilizing fiscal or monetary policies to create an economic boom before an election so that periodic fluctuations are induced according to election calendars. This article uses panel data from 1992 to 2010 to examine the effect of presidential elections on central government departmental expenditure in Taiwan. The results suggest an opportunistic PBC in Taiwan after the first Taiwanese presidential direct election in 1996. Furthermore, Taiwan’s government expenditure cycles have been significantly stronger in the years of the “new democracy.”     

Campaign Finances and Provincial Elections in Ontario,Canada

This study analyses the relationship between provincial election outcomes and campaign spending. This study is novel as it utilizes only those expenses that should have a causal link with election success. OLS regression controlled for candidate quality, incumbency, and economic conditions reveals a positive (negative) relationship between campaign (challenger) spending and election succession, while logistic regression results in a 93% correct prediction rate. Two-staged least-square regression corroborates the findings. The results suggest that although campaign spending is useful, incumbency status and experience are more important. Additionally, campaign spending is less important during close elections and has a diminishing marginal return.     

The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century

One of the most important developments affecting electoral competition in the United States has been the increasingly partisan behavior of the American electorate. Yet more voters than ever claim to be independents. We argue that the explanation for these seemingly contradictory trends is the rise of negative partisanship. Using data from the American National Election Studies, we show that as partisan identities have become more closely aligned with social, cultural and ideological divisions in American society, party supporters including leaning independents have developed increasingly negative feelings about the opposing party and its candidates. This has led to dramatic increases in party loyalty and straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage of incumbency and growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of House, Senate and even state legislative elections. The rise of negative partisanship has had profound consequences for electoral competition, democratic representation and governance.     

Regression Discontinuity diagnostics reveal statistical anomalies in Turkish elections

Using Regression Discontinuity diagnostics we document a number of statistical anomalies in the 2004 Turkish mayoral elections. The governing party that controls the parliament is much more likely to win close races than lose. Moreover, compared to close governing party losses, there is a sharp drop in turnout and contending party votes in close governing party wins. Finally, the parties that disproportionately lose very close races are exclusively ideological competitors of the governing party. Among the potential mechanisms that may create those anomalies, electoral manipulation seems to a plausible explanation. Those anomalies show that the outcomes of very close popular elections can be non-random and that the assumption of the continuity of the expected potential outcomes at the threshold could be violated. We discuss implications of our findings for Regression Discontinuity Designs and for understanding the consolidation of the right-wing electorate in Turkey during the last decade.     

Victory without power: The Pm-Pendulum forecast

The “PM and Pendulum” model was adjusted for the 2015 General Election to take account of the Liberal-Democratic participation in government and the SNP surge. So adjusted, the model predicts a Tory vote victory by 3.4 percent over Labour. The seat forecast puts the Tories ahead with 287 seats to 263 for Labour, with 41 for the SNP. Thus another Hung Parliament! Ex-post estimates show that without the Lib-Dem adjustments the model would have predicted a Conservative majority.     

Do local elections predict the outcome of the next general election? Forecasting British general elections from local election national vote share estimates

This article outlines a method for forecasting British general elections from national level vote shares at local elections. Although local elections are notionally ‘local’, the evidence suggests that they at least partly mirror national electoral fortunes. A simple general election vote share on local election vote share regression model that accounts for partisan differences and incumbency effects fits past data with reasonable accuracy. Based on the results of the 2013 and 2014 local elections, the model forecast a 56% probability of hung parliament, with a 78% probability of the Conservatives receiving the largest share of the vote.     

A Tale of Three Cities: Electoral Accountability in Indonesian Local Politics

In Indonesia, local government is endowed with important policy prerogatives and local politics is key to advance social welfare. The literature on Indonesian local politics has convincingly exposed serious limitations in local democratic practices, and it has questioned the ability of local democracy to promote genuine political change. This work, however, predominantly focuses on elite politics and specific forms of accountability based on patronage and clientelism. In this paper, we study democratic accountability in Indonesia from a different perspective. Drawing from the comparative literature on voting behavior, we hypothesize that Indonesian voters evaluate local politicians for their performance, and that they vote to reward or punish them for what they do in office. The analysis of three original surveys conducted in the cities of Medan, Samarinda and Surabaya offers partial support for this argument. While there is a positive relationship between evaluations of local government performance and support for incumbents, the strength of this link varies substantially across individuals and cities. The results shed new light on voter-politician linkages in Indonesia, suggesting that forms of accountability different from clientelism may emerge in this large and diverse country.