高校建设必须以"三个代表"重要思想为指导

在高校建设中全面贯彻"三个代表"重要思想,是实践和发展"三个代表"重要思想的重要任务.必须牢牢把握"发展"这一主题,树立科学的发展观,办好高等教育,培养出社会主义现代化建设需要的合格人才,推动先进生产力的发展;加强高校精神文明建设,树立育人为本的校风,敬业为荣的教风,成才为志的学风,推动先进文化的前进;抓发展,抓改革创新,抓规范管理,营造良好的工作、生活和学习环境,实现和维护广大师生的根本利益.     

Why privacy is at risk

Dr Chris Pounder has been professionally involved in delivering data protection services since the time of the Lindop Report in 1978. Here he argues for an express link between the data protection and human rights regimes. Amberhawk is a new company founded by Chris in 2008 with Sue Cullen as the vehicle for the continuation of the information law training business previously operated by Pinsent Masons LLP.     

风险规制与专家理性——评布雷耶的《粉碎邪恶循环:面向有效率的风险规制》

布雷耶在《粉碎邪恶循环:面向有效率的风险规制》一书中分析了美国政府在规制那些不起眼的风险过程中所呈现的风险规制议程确定的随意性、规制缺乏连续性等情形。他认为产生这些问题的症结可以归因于一个邪恶循环,即公众对风险的认知、国会的反应以及规制过程的不确定。为打破这一邪恶循环,则需要建立一种以目标为导向的,去政治化的、精英式的"超级专家理性"制度。就我国风险规制而言,由于存在着与美国政府相似的问题,而布雷耶法官所提出的"超级专家理性"制度切中了我国风险规制体系的要害,因此,这项制度对于破解我国风险规制所存在的问题具有重要的启示意义。     

环境规制与财产权保障的冲突和协调

环境保护应当协调好环境规制与财产权保障之间的关系。德国《宪法》尽力协调私人财产权的自由保障功能和社会公正功能之间关系的做法值得我们借鉴。在环境规制行动中,要分清对财产使用的负外部性的规制和特殊贡献两种不同情形,贯彻好比例原则和平等原则。     

试论高等教育资源的有效配置及实现途径

市场作为促成教育资源供求在总量和结构上协调的因素,是教育资源有效配置的实现条件.在教育垄断市场下,教育产出进入经济系统具有较大的障碍,教育系统内部组织低效,整个教育系统失去了自组织的刺激机制,无法促进教育资源的有效供给.高等教育卖方市场的形成将不断促进教育系统的创新.教育系统也惟有在外界社会经济系统的作用下,不断地进行教育内容和方法的改革,才能在与社会经济系统的适应过程中获得发展的物质条件,在国际教育竞争中处于有利地位.在市场经济条件下,高等教育具有私人产品的性质,决定了其市场化配置高等教育资源的基本方向,但仍需依赖政府干预以纠正市场运行的偏差.     

借鉴英国高等教育经验推进辽宁公安教育发展

英国高等教育的基本特点是以学院为基础的组织结构,多元化的社会融资渠道,独立创新型的教学体制,大学创建公司的科研模式.文章分析了英国高等教育大力提高全民高等教育水平,着手制定新一轮战略规划,积极向海外拓展的发展趋势与走向;立足于公安教育应肩负起三大政治任务的定位点进行思考,提出了积极借鉴英国高等教育经验,充分利用英国高等教育资源,提升公安教育、训练水平,加速公安教育事业发展的基本构想.     

Competition and cooperation in artificial intelligence standard setting: Explaining emergent patterns

Efforts to set standards for artificial intelligence (AI) reveal striking patterns: technical experts hailing from geopolitical rivals, such as the United States and China, readily collaborate on technical AI standards within transnational standard-setting organizations, whereas governments are much less willing to collaborate on global ethical AI standards within international organizations. Whether competition or cooperation prevails can be explained by three variables: the actors that make up the membership of the standard-setting organization, the issues on which the organization's standard-setting efforts focus, and the “games” actors play when trying to set standards within a particular type of organization. A preliminary empirical analysis provides support for the contention that actors, issues, and games affect the prospects for cooperation on global AI standards. It matters because shared standards are vital for achieving truly global frameworks for the governance of AI. Such global frameworks, in turn, lower transaction costs and the probability that the world will witness the emergence of AI systems that threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms.     

The politics of Uber: Infrastructural power in the United States and Europe

Platform firms have been depicted as having structural and instrumental power and being able to prevail in regulatory battles. This article, in contrast, documents how they have often adapted to regulations and provide different services across locales. I show that platform firms have a specific type of power, infrastructural power, that stems from their position as mediators across a variety of actors. This power, I argue, is shaped by pre-existing regulations and the firms' strategic response, that I call “contentious compliance”: a double movement of adapting to existing regulations, while continuing to challenge them. I apply this framework to the expansion and regulation of Uber in New York City (US), Madrid (Spain), and Berlin (Germany).     

How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization?

As trade wars and protectionism again present severe challenges and obstructions to international economic regulatory organizations (IEROs), it is timely to ask how their predecessors survived the last deep deglobalization of the interwar years. This article presents a fresh neo-Durkheimian institutional explanation. It highlights contrasting pathways to survival and bequest of IEROs in three fields of regulation – international infrastructure, capital and labor, and commodities. Our explanation shows that functional imperatives and short-term market pressures in these different areas of regulation facilitated specific forms of social organization within IEROs (such as hierarchy or individualistic brokering). These contrasting forms of social organization cultivated distinct regulatory styles during deglobalization and cultivated capacities for contrasting survival and bequest strategies. Our approach is thus able to account for variation in pathways to survival in a way that other possible explanations, such as theories of regulatory capture or bureaucratic autonomy, cannot.     

Epistemic contestation and interagency conflict: The challenge of regulating investment funds

Scholarship on regulating global finance emphasizes the importance of national and bureaucratic interests, but less attention has been devoted to epistemic sources of regulatory conflict. We address this by analyzing the failure of regulators to agree tougher rules for large investment funds after the 2008 crisis. The article suggests this outcome was the result of epistemic contestation between prudential regulators and securities regulators, rooted in divergent interpretive “frames.” We show that US and EU prudential regulators pushed for entity-based regulation of investment funds by escalating the issue to global standard-setting bodies. But this was successfully resisted by securities regulators that exercised epistemic authority through recursive practices—appeals to expertise, jurisdictional claims, and alliance building—to defend their transaction-based approach. The article demonstrates how an interpretivist perspective can provide new insights into inter-agency conflict and regulatory disputes in other policy fields.