在我国实施财政政策和货币政策应注意的几个问题

西方国家宏观经济调控的主要手段是财政政策和货币政策 ,借鉴其实施这两种政策的实践经验 ,结合我国国情 ,我国在制定和实施政策时须注意以下几个方面 :一、从长期和战略的角度看 ,应坚持“中性”的货币政策和财政政策。二、从短期来看 ,应采取相机抉择的财政和货币政策。三、货币政策和财政政策是一把双刃剑 ,既可能优化资源配置 ,又可能强化所有制结构和产业结构的扭曲 ,降低资源配置效率。四、把需求管理政策与人力政策相配合方能有效治理我国的失业问题。     

公共财政支出结构失衡对区域经济协调增长的影响研究

关于公共财政支出结构失衡对区域经济协调增长影响的研究表明,只有当各区域生产性支出与非生产支出相等时,各区域之间的经济增长速度才能达到最大化。在构建衡量公共财政支出结构失衡指标的基础上,通过指数计算,可以发现中部地区的财政支出结构失衡程度最严重,其次是东部,最后是西部。再运用该指数并结合运用1994年—2007年的面板数据,采用系统广义矩两步法对公共财政支出结构失衡与区域经济协调增长之间的关系进行实证分析,结果表明,东部的财政支出结构失衡反而能够促进经济的增长,中部和西部地区的财政支出结构失衡对经济增长并没有明显的作用。因此,我国地方政府财政支出结构需要得到进一步改善,才能促进区域之间经济的均衡增长。     

现代财政制度的法学审思

十八届三中全会提出建立“现代财政制度”,这是建立健全现代国家治理机制、实现长治久安的制度保障.传统财政制度重国家本位轻人民本位、重管理轻治理、重结果导向轻过程导向.而现代财政制度具有法治性、回应性、均衡性和公共性的品格,彰显对公共财产权的规范,进而实现对公共财产、私人财产的双重保障;其法律构造内含宪法规范、公共财产规范、分配规范和宏观调控规范四个维度.构建现代财政制度,应以点带面、循序渐进,现阶段应将改进预算制度、完善税收立法和建立事权与支出责任相适应的财政分权模式作为三大抓手.     

THE SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGETING SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

This article describes and evaluates the budgetary institutions in Saudi Arabia. The primary sources of information for this study are publications from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and a survey implemented to investigate the different aspects of budget formulation and execution. We find that the Saudi budget experiences difficulties associated with incremental annual line‐item budgeting systems. Although capital expenditures in the education and health sectors are guided by five‐year plans developed by the Ministry of Planning, the rest of the budget preparation procedure is mainly driven by requests from government agencies to increase spending (i.e. a bottom‐up approach), instead of being based on an early determination of the macroeconomic constraints and the acceptable level of deficit (i.e. a top‐down approach). The result is an exacerbation of tragedy of the commons problems associated with information asymmetry and conflict‐avoidance strategies. We discuss possible reasons for this finding and offer budgetary reform proposals. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

新形势下人大财政监督职能之建构简

《宪法》将人民代表大会制度规定为我国的根本政治制度,并赋予人大立法权、监督权、重大事项决定权和任免权的职能。其中,监督权更是起到了约束政府权力的关键性作用,应充分贯彻于预算的整个过程。在社会主义法律体系已经形成的新形势下,人大在进一步完善立法的同时,亟须“一体两翼”地着力加强预算监督,促进工作重点向强化预算审批职能方面转移,不断提高理财治国能力,推动国家治理模式的现代化转型,从而与公共财政、良法善治的理念相契相合,顺应关注民生、防治腐败的时代发展要求。     

Testing for Fiscal Illusion in Wisconsin Towns

Fiscal illusion, a theory of the impact of government revenue structures on voter decision-making, has been studied extensively by economists and political scientists; however, empirical verification has been limited. This study builds on Lowery's (1987a) work by examining the relationship between suggested illusionary revenues and measures of electoral stress. Here, electoral stress is measured as constituent contacting—one possible measure of voter influence—for local government officials up for re-election. Using a combination of survey data from over 1,000 Wisconsin town board members, audited fiscal data and U.S. Census data, we were able to test for fiscal illusion. Our findings show that when looking at five revenue types (conditional grants, unconditional grants, property taxes, user fees and charges, and debt service) there is some evidence suggesting officials seeking another term in office will tend to support fees and charges as a revenue structure over other structures. Overall, there is little consistent evidence suggesting that elected officials are manipulating revenue structures for electoral gain. Revenue structures are mostly influenced by social and economic factors, such as median household income, population changes, and per capita property valuation.     

Symposium Introduction: Local Responses to ‘Austerity’

This introduction to the symposium sets out the context for local government in the United Kingdom at the current time. It outlines the scale of the reductions in funding since 2010, showing how uneven these cuts have been across the country and the reasons for this. It also describes the increased exposure to risk of both local government and of the citizens and communities it serves. The central question for the papers which follow is how local government is responding to these twin challenges. The papers provide insights from a number of detailed studies of individual authorities, exploring the strategies adopted to manage in response. The analyses focus on the distributive consequences for individuals and communities, but they also reflect on the wider consequences for local government itself. A particular concern is whether local responses are changing as austerity moves from its initial to its later phase.     

Do Electoral Risks Moderate the Effect of Partisan and Electoral Cycles on Debt-Financed Local Spending?

Governments’ use of debt as a political instrument has been widely studied from the perspective of partisan and electoral cycles, mainly concerning central government. On the whole, previous studies have attempted to determine the effects of political ideology and the proximity of elections on the opportunistic use of public spending. The current study aims to broaden the scope of attention to the effect of partisan and electoral cycles on debt, by means of a broader consideration of the motives that lead politicians to take on a deficit and that are usually linked to the associated electoral risk. More particularly, we examine whether, during the electoral period, greater confidence in re-election can modify party behaviour concerning the use of public spending, and if so, whether the change is greater or smaller depending on the ruling party’s ideology. The results obtained show that local administrations need to incur debt, although politicians take on more liability than is appropriate to their demographic and economic characteristics, especially in an election year. It was also found that political stability favours a reduction in the public deficit, a pattern that is maintained in electoral periods. This effect was found to be independent of the partisan cycle.     

The Centre Decides and the Local Pays: Mandates and Politics in Local Government Financial Management in China

Abstract

In China, ‘the centre decides and the local pays’ means the central government decides on policies but requires its local subordinates to provide the financial resources. The politics of this practice implies that local government has to take different strategies to cope with the unfunded mandates with various consequences. As an empirical study framed by Niskanen’s rational choice theory and Dunleavy’s ‘bureau-shaping’ model, this paper examines how the unfunded mandates impact local government behaviour. Its main focus is the question of how the local officials respond, the extent to which they comply or resist and the techniques they use to adapt to these mandates. This paper finds when deciding how to pay the bill for the centre, local officials have to take a number of principles into consideration. They need to stick to the people-orientated principle and to finance money for salaries and operation to the extent that they can; they also have to see if the mandates are strictly implemented or popular among local people.     

The Benevolent Prince in Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Teutscher Fürsten Stat</Emphasis> with Special Consideration of the Prince’s Revenues,Regalia and Taxes: Comment

The comment considers Seckendorff’s Teutscher Fürsten Stat as an ambitious outline of a developmental strategy, in which predominant role is played by education. On the assumption of this perspective Helge Peukert’s contribution is evaluated and criticised. Alternative interpretations and categorisations pertaining to Seckendorff’s ideas on social and economic policies are offered. Questions of further research regarding the principles of ideal government and guidelines for fiscal policies as propounded by Teutscher Fürsten Statare delineated.