论国有企业民主管理制度基本内涵

在市场经济的国有企业、公有企业,甚至私营企业中移植计划经济中生成的职工民主管理制度,是否可行?这涉及到对其本质特征的认定。运用企业理论对国有企业管理制度进行分析,进而得出国有企业职工民主管理制度生成的制度原因,得出国有企业职工民主管理制度的根本性质特征:政治性约束机制。     

地方举债权与财政联邦制的思考

从地方政府的负债恶化和预算法修改的呼声入手,评析地方政府的各种对策,在财政联邦制的框架内,以地方政府的举债权和规范市政收益债券为切入点,分析中央政府与地方政府的财政权力的合理和制度性划分,方法寻求到一个契合中国目前国情的财政分权模式。     

Decentralized education spending and regional disparities: Evidence from Chinese counties 1997–2001

Chinese fiscal reforms in the past decade have recentralized government revenues, making lower governments more dependent on central and provincial funds. At the same time, decentralization in spending has obliged the county governments to take primary responsibility for financing compulsory education. That vertical imbalance can lead to widening regional gap in education if the central government does not carry out effective redistributive fiscal transfers. This paper examines a data set that includes all the counties of mainland China from 1997 through 2001 and finds that regional economic and budgetary disparities did carry over to education spending. The author would like to thank Professor Alice Cooper and the anonymous reviewers for invaluable suggestions.     

从马克思的财政理论到西方财政政治学的兴起——议会财政权理论的历史性梳理

财政是政府的命脉,财政权是主导国家财政资源配置乃至政治权力配置的关键要素。目前,西方国家议会的财政权已形成一个完备的制度体系,对议会财政权的理论研究也走向更深的层次。本文从阐述马克思的财政理论入手,着重介绍以亚当.斯密为代表的传统学派、以诺思和布坎南为代表的新制度主义学派和公共选择学派对议会财政权问题的论述以及当代以威尔达夫斯基为代表的财政政治学理论的兴起过程,在系统地梳理议会财政权理论历史发展脉络的基础上,阐明其在政治学研究领域的重要地位。     

Organization and Reporting of Public Financial Accounts: Insights and Policy Implications from the Singapore Budget

This paper analyses the Singapore government budget's organization and reporting structure, and draws lessons and policy implications for improving public financial management practices. The paper finds that Singapore's fiscal marksmanship record has been poor with consistent underestimates of revenue and overestimates of expenditure. Second, subtle divergences from international reporting standards limit the information available and constrain the budget's analytical usefulness in international comparisons. Third, current reporting conventions of the budget fail to provide an adequate representation of the government's fiscal position. Fourth, revised estimates of budgetary balances in line with international reporting standards show a considerable increase in the fiscal space available. The policy implications of these findings are discussed, as well as some reporting changes which can help improve the fiscal marksmanship record, increase public sector transparency and accountability, and facilitate better quality discourse among all stakeholders on public financial management.     

Financial Markets Matter More than Fiscal Institutions for the Success of the Euro

Many argue that the euro is handicapped as a currency because European governments are unwilling to pool responsibility for fiscal policy in common institutions. This argument is derived from the theory of optimum currency areas and fuelled by analogy with US experience. It is mistaken. A monetary union does not need a fiscal union to work. Worse, efforts to build European fiscal institutions are likely to distract European policymakers from a more important agenda. Europe needs a fully functioning banking union with a common risk-free asset if Europeans want to stabilise the euro as a common currency. Moreover, it would need these things even if the euro did not exist and all it had was the common market. Financial stability – and not fiscal federalism – is the key to Europe's future. European policymakers should focus their efforts on building the necessary institutions.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Natural Disaster Mitigation: Evidence from the United States

How decentralized government structure influences public service delivery has been a major focus of debate in the public finance literature. In this paper, we empirically examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on natural disaster damages across the U.S. states. We construct a unique measure of decentralization using state and local government expenditures on natural resources, which include investment in flood control and mitigation measures, among others. Using state‐level panel data from 1982 to 2011, we find that states that are more decentralized in natural resource expenditures have experienced more economic losses from floods and storms. This effect is only pronounced in states that are at higher risks of flooding. Our findings suggest that fiscal decentralization may lead to inefficient protection against natural disasters and provide implications for the assignment of disaster management responsibilities across different levels of government in the U.S. federal system.     

我国财政权限配置的不足与改进

我国财政权限的配置还存在一些不足.我国未来财政权限的配置在总体上应该采取非对称型模式,即将财政收益权在各级政府间进行适当划分,并偏向中央政府,使中央政府保持足够的财力;在对财政收益权进行划分的同时,对财政立法权则应基本保持集中,由中央政府享有主要的权力;进一步协调财政(税收)征收权在两套征管机关之间的行使;赋予各级地方政府相对独立的财政预算权.     

The OBR and the March 2023 Budget: The Travails of UK Economic Growth and the Politics of Technocratic Fiscal Governance

This article places the Office for Budget Responsibility's commentary on the March 2023 UK Budget in political context. It explores how increased independent expert input has transformed the UK economic policy regime, focussing on the complex relationship between rules-based economic governance, independent oversight and fiscal discipline. The technocratic veneer that enshrines the UK fiscal watchdog obscures the inevitable politics of rules-based fiscal governance. The recent budget revealed OBR scepticism about how far budget measures can address the UK economy's long-term structural weaknesses. This underlined the key role for judgment inherent within technocratic fiscal oversight.     

Sovereign Wealth Fund and fiscal federalism in Nigeria (2011–14): An assessment of contending issues

After more than half a century as a leading oil-producing nation in Africa, Nigeria followed the footsteps of most natural resources rich countries (particularly crude-oil) by establishing the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). SWF is a large pool of state-owned investment fund composed of diverse financial instruments, invested in whole or in part, outside home countries. Since 2004, ‘Special funds’, of which SWF is part, have become issues of serious contention between the Federal and state governments in Nigeria. On 22 May 2011, the 36 state Governors approached the Nigerian Supreme Court, requesting the Court to use its judicial powers to squash plans by the Federal Government of Nigeria to withdraw $1 billion from the Excess Crude Account to float the planned SWF. The bone of contention surrounds issues of constitutionality, ownership and prudency in the management of the fund. Relying on extant literature, Acts of Parliament as well as commentaries, opinion pieces, editorials and news articles from Nigerian newspapers, this paper examines the controversies that surround the establishment of SWF in Nigeria within the context of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and assesses the conflict mitigating capacity of the Nigeria’s federalism especially in the light of the nation’s fiscal practices.