治理结构,权力机制与高校腐败——基于117个高校腐败案例的分析

基于新制度主义中的制度性同形理论,通过对117个高校腐败案例进行分析,发现高校腐败最大的特征就是与政府腐败特点的一致性,无论是在腐败主体特征还是腐败行为特征方面都极为相似。研究表明:在高等教育场域中,在强制性同形和模仿性同形机制作用下,高等教育场域中的高校与政府呈现组织性趋同现象,两者的组织结构、治理机制、监督漏洞、官场文化等方面都具有同形性,两者都采取相对集权的治理结构,而监督制衡机制效果不彰,无法有效地约束和限制权力,从而使高校腐败特征与政府腐败特征表现一致。从这个特点上来说,高校现有的治理结构和权力机制并没有体现出高校应有的独特性,其权力的运行机制也不足以控制腐败的发生。     

From bandit colonialism to the modern triage society: Towards a moral and cognitive reconstruction of knowledge and citizenship

Abstract

This article argues that the transition from bandit colonialism through the intricate systems of the modern triage society that is wired for Western cultural compliance requires more than just critique, or a prayer for the meek to inherit the earth. It requires a decisive consensus that the meek do not inherit the earth by their meekness alone – they need defences of the mind and conceptual categories around which they can organise their thoughts and actions. Turning the previously colonised into participants in a new moral and cognitive venture against oppression requires more than just periodic elections – significant though electoral processes are. Addressing the atrophy of human capabilities that has characterised human development in the context of both bandit colonialism and the modern triage society demands the development of a plurality of insights, of critical traditions, and a deepening of the tools for diagnosis and hence the quality of prognosis. It may, in certain instances, demand a cognitive indifference to the Western model and a robust engagement with the methods of science and in particular their impact on sustainable livelihood when acting in consort with economics. But most of all it calls for a vigorous engagement with conceptual categories and the theoretical and cultural underpinnings from which they have descended, with the clear intention of their dismantling.     

The Impacts of Different Regulatory Regimes on the Effectiveness of Public Procurement

The combination of two reforms in Russia, reform of public-sector entities and of public procurement, enables us to estimate the results of a transition from rigid to more flexible regulations in public procurement (PP). We consider two public universities in 2011–2012. The procurements of one university were regulated by rigid Federal Law during the entire period; the procurements of the other university were regulated by Federal Law until June 2011 and then by a more flexible regulation. Using the difference-in-differences methodology, we assess how the transition to this new regulation affects the main PP parameters. We show that more flexible regulation leads to a decline in bid competition but improves contract execution.     

Unveiling the Features of a Regulatory System: The Institutional Grammar of Tobacco Legislation in Mexico

The United Nations will host a drug policy summit in 2016. This will be a good forum to evaluate the effectiveness of existing legal frameworks. The institutional grammar tool can help with such evaluation. This article uses the tool to analyze the inherent features of tobacco regulations in Mexico. The analysis shows that the legal framework seeks to curb consumption with a combination of information and choice rules, and administrative penalties. As the analysis reveals, the usefulness of the method depends upon the availability of a solid theory that allows one to link rule features and the behavior they expect to induce.     

Injured but Not Yet Dead: A Bottom-Up Perspective on the Swedish Governmental Commissions

This article analyzes the recurrent “erosion thesis” in the governance literature, arguing that bureaucratic or procedural public-sector institutions have come to play a less significant role in public-policy formation. Evidence from the Swedish policy-making institutions referred to as “governmental commissions” and adoption of the perspective of interest organizations support the claim. Using various theories of institutional change, I show that increased government control has reduced the influence of governmental commissions on policy, but not eliminated the belief held by interest organizations that the commissions are legitimate institutions.     

Performance Regimes—The Institutional Context of Performance Policies

Performance measurement, targeting, reporting and managing of public services has spread across jurisdictions in recent years. The most usual stance adopted by governments in developing performance policies has been shaped by principal-agent theory and a hierarchy of principal-agent relationships from core executive to service delivery. Such notions have been challenged from several directions, both in theory and empirically. Writers on accountability and those analyzing the “audit explosion” and the growth of “regulation inside government” have pointed to the way in which multiple actors and accountabilities have grown. Drawing on these and other sources this article develops a “performance regimes” perspective that offers a heuristic analytical framework of the main groups of institutional actors who can (but do not always) attempt to shape or steer the performance of service delivery agencies. The aim is to create a framework that can be applied comparatively to study changes in total performance regimes over time and between jurisdictions and sectors.     

Weber and ‘legitimate domination’: a theoretical critique of Weber's conceptualisation of ‘relations of domination’ ∗

In this paper it is argued that Weber cannot provide a consistent account of the maintenance of systems of ‘legitimate domination’. This argument is based upon an examination of Weber's fundamental concepts of ‘actio’ and ‘behaviour’ and their theoretical relation to Weber's ‘ideal-typical’ approach to the phenomenon of ‘domination’. Through this examination it may be seen that Weber fails to determine the specific ‘natural’ and ‘social’ conditions of forms of domination. Furthermore, Weber's theoretical position can be seen to result in an implicit attempt to combine irreconcilable ‘natural’ and ‘ideal’ forms of determination.     

How and why capitalisms differ

Abstract

The variety of capitalism school (VOC) and regulation theory (TR) are both analyses of the diversity of contemporary national economies. If VOC challenges the primacy of liberal market economies (LME) and stresses the existence of an alternative form, i.e. coordinated market economies (CME), TR starts from a long-term analysis of the transformation of capitalism in order to search for alternatives to the Fordist regime that emerged after the post-Second World War era. Both approaches make intensive use of international comparisons, challenge the role of market as the exclusive coordinating mechanism, and raise doubts about the existence of a ‘one best way’ for capitalism. Finally, they stress that globalization does deepen the competitive advantage associated with each institutional architecture. Nevertheless, their methodology differs: VOC stresses private firm governance, whereas TR considers the primacy of systemic and macroeconomic coherence. Whereas for VOC there exist only LME and CME, TR recurrently finds at least four brands of capitalism: market-led, meso-corporatist, social democrat and State-led. VOC seems to consider that the long-term stability of each capitalism can be challenged only by external shocks, but TR stresses the fact that the very success of a regulation mode ends up in a structural crisis, largely endogenous.     

How to change other people's institutions: discursive entrepreneurship and the boundary object of competition/competitiveness in the German banking sector

Abstract

The paper explores recent public debates about the structure of the financial system in Germany. It pays particular attention to their symbolic-strategic dimension, that is, to attempts by several institutional entrepreneurs to reformulate the criteria of organizational legitimacy, concentrating on the sense-making and legitimization processes involved in institutional persistence or change. The paper discourse-analyses a campaign by institutional entrepreneurs – mainly representatives of commercial banks – who attempted to homogenize the criteria of organizational legitimacy in the German banking sector by questioning the fundamentals of the three-pillar system and the non-commercial banks. Institutional entrepreneurs are understood as discursive entrepreneurs whose actions refer to institutionalized generalizations of value. In the case of the financial sector in Germany, it was the generalized value of competition/competitiveness that served as a discursive device to legitimize the attempts of commercial banks to alter the institutional structure.     

A theory of risk colonization: The spiralling regulatory logics of societal and institutional risk

Abstract

Explanations of the growing importance of risk to regulation identify three processes; the need to respond to newly created and discovered risks; the growth of regulatory frameworks; and the use of the risk instrument as an organizing idea for decision-making in modernity. Synthesizing these explanations, we propose a theory of risk colonization. We introduce a distinction between societal and institutional risks, the former referring to threats to members of society and their environment, and the latter referring to threats to regulatory organizations and/or the legitimacy of rules and methods of regulation. We argue that pressures towards greater coherence, transparency, and accountability of the regulation of societal risks can create institutional risks by exposing the inevitable limitations of regulation. In the first stage of risk colonization, framing the objects of regulation as ‘risks’ serves as a useful instrument for reflexively managing the associated institutional threats. This can be followed, in a second stage, by a dynamic tension between the management of societal and institutional risks that results in spiralling feedback loops. The very process of regulating societal risks gives rise to institutional risks, the management of which sensitizes regulators to take account of societal risks in different ways. We discuss links between this theory and the concept of governmentality and conclude with some speculations about the possible positive and negative consequences of risk colonization.