Negotiating access to populations of concern in South-East Asia

South-East Asia is home to both conflict and ‘natural’ disasters which have caused significant displaced populations. Given this context, there is a need to better understand the motivations of the multiple actors involved in negotiating humanitarian responses, and to account for the impact the finished agreement has on the region both in the short and long terms. This article investigates the motivations behind two humanitarian responses in South-East Asia. The first case is the set of humanitarian responses to the Indochinese exodus in the 1970s and 1980s. The second case is the humanitarian response to those affected by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar during the late 2000s and early 2010. Both of these agreements have been held up as historic and ground breaking achievements within the international relations of South-East Asia. This article assesses these agreements to identify the multiple levels of governance involved and the individual actors’ motivations behind them. It argues that greater appreciation of these dynamics will contribute to understanding the governance of humanitarian responses to populations of concern in South-East Asia. This will be important to consider as new crises emerge that demand new negotiations within a crowded field of actors governing humanitarian responses in the region.     

How We Feel about the Deal

Recent experimental research suggests that humans are prone to systematic errors when determining how they currently feel, imagining how they will feel about future events, remembering how they have felt about past events, and understanding the preferences that underlie their decisions. In this article, we briefly review three basic assumptions that are called into question by recent findings regarding specific kinds of errors that people are prone to make. We suggest that this line of research has important implications for negotiation theory, research, advice, and practice.     

中国在国际气候谈判中面临的新挑战及其应对

德班平台建立后,国际气候谈判由“双轨制”变为单轨,发达国家和发展中国家自此将在一个共同的平台上就未来国际气候机制展开谈判,过去相对稳定的国际气候谈判格局发生演变.在这种情况下,中国面临着发展中国家身份的集体认同的变化,以及中国所一贯坚持的“共同但有区别的责任”原则的重新解读,这些变化将给中国的身份定位及国家利益带来影响.因此,中国一方面要把握在未来国际气候机制制定中的话语权,积极参与全球气候治理体系的改革与建构,使其适应中国国内中长期发展目标;另一方面也要承担相应的减排责任,做负责任的大国,为全球气候治理贡献力量.     

Groups,Decision Rules,and Negotiation Outcomes: Simulating the Negotiator's Dilemma

The negotiator's dilemma is a vexing problem (structurally similar to the prisoner's dilemma), but it is made more complicated by the fact that many negotiations involve teams of negotiators. Although it is widely recognized that the behavior of groups of people can deviate in important ways from the behavior of individuals, the implications of this for the negotiator's dilemma are unclear. For this article, I have used a computer simulation to explore the impact of different decision rules (majority rule, consensus, and weakest link) on how the approach of groups to negotiations might differ. The results suggest that the use of different decision rules can greatly complicate negotiations. While the majority rule is quite versatile in multiple contexts, a pairing of weakest link and consensus decision rules is highly problematic for finding a negotiated settlement.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

U.S.–Iran Nuclear Track Two from 2005 to 2011: What Have We Learned? Where Are We Going?

This article reviews and assesses United States–Iran track two diplomacy over the nuclear issue from 2005 to 2011. It asks why during what should have been a “ripe” moment for discussions, in the first years of the Obama Administration, track two processes were able to contribute so little to any official progress on the issue. The article concludes that the moment was not so ripe, after all, and that officials on each side were less willing to receive the ideas generated by track two than their rhetoric would have indicated.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

警务危机谈判的先期处置

警务危机谈判的先期处置在某种程度上左右着谈判的最终结果．并且是成功处置警务危机的一个重要环节。文章系统分析了警务危机谈判涉及的工作范围．以及先期警力的职责。在这个基础上，详细论述了在劫持人质案件及企图自杀案件中先期对话的技巧。     

对话思维在刑事公案中的运用

一个正当的法律决定必须通过理性的协商、交流与对话制度才能形成，把法律意义上的真理与通过沟通形成的共识联系起来。立法过程、诉讼程序的设计体现了对话协商的思想。在刑事公案的审理中，刑法规范的选择适用以及判决书的论证也应该以对话思维方法为出发点，对各方观点包括民意进行辨析和鉴别，理性地吸收合理部分，使公案的判决达到合法性、合理性和可接受性的统一。对话思维的运用必须限制在刑法的框架内，就是说，对各方意见包括公众意见的吸收，都必须能够有相关的刑法规范作为依据。     

Group Polarization and 12 Angry Men

Deliberating groups, including juries, typically end up in a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation tendencies. A jury whose members are inclined, before deliberation, to find a defendant not guilty will likely render a verdict of not guilty; a jury whose members want to award punitive damages will likely produce an award higher than that of the median juror. The phenomenon of group polarization, found in many domains, stems from a combination of information pooling and peer pressure. The events portrayed in the film 12 Angry Men seem to defy the logic of group polarization, but the film nonetheless shows an acute psychological sense.