Political Decentralization and Technological Innovation: Testing the Innovative Advantages of Decentralized States

Are politically decentralized states better at fostering long‐run technological innovation than centralized states? Societies with decentralized governments are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation's gale of creative destruction. Meanwhile, centralized states, even when democratic, have come to be viewed as rigid and thus hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new technology, or prone to cling too long to foolhardy or outdated technological projects. Therefore government decentralization is often perceived as a necessary institutional foundation for encouraging long‐run technological innovation. However, in this article, I analyze data on international patent activity, scientific publications, and high‐technology exports, and show that there exists little evidence for an aggregate relationship between government structure and technological innovation.     

Benevolent Governance and Fiscal Federalism in Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Teutscher Fürsten Stat</Emphasis> (1656): Comment on Erik S. Reinert

The author comments on Erik S. Reinert’s presentation held at the 17{th} Heilbronn Symposion in Economics and the Social Sciences in June 2004.     

美国与德国法院体制之比较

美国与德国都是联邦制国家也是奉行宪法至上的国家 ,两国的法院体制都必须适应这一特点。比较两国的法院体制的基本特征 ,分析这些特征产生的原因并进而探讨法院在维护联邦制中的作用。     

Defying the traditional theses: Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Belgium

ABSTRACT

This article considers the features of intergovernmental relations (IGR) on immigrant integration in Belgium and critically examines the dynamics that shape them. The characteristics of IGR on immigrant integration in Belgium are shown to vary over time and differ across regions and sub-policy areas (immigrant reception policies and anti-discrimination). The comparative case study indicates that the primary traditional theses of the international comparative IGR literature, namely classical institutionalism and party politics, do not provide insights into the nature and mechanisms of IGR on immigrant integration in Belgium. Less established variables like European integration and sub-state claims for distinctiveness constitute key explanatory variables. While European integration explains the increase of IGR over time, notwithstanding the appearance of party incongruence, sub-state claims for distinctiveness enlighten the more conflictual nature of IGR with Flanders, even in cases of more party congruence than for Francophone authorities.     

Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.     

Not Centralisation but Decentralised Integration through Australia's National Mental Health Policy

This article challenges dominant perceptions of Commonwealth centralisation in Australia's federal system. While recognising the Commonwealth has entered a range of policy fields not anticipated by federal founders, it argues this does not equate to a generalised unidirectional and hierarchical orchestration of state/territory functions. The crucial case of mental health policy is presented as an alternative scenario in Australia's federal experience. Theoretically key challenges from the multi‐level governance literature are proffered against the centralisation thesis. These include queries about the origins of Commonwealth directives and assumptions of zero‐sum notions of state/territory autonomy. Brief empirical analysis highlights the role of the Commonwealth as a conduit of horizontal and vertical flows of knowledge through the national mental health policy agenda. Given disconnect and diversity between national ambitions and their realisation at state/territory level, it is argued better proceduralisation through bottom‐up peer dialogue and feedback present alternative routes towards decentralised integration.     

Domestic Institutions and regional representation in the European Union: the case of Austria

Multi-level governance in the European Union is a well-established model in the EU literature. An area of ongoing focus within that literature has been the regional representation offices that have proliferated in Brussels. This article addresses the research question of how domestic institutional arrangements affect the strategies of regions seeking representation at the European level. Based on the results of original interviews with directors and deputy-directors of Austrian regional representation offices in Brussels to illustrate the approach these offices take when interacting with other European institutions and with Austrian federal representatives, this study builds on the regional representation literature that has stressed the pre-eminence of state institutional structures in understanding the role of regional representation offices and argues that the importance of the offices is best examined through a focus on state level institutions and power arrangements rather than on office impact at the European level.     

Diversity,federalism and the nineteenth-century liberals

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues for the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity.     

Vertical party integration: informal and human linkages between elections in a Canadian province

Examining multi-level vertical party linkages in Canada’s largest province, this paper makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, drawing on data from a unique survey of constituency associations, the paper focuses on an often unexplored aspect of parties: their local organisations. Second, the paper offers an exploratory analysis of constituency level factors in order to determine which types of constituency associations are the most likely to be integrated. The results of the logistic regression demonstrate the possibility of non-party-based factors such as electoral strength that may contribute to vertical party integration.     

Federalism in Africa: Origins,Operation and (In)Significance

Abstract

Recent years have seen major advances in the comparative study of federalism and a growing literature on decentralization in Africa, but there has been surprisingly little systematic comparison of African federalism. This article explains several commonalities in the origins and operation of Africa's three main federal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Each country used ‘holding-together’ federalism in order to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country—especially Ethiopia and South Africa—also experienced several key centripetal forces: dominant governing parties, top-down state administration and high degrees of fiscal centralism. Federalism mattered in offering accommodative decentralization, but in its operation subnational governments have limited autonomy because of these interlocking centralizing features. This African variant of federalism can have certain salutary features, even as it precludes the possibility of many of the theorized advantages of federalism that are predicated on real subnational autonomy.