Narrative is not only entertainment but also a mode of engaging in negotiation with others, and culture is one of the things negotiated thereby. Stories are structured by an internal and external authority in terms of origin, coherence, and effectiveness in the world. Cultural managers will inevitably be involved in situations where narratives diverge, and they will discover that dealing with competing narratives involves a type of diplomatic communication with a range of participants in the arena of culture, from artists to civic authorities to audiences. Historical anecdotes from both classical and modern eras suggest how powerful cultural credit and cultural production can be and how ideas of culture can be deployed in politics. The slow and careful procedures of diplomacy—taken analogously as communication, protection, negotiation, and sovereignty—can prevent even domestic cultural management from provoking hostility or resistance to a perceived attempt to exert control. Ultimately, we are mostly living in a fluid rather than a precisely calibrated world, and cultural managers know that absolute justifications for cultural work are impossible to find. 相似文献
Since August 2014, there has been a marked increase in the violence perpetrated by the Islamic State against Western hostages. Videos released by the Islamic State depicting the brutal executions of hostages have been circulated widely on social media. This has prompted a dialogue about governments’ policies regarding negotiation with terrorist organisations to secure the release of their citizens held overseas. The United States and Britain, two non-negotiating countries, have faced significant criticism for this policy, which has led to the beheadings of several American and British citizens. This article analyses the discourse of two spokesmen – White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, and British hostage John Cantlie – in framing the issue of hostage negotiations on behalf of their organisations. A grounded theory approach informed by framing analysis is utilised in order to identify dominant discourses employed in White House press briefings and John Cantlie’s videos and articles. This article concludes that, through the deliberate use of discourse, the US government and the Islamic State shape public perception of hostage negotiations in pursuit of distinct policy goals. 相似文献
As we head toward the end of the millennium we, as specialists and experts in the field of international criminal justice, must pause to reflect seriously on the issue of global organized crime. Study in this regard requires that more rigorous attention be focused on the future directions of research, the creation of a network of regional and worldwide scholars to perpetuate a collaborative agenda, and data collection for comparison of various activities associated with law enforcement and correctional operations. We must find a more unified systemic approach to crime control. Regardless of whether a nation is large or small, developed or underdeveloped, rich or poor, every society is confronted with the task of controlling organized crime.
Organized crime is indeed a universal phenomenon. It has long been predicted that international organized crime will become a major force in the commercial, financial and military sectors of every country, eventually affecting directly the destiny of all countries. We may soon be confronted with an economic and financial crisis, in that governments everywhere cannot afford to watch events unfold by saying “there is no solution to the problem because it is beyond our ability to control the problem.” We must find a solution.
On June 26, 1995, American President William Clinton, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the United Nations at the ceremony held in San Francisco called for, “Support through the UN of the fight against forces of disintegration from crime syndicates and drug cartels. They cross borders at will. Nations can and must oppose them alone, but we know, and the Cairo Conference reaffirmed, that the most effective opposition requires strong international cooperation and mutual support.”
The original idea for a global high‐level conference on organized crime came from a magistrate who devoted his life to fighting the Mafia, Judge Giovanni Falcone, who died in a bomb attack in May 1992, in Italy. Following Judge Falcon's death, the Minister for Justice in Italy took on the idea of holding this conference in his address to the General Assembly that year. The conference was held in Naples two years later, organized by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the Secretariat of the U.N., under the guidance of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and in accordance with the Economic and Social Council resolution 1993/29 of July 27, 1993, and the recommendation of the Commission was made at the second session. The 142 states represented at the Conference unanimously adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan Against Organized Transnational Crime, which was later approved by the General Assembly by resolution 49/159 on December 23, 1994.
For further information regarding the topic of international and transnational organized crime and associated issues, see World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, Naples, Italy, United Nations, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, No.26/27, November 1995; speech by President William Clinton on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the U.N., San Francisco, June 26, 1995; A Law Enforcement Source book of Asian Crime and Cultures: Tactic and Mindset, Douglas D. Daye, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1997; Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering: A Handbook for Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators, James R. Richards, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1999; and Global Report on Crime and Justice, by UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Graeme Newman, ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 相似文献
Civil society is generally seen as an important actor in peace processes. But when it comes to reaching an agreement during peace negotiations, much of the current debate is centered on the question of including or excluding civil society. Although most researchers argue that civil society participation makes the process more sustainable and democratic, most practitioners emphasize that enhanced civil society participation makes it more difficult to reach a peace agreement. I argue that practitioners and theorists must both move beyond this dichotomy and, instead, focus on the variety of ways in which civil society actors can be included in a given negotiation process. To this end, I present in this article a comprehensive overview of nine models of inclusion, from most to least direct involvement of civil society, supported by illustrative case studies. Analysis of these models suggests that it will be possible to broaden the participation of civil society in peace negotiations without decreasing the negotiations' effectiveness. 相似文献
Traditional methods for teaching negotiation have required both instructor and student to be physically present in the same location. With the advent of the Internet and associated technological advances, however, instructors may now transcend geographical barriers and effectively deliver the same content virtually. In this article, we present an exploratory study comparing two masters‐level negotiation courses: one taught using a traditional in‐person method and the other taught online. Results showed no significant difference in knowledge acquisition as quantified by objective measures, including mean grades. In addition, self‐report data indicate that, although students' skill and mastery of negotiation improved in both courses, online students reported that they experienced less interaction and social engagement with their classmates and instructor. Several course development strategies and best practices are discussed. 相似文献
This article highlights the stressful logistics of final negotiations for the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, a treaty that both ended the Irish war of independence (1919–21) and authorized the creation of the Irish Free State (1922). The treaty also confirmed a new international border which is still problematic today (not least in respect to the United Kingdom's decision to exit the European Union). Caught between dissidents in Dublin and experienced British ministerial negotiators in London, the ostensible plenipotentiaries of an Irish revolutionary government were obliged to rush back by rail and boat on a fraught mission to Ireland and then return immediately to London for final negotiations. The article lays bare the circumstances of that fateful weekend of 2-4 December 1921, two days after which the Irish team in London signed a controversial document that was to be contested in a civil war between different groups of Irish nationalists in 1922. The author argues that logistical pressures cannot be divorced from political tensions bearing down on negotiators. 相似文献