华商网络内部信息交流机制研究

华商网络的成功，来自于其内部的信息交流与合作机制，它对于克服现实中大量存在的非正式贸易与投资壁垒起着非常重要的作用；“五缘关系”是华商网络内部信息交流机制的核心，在此基础上形成了多种交流方式与渠道，而且多种交流方式之间可以相互重合；华商网络内部区分成员的标准越松散，那么成员的信息交流与合作就变得越为困难，但如果区分成员的标准过于严格的话，又会造成华商网络规模过小，从而不利于华商之间的合作。     

The Italian Mediation Explosion: Lessons in Realpolitik

Between the time that the first modern Italian mediation statutes were issued in 1993 and March 2011, when mandatory mediation procedures under Italian Legislative Decree 28/2010 went into effect, an interesting paradox emerged in Italian mediation: mediation usage was virtually nonexistent despite the high success rates of mediated cases. Clearly, the mere availability of mediation was not sufficient to attract disputants away from the courts, even though the Italian court backlog skyrocketed to 5.4 million cases during this period. Decree 28/2010 was issued by the Italian government to address this paradox through a mandatory mediation requirement, but the law has faced significant opposition from some members of the Italian bar in the form of public strikes and legal challenges. Legislators have responded to this dissent with reactionary amendments to “cure” problems in the regulatory structure, even though there has also been significant positive attention paid to the Italian mediation model at the European level. As the opposition to Decree 28/2010 now appears to be diminishing and recent data indicate that mandatory mediation is achieving its objectives (to the tune of tens of thousands of mediated cases since March 2011), two lessons in realpolitik emerge for mediation proponents. First, nothing less than compulsion can rapidly increase mediation use. Second, the legislator who compels mediation without openly engaging the opposition is not mediation savvy, for even in compelling a policy choice, one should be respectful and mindful of the opponent's position, if for no other reason than to minimize his or her opposition to the final result.     

Prison sentences: last resort or the default sanction?

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the sentencing purposes for penal penalties, judges’ perceptions of sentencing purposes and prison sentences, and the effects of penal sanctions. We examine judges’ positions towards different penalties, with a focus on imprisonment, since their views on the different penalties are related to their sentencing decision-making. Understanding these views is then critical for several practical and political purposes, including bridging the gap between academic discourse and legal practice. We accessed judges’ views on penal sanctions through a questionnaire and an interview. Our sample is compounded by the judges of the criminal courts from the three major cities in Portugal. Despite the most recent criminological empirical knowledge, judges valued imprisonment as the most adequate sentence, both for different crimes and for different judicial purposes. This result is not consistent with viewing imprisonment as a ‘last resort’ solution. Indeed, we did not find this ‘last resort’ position in our data, and it is not apparent in the judicial statistics on imprisonment rates. Our data highlight the importance of increasing judges’ training on criminological and sociological issues as well as the importance of changing the influence of their personal beliefs regarding penal sanctions into research-based positions.     

US-Asia Economic Relations: A Political Economy of Crisis and the Rise of New Business Actors

Reviewed here are contrasting approaches to the same locus of marginalisation: the precariat in the informal sector. In developed and underdeveloped countries alike, neo-liberal economic growth is increasingly dependent on insecure, temporary and low-paid employment. Such laissez faire capitalism demonstrates additionally that – contrary to earlier views about the capitalism/unfreedom link – bonded labour is not an obstacle to accumulation, since the free market currently thrives on an unfree workforce. Because, with the exception of Marxist theory, no opposition to this pattern of economic growth argues for transcending the capitalist system, critiques of its labour regime are unable to formulate an adequate political solution.     

Social Change and Class Formation in a French West African State

This article focuses on migrant children in West Africa in contexts where independent migrations during childhood constitute the norm rather than the exception. The article examines how the relative age and gender of a child influence his/her trajectory. It is based on the biographies of two young domestic workers – a girl in Côte-d’Ivoire and a boy in Burkina Faso. In describing their trajectories during the first eight to ten years of their migration to the city, this article shows that ideas surrounding age-appropriate work and the acquisition of new skills allow both girls and boys to increasingly exercise more power over their own lives. From these detailed trajectories it becomes clear that the dominant institutional categories, on the one hand, mask the diversity of activities of these very young migrants. On the other hand, they conceal the diachronic changes that take place in the course of their migratory work experience.     

EU's Fight Against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and Unsuitable External Models

This article offers an analysis of the European Union's (EU) efforts in the fight against terrorist finances. Following the 9/11 attacks, the EU has adopted the relevant United Nations counterterrorism resolutions as well as the special recommendations of Financial Action Task Force. In addition, the EU has developed its own measures spanning across all of its three pillars. There is, however, a cause for concern that some of these measures have not been properly implemented, while others have been criticized on legal, transparency, legitimacy, and efficiency grounds. These shortcomings are not only due to EU's own internal obstacles, but also result from the EU's uncritical adoption of the prevailing smart sanctions and money-laundering regimes, which are based on a number of unwarranted assumptions that do not reflect the nature of contemporary terrorist threats in Europe.     

Informal institutions,forms of state and democracy: the Turkish deep state

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms.1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’; O'Donnell, ‘Another Institutionalization’; O'Donnell, ‘Polyarchies’; Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions’; Merkel and Croissant, ‘Formale und informale Institutionen’; Weyland, ‘Limitations’; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In ‘defective democracies’,2 Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective’. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually ‘the actual rules that are being followed’.3 O'Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: ‘without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where ‘perverse institutionalization’5 Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation’, 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal ‘domination’,6 Weber, Economy and Society. View all notes Herrschaft in a Weberian sense. This modality of dual domination is what I call ‘deep state’.     

Democratic sanctions meet black knight support: revisiting the Belarusian case

Democracy promotion through economic sanctions has become commonplace. Previous studies argue that an important challenge to the effectiveness of democratic sanctions is the contravening support of black knights. However, these studies underestimate conflicting interests between the target and its black knight. In this paper, I propose a bargaining model for understanding how targets obtain support from black knights. The target’s main source of bargaining power is its threat to defect from the black knight and obtain support from an international rival. However, the credibility of this threat decreases with democratic sanctions because they hinder cooperation with a likely source of support, namely the sender. Therefore, targets take steps towards democracy to improve their bargaining position relative to the black knight. To probe my argument, I conduct a deep single case study of EU sanctions against Belarus between 2004 and 2016 with Russia as a black knight. Sanctions should have no effect in this paradigmatic case of black knight support. Yet, there is substantial evidence that democratic sanctions have increased the cost of electoral fraud and state repression in Belarus. This indicates that the conflicting interests of targets and their black knights provide windows of opportunity for democracy promotion.     

Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties

Which parties represented in the European Parliament (EP) are able to extract regular donations from their MEPs' salaries and, if they extract donations, how great are they? In the literature on party finances, there has been a lack of attention paid to the use of salaries of elected representatives as a source of funding. This is surprising given that the national headquarters of many parties in Europe regularly collect ‘party taxes’: a fixed (and often significant) share of their elected representatives' salaries. In filling this gap, this article theoretically specifies two sets of party characteristics that account for the presence of a taxing rule and the level of the tax, respectively. The presence of a tax depends on the basic ‘acceptability’ of such an internal obligation that rests on a mutually beneficial financial exchange between parties' campaign finance contributions to their MEPs and MEPs' salary donations to their parties. The level of the tax, in contrast, depends on the level of intra‐organisational compliance costs and parties' capacity to cope with these costs. Three factors are relevant to this second stage: MEPs' ideological position, the size of the parliamentary group and party control over candidate nomination. The framework is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering the taxing practices in parties across the European Union Member States.