高等学校惩戒学生行为的行政法理分析

高等学校惩戒学生的行为具有社会行政属性,其地位不宜界定为"法律法规授权组织",而应理解为社会行政主体.高校对学生的惩戒权自然也应接受行政法治原则的观照.在监督方式上,应充分尊重高校的内部监督和行政监督,认真把握司法监督的广度和深度.     

On the Regulation of the Discretion of Environmental Administrative Punishment: Based on the Framework of the Modernized Environment Governance System

With the increasing environmental risks, the limitations of legislative regulation, negative judicial regulation and weak administrative regulation make it difficult to regulate the exercise of the discretion of environmental administrative punishment, which also increases the difficulty of the implementation of environmental administrative penalty decisions. The government, enterprises and the public three-dimensional main body structure constructed by the modern environmental governance system provides a new framework for the discretionary regulation of environmental administrative punishment. Based on the traditional theories of administrative Law, three regulation mechanisms can be formed,which include administrative self-control, negotiation regulation, and the social regulation. These three regulatory mechanisms working together in the whole process of environmental administration would regulate and restrict the exerting of discretion of environmental administrative punishment.     

中国高等学校扩招政策分析

政策网络分析是西方国家研究公共管理和公共政策的重要途径。运用这种理论进行分析,中国高校扩招政策具有关系稳定、对成员资格有高度限制、参与者之间相互依赖等特性。这种政策在实施过程中产生了诸如教育财政融资体系不健全、毕业生就业压力增加等问题。需要多元的社会利益群体的参与,以利于配套政策的制定,形成开放、多元的利益诉求整合模式。     

浅析射击过程中的心理调控

在射击过程中,如果学员训练时间不长或经验不足,心理活动的变化就会使其形成的技术动作规律遭到破坏,究其原因,在于学员的害怕心理、缺乏自信心、重复性受挫、成绩观念、习惯性怯场等。对此,应用心理暗示法、意念训练法、表象训练法、腹式松弛训练法、适应性训练法等进行矫正。     

我国高等教育评估专业化新进展综述

评估专业化即评估职业个体和群体逐渐符合专业标准,社会地位和专业地位不断获得提升的过程。随着教育评估实践的逐步开展、评估理论的深入研究,我国高等教育评估专业化的趋势越来越明显。在此,在分析评估专业化基本内涵的基础上,从评估法规建设、理论研究、机构发展、评估机制、专家队伍等方面对我国当前高等教育评估专业化的进展进行了梳理和归纳总结。     

论和谐社会审美精神的建构和指向

和谐社会的审美精神，既是社会发展的现实需要，又是中华民族优秀文化传统发扬光大的需要。中华文明五千年历史文化中积淀着和谐意识与和谐美精神，建构起和谐精神的根基。现代和谐社会在继承发展中，以其现代意识提升人的综合素质，提高生活的品质，弥合现实与理想的关系和矛盾，从而以审美精神建构和谐社会，使和谐社会呈现出审美化、理想化与现实性、功用性结合的特征，体现出和谐社会的审美价值和意义。     

On the value of formal assessment of uncertainty in regulatory analysis

The US Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2003 a new requirement for the treatment of uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of proposed regulations, requiring agencies to carry out a formal quantitative uncertainty assessment regarding a regulation’s benefits and costs if either is expected to reach $1 billion annually. Despite previous use in other contexts, such formal assessments of uncertainty have rarely been employed in RIAs or other regulatory analyses. We describe how formal quantitative assessments of uncertainty – in particular, Monte Carlo analyses – can be conducted, we examine the challenges and limitations of such analyses in the context of RIAs, and we assess how the resulting information can affect the evaluation of regulations. For illustrative purposes, we compare Monte Carlo analysis with methods typically used in RIAs to evaluate uncertainty in the context of economic analyses carried out for the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Nonroad Diesel Rule, which became effective in 2004.     

Globalization and legal change: The “Americanization” of European law?

Intensified global economic competition, economic liberalization, and the rise of EU governance have led some observers to argue that there has been a trend toward the “Americanization” of the European “way of law.” This article addresses that contention, focusing on legal change in European member states. It first describes ways in which the American legal tradition has differed most sharply from the national legal systems of Western Europe (including Great Britain) and the political and economic factors that account for this “American legal distinctiveness.” Similar political and economic factors currently are at work in Europe, the article acknowledges, creating incentives for legal convergence. But it also argues that European legal culture and the political organization of European national states generate path‐dependent forces that impede European movement toward American ways of law, and it discusses six important differences between European and American law that remain entrenched and are unlikely to disappear.     

The economic significance of “insignificant” rules

We know relatively little about the economic effects of “insignificant” rules because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be cumulatively important. We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants, which is not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit–cost test. We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to benefit–cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.     

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation.