Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in multi-level states. A comparative assessment

ABSTRACT

The study of intergovernmental relations (IGR) is a classical research area in scholarship on federalism and territorial politics. However, it has largely ignored the relatively new, and recently decentralized area of immigrant integration. The aim of this Special Issue is twofold. First, it aims to analyse how governments in multi-level states coordinate on immigrant integration. Second, it wishes to explain the dynamics that shape the features of intergovernmental relations. In doing so, we focus on four multi-level states; two of which are federal (Belgium and Canada) and two that are decentralized (Italy and Spain). Whilst we engage with the established literature on intergovernmental relations to formulate hypotheses about the nature and dynamics of intergovernmental relations, we also formulate less explored hypotheses. Our overarching argument is that the scholarship on IGR benefits from in-depth comparative case studies comparing IGR not just across countries, but also across policy areas and over time.     

Where does learning take place? The role of intergovernmental cooperation in policy diffusion

Although it is widely accepted that a decentralised system can enhance policy learning and the spread of best practices, an under‐researched question is where that learning process takes place. Using data on the diffusion of health care policies in Switzerland, this article analyses the role of institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation and its impact on the spread of successful policies. The results show that joint membership of policy makers in health policy specific intergovernmental bodies is related to the diffusion of best practices.     

财政联邦主义理论及政府间关系分析模式概述

财政联邦主义理论体系根植于西方国家长期的民主政治和地方自治实践及经验总结,政府间关系分析模式业已突破传统单纯关注中央——地方二元结构的思维局限,逐渐发展成为多元主体相互影响下的网络体系,同时融入其他学科的理论假设进入分析框架。     

Comparative Climate Change Policy and Federalism: An Overview

This commentary provides an overview of the four papers in this issue of Review of Policy Research on the politics of climate change. The papers all address in one way or another aspects of how federal‐type systems are dealing with the collective action and multilevel governance issues of climate change policy. The comparative study of federal systems provides insight into how domestic authority is so often overlapping and divided when dealing with greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Federal arrangements offer a rich array of norms, institutions, and practices for tackling these problems. Federal systems grapple continuously with the kinds of issues that are the most intractable in the climate change case, such as overcoming interregional differences of interests and values. A common federal feature is competition among subnational governments and between them and national or federated governments over climate change policy, which has been especially significant in the United States and in Canada in the relative absence of national action––although soberingly, the whole is as yet nowhere near as great as the sum of the parts. More significant, but rarer is the achievement of tighter coordination in federal systems achieved through intergovernmental co‐decision, as seen in the European Community and Australia. This has been accomplished in large part due to a consensus among all intergovernmental parties on the nature of the problem and congruence with the existing international regime, characteristics missing in the North American context.     

Public Attitudes toward Climate Science and Climate Policy in Federal Systems: Canada and the United States Compared1

Multilevel governance poses several challenges for the politics of climate change. On the one hand, the unequal distribution of power and interests can serve as a barrier to implementing coherent policy at a federal level. On the other, these features also enable policy leadership among sub‐federal units. In the context of wide variation in climate policy at both national and sub‐federal levels in Canada and in the United States, this paper utilizes an original data set to examine public attitudes and perceptions toward climate science and climate change policy in two federal systems. Drawing on national and provincial/state level data from telephone surveys administered in the United States and in Canada, the paper provides insight into where the public stands on the climate change issue in two of the most carbon‐intensive federal systems in the world. The paper includes the first directly comparable public opinion data on how Canadians and Americans form their opinions regarding climate matters and provides insight into the preferences of these two populations regarding climate policies at both the national and sub‐federal levels. Key findings are examined in the context of growing policy experiments at the sub‐federal level in both countries and limited national level progress in the adoption of climate change legislation.     

The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq

After uprooting Saddam Hussein from power, establishing democracy in Iraq has been declared among the most important objectives of the U.S.-led Coalition. However, the Coalition has encountered complex ethnic and religious relations and resentment of foreign intervention in Iraq. These reactions reflect decades, even centuries, of divisive and antagonistic policies whose impacts continue to complicate and threaten coexistence and civil peace. The immediate challenge of achieving stability and peace in Iraq, therefore, rests in the ability to foster a genuinely indigenous institutional political structure that can accommodate the different ethnic and sectarian aspirations. This article highlights the major potential shortcomings of the federal model established by the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period." It also examines the shortcomings of the List Proportional Representation system as presented by the United Nations for Iraq's transition, and alternatively proposes national electoral reform strategies, with the implementation of an Alternative Vote system with Minority Provision in the election to the National Assembly, as a means to strengthen Iraq's national unity.     

Kompensationsmöglichkeiten föderaler Vollzugsdefizite. Das Beispiel der kantonalen Alkoholpräventionspolitiken

The implementation of public policies in Switzerland is highly federal and decentralized with the main competencies at the sub‐national level of the member states, i.e. the cantons. Comparing alcohol prevention policies in the Swiss cantons, the present article supports the thesis of considerable differences in the cantonal provision of respective outputs. At the same time we can find cooperative implementation strategies compensating the resulting performance deficits. However, this so‐called “secondary harmonization” only is applied by about half of the cantons. We identify three reasons for that fact: First, only those cantons engage in horizontal cooperation that, on the one hand, have an actual interest in improving their policy performance, and, on the other hand, can afford it resource‐wise. Second, today's paradigm of the “lean state” leads to competitive rather than cooperative implementation strategies. Third, the federal administration neither encourages horizontal cooperation, nor do we find a vertical cooperation between the higher and the lower federal level on an equal basis.     

地方举债权与财政联邦制的思考

从地方政府的负债恶化和预算法修改的呼声入手,评析地方政府的各种对策,在财政联邦制的框架内,以地方政府的举债权和规范市政收益债券为切入点,分析中央政府与地方政府的财政权力的合理和制度性划分,方法寻求到一个契合中国目前国情的财政分权模式。     

论北洋军阀统治时期熊希龄的国家结构观

在袁世凯统治时期,熊希龄曾入主内阁,在地方制度上提出采行单一制国家结构、实行中央集权的施政纲领,对袁世凯加强中央集权统治起到了推波助澜的作用.1917年至1926年,他改变立场,极力主张联邦制,20年代还汲汲于实际活动.熊希龄思想的变化具有复杂的背景和深刻的根源,典型地反映了立宪党人的政治见解和政治性格.     

Consociationalism and Intergovernmental Relations ‐ Linking Internal and External Power‐Sharing in the Swiss Federal Polity1

For several decades, comparative politics has treated the Swiss political system as the prime example of a power‐sharing polity in which consociationalism and cooperative intergovernmental relations co‐exist in a mutually reinforcing manner. Surprisingly enough, so far the linkages between these two types of power‐sharing have been neither adequately theorized nor empirically analyzed. In order to substantiate how intra‐governmental power‐sharing facilitates intergovernmental cooperation, this paper proposes a rational choice approach specifying different mechanisms driving actors' choices in favour of or against strong intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs). Just to mention two of the mechanisms at work: given multi‐party executives in the cantons, over time, party compositions hardly change and ideological differences between cantonal executives are moderate. Hence, a fairly stable horizontal interest profile characterized by little ideological divergence facilitates the setting‐up of strongly institutionalized IGAs. These mechanisms are examined empirically, first, by systematically assessing the organization of Swiss intergovernmental relations and second, by identifying the motives of Swiss intergovernmental actors to establish the given structures on the basis of in‐depths interviews. While the results indicate that intra‐cantonal power‐sharing facilitates inter‐governmental institutionalization, they also reveal what culturalist approaches on Swiss federalism presupposing actors' inclination towards cooperation commonly overlook, namely Swiss actors' strategic moves to guard own powers and defend institutional self‐interests affecting organizational developments in the intergovernmental arena.