经济制裁的政治经济目的及其评价

文章阐述了经济制裁的定义 ,着力探讨以经济和政治利益为主要目标的经济制裁政策 ,及美国对欧盟、古巴的经济制裁、国际社会对南非种族隔离政权的经济制裁、西方国家对津巴布韦的经济制裁等进行了典型剖析 ,并从效果和意义的角度对经济制裁进行了总结和评价。     

互联网普及程度对非正规就业的影响分析

研究基于 2002-2016 年的全国省级面板数据,使用固定效应模型检验了互联网普及程度对非正 规就业的影响,发现互联网普及程度对非正规就业比例有显著的负向影响,互联网的普及提高了社会整体的就 业质量。进一步使用滞后一期互联网普及程度作为工具变量,两阶归结果表明上述结论仍然成立。此外,为了 排除《劳动合同法》对研究结论的影响,本研究使用《劳动合同法》实施以前的样本进行检验,发现互联网普 及程度对非正规就业比例的负向影响仍然显著。     

Economic Sanctions and Political Repression: Assessing the Impact of Coercive Diplomacy on Political Freedoms

This article offers a thorough analysis of the unintended impact economic sanctions have on political repression—referred to in this study as the level of the government respect for democratic freedoms and human rights. We argue that economic coercion is a counterproductive policy tool that reduces the level of political freedoms in sanctioned countries. Instead of coercing the sanctioned regime into reforming itself, sanctions inadvertently enhance the regime’s coercive capacity and create incentives for the regime’s leadership to commit political repression. Cross-national time series data support our argument, confirming that the continued use of economic sanctions (even when aimed at promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights) will increase the level of political repression. These findings suggest that both scholars and policy makers should pay more attention to the externalities caused by economic coercion.

Economic sanctions and the rhetorical responses of totalitarian regimes: Examining North Korean rhetorical strategies, 1949–2010

This study investigates the impact of economic statecraft on the North Korean Government. As a totalitarian regime, which is characterized by a controlled mass media, the North Korean Government tries to contain potential problems caused by sanctions by using three types of political rhetoric: appeasement, backlash, and surveillance. Using time-series data from 1949 to 2010 derived from a content analysis of the New Year's Day addresses by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, the empirical results suggests that the North Korean Government does alter its rhetorical strategies in response to external economic sanctions. Negative sanctions cause the regime to use appeasement strategies (or calls for reforms and internal changes). It tends to use backlash rhetoric (or blaming the sanctioning powers) in response to, interestingly, positive sanctions. Surveillance rhetoric, or the call for internal vigilance against enemies, on the other hand, does not have any statistical connection with sanctions, rather driven by other factors, such as the Korean War, external instability, and so on.     

An effective sanctioning actor? Merging effectiveness and EU actorness criteria to explain evolutions in (in)effective coercion towards Iran

EU sanctions invoked in response to the Iranian nuclear crisis (2006–2016) were long considered to be of limited effectiveness in halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Recently, however, sanctions seem to have contributed to a breakthrough in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. This article aims at explaining this evolution. It, therefore, designs a framework that explains why sanctions (fail to) change targets’ behaviour. Since the sanctions effectiveness literature lacks an integrated framework to explain evolutions in effective coercion, this article merges sanctions effectiveness variables and Bretherton and Vogler’s actorness criteria. Applying the resulting framework to two broad episodes of the Iranian case (2006–2013 and 2013–2016), this article provides a first test of the framework’s added value. It concludes that a full understanding of sanctions effectiveness requires consideration of external, internal, and in-between factors.     

Autonomy or organisation? Reforms in the Ghanaian internal revenue service

Autonomous Revenue Authorities (ARAs) have recently become a popular organisational reform to improve revenue collection in developing countries. The success of ARAs is commonly attributed to ‘autonomy’ which reduces political interference, and increases financial independence and managerial freedom. This article examines the case of the Ghanaian ARA – the Internal Revenue Service and argues that its strong performance is the result of not ‘autonomy’, but other more nuts and bolts reforms, specifically: (a) strategies designed to direct the focus of the IRS to different taxpayer segments, particularly the informal sector and (b) significant attempts to bring the tax administration closer to the taxpayer through decentralisation and improved taxpayer services. To the extent that autonomy enables ARAs to undertake these other reforms it forms an important piece of the picture, however, they do not require autonomy – they could well be adopted under traditional tax administrations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The redistributive impact of hypocrisy in international taxation

Why do tax havens, whose attractiveness for foreign investors depends upon financial secrecy, agree to automatically report account data to foreign governments? From a contractualist perspective, their cooperation should be motivated by the expectation of joint gains. Prior to such agreement, however, tax havens expected outflows of foreign capital and reductions in economic activity as likely outcomes. We show that the United States (US) imposed automatic information exchange on these countries without itself participating. The result is a strongly redistributive regime that worsens the economic situation of tax havens. By means of a difference‐in‐differences analysis, we ascertain a substantial and statistically significant negative effect of a US sanction threat on the value of assets held by foreigners in tax havens relative to non‐havens. The effect becomes stronger when the US is included in the non‐haven group. The analysis confirms the US's ability to redistribute financial wealth internationally through organized hypocrisy.     

Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval

How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research.     

Political activism in Iran: strategies for survival,possibilities for resistance and authoritarianism

This article examines mobilizations and activism in authoritarian settings by considering the case of Iran. By focusing on the transformation of activism since the 1990s and the green movement, it advances an explanation of how oppositional political groups have been able to survive and produce forms of resistant subjectivity despite authoritarian constraints. In order to do so, the article brings together two scholarly traditions, namely Social Movement Theory (SMT) and the study of subjectivity and resistance as framed by Sari Hanafi. SMT explains how activists have been able to navigate repression and create opportunities for mobilization while shifting between formal and informal politics. The study of subjectivity helps conceptualize the type of subjects or political citizens that authoritarian environments generate. The article builds on field research with activists conducted in Iran and Turkey between 2007 and 2016. It argues that authoritarian constraints allow autonomous activism to flourish while emptying of meaning the regime-sanctioned political infrastructures.     

刍议行政非正式听证制度

行政非正式听证制度对于保障公民权利具有极为重要的作用,但却没有得到理论及实务界足够的重视.作为听证制度的重要组成部分,非正式听证理应与正式听证制度合理配合,在行政权运行过程中发挥独特的作用.世纪伊始,适逢行政法学界积极推进《行政程序法》出台之契机,探讨行政非正式听证更有其积极的意义.应借鉴国外、我国台湾地区的相关经验,建立符合我国国情的行政非正式听证制度.