Religious Intelligence

Sacred rituals and symbols can act as force multipliers that motivate and constrain the effectiveness of actors. Religious intelligence involves an assessment of how these rituals and symbols affect combat operations. The fourfold challenge faced by the religious intelligence analysts is to ascertain how prominent a role religion will play in a given conflict, what the relevant sacred phenomena are, how salient they are for the specific religious communities present, and how they will affect a given conflict. The case studies that form the core of this article highlight three issue areas open to religious intelligence collection and analysis, and exhibit variation in the ability of intelligence analysts to correctly assess those religious factors. Egyptian and Israeli decision making prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates how information about sacred time can influence war initiation. The diverging outcomes of two counterinsurgency operations at the same sacred site, “Operation Blue Star” (1984) and “Operation Black Thunder” (1988), demonstrate the utility of intelligence about the parameters of sacred space. A final case study explores the U.S. failure to grasp the importance of religious authority in the Iranian Revolution. I conclude by considering the actors best suited for gathering and processing religious intelligence. Religious intelligence requires interdisciplinary teams that combine expertise in religion, area studies, and military operations.     

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.     

The emotional intelligence of adult sex offenders: ability based EI assessment

Abstract

Previous research has suggested that sex offenders are deficient in several areas of emotional functioning such as empathy, emotional perception, emotional management and interpersonal functioning. It is unclear, however, whether sex offenders display a general deficit in emotional functioning or whether their emotional deficits are specific to the circumstances in which offences occur. The present study aimed to provide a broad assessment of the emotional functioning of sex offenders by assessing their emotional intelligence (EI) using an abilities-based emotional intelligence test. Nineteen sex offenders, 18 non-sex offending prisoners and 19 controls were administered the Perception, Assimilation and Management branch subtests from the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). The results indicated that the sex offenders were not significantly different than the control group, as assessed by these three branches of the MSCEIT. The results lend support to the suggestion that the emotional deficits displayed by sex offenders may be offence-specific. Implications for the use of the MSCEIT in sex offending populations and the role of EI in relapse prevention programmes are discussed.     

公安边防反恐情报工作的SWOT分析

恐怖犯罪是威胁我国社会稳定的一个不可忽视的因素。反恐情报工作是反恐工作的重中之重,因此提高公安边防部队反恐情报工作的水平直接关系到整个反恐工作的成败。文章将SWOT分析方法应用于公安边防反恐情报工作,发现当前工作的优缺点,最大限度地发挥优势,避免不利因素带来的影响。     

混合STR分型分析方法研究进展

混合STR分型的解释及分析一直是国际上法医物证领域研究的热点和难点。随着DNA检验技术的发展,案件中检出的混合STR分型呈现出模板量降低以及混合组分数增加的趋势,其解释变得愈加复杂,传统的人工分析方法已难以满足现实要求。近几年国外基于统计算法模型的自动化软件解析方法渐趋成为混合STR分型分析的主要方法。本文综述了混合STR分型分析方法的相关研究进展,包括人工为主的定性分析方法以及基于统计模型的基因型概率分析方法;讨论了混合STR分型分析方法的未来发展趋势以及人工智能技术的应用前景。     

聚众哄抢财物与聚众“打砸抢”的刑法教义学

聚众哄抢财物行为通常成立聚众哄抢罪;哄抢使用中厂房的物资设备的,是聚众哄抢罪与破坏生产经营罪的想象竞合犯,以聚众哄抢罪定罪处罚;聚众是与哄抢并列的行为或者是哄抢行为的方式或状态,说明了聚众哄抢罪的必要共同犯罪特征;成立聚众哄抢罪未必要有首要分子组织、策划或纠集;聚众哄抢罪的对象是他人占有的动产或者不动产中可以分离的部分;哄抢的本质是公然抢夺或盗窃;不符合聚众哄抢罪的哄抢财物行为可认定为抢夺罪或盗窃罪;聚众哄抢罪与抢夺罪、盗窃罪的共犯有差异;哄抢人采取对人暴力或胁迫等方式,压制被害人反抗而哄抢财物的成立抢劫罪,聚众哄抢罪可以成立事后抢劫;聚众"打砸抢"是聚众实施某些寻衅滋事行为的特别规定;"致人伤残、死亡"应限制解释为聚众"打砸"人所致;"毁坏或者抢走公私财物"是抢劫罪的法律拟制,首要分子以外的人成立寻衅滋事罪(或与敲诈勒索罪、聚众哄抢罪、故意毁坏财物罪等的想象竞合犯)。     

Disrupting Conventional Law Firm Business Models using Document Assembly

Document assembly software is a technology that is fundamentalto disrupting law firms. This article uses the framework setout by Clayton Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemmaand subsequent books to examine the range of business modelsthat use document assembly software, from those that are sustainingin relation to law firms to those that are disruptive in relationto law firms. It looks at three barriers that slow down thepace of disruption: a shortage of the right people, rules againstunauthorised practice, and inadequate capitalisation of lawfirms. These barriers will be overcome on a piecemeal basisas disruptive forces advance and undercut the billable hour.     

司法精神病学鉴定为无精神病刑事案例的智力分析

目的研究司法精神病学鉴定中被鉴定为无精神病刑事案件者的智力水平。方法对88例被鉴定为无精神病的刑事案例及89例被鉴定为精神分裂症的刑事案例的智力测验结果进行对比分析。结果无精神病组与精神分裂症组的性别、年龄、文化、职业、婚姻及案件类型的构成差异无统计学意义;无精神病组的智力测验成绩显著优于精神分裂症组但低于正常水平(常模);自称有精神病或否认有精神病案例间智商的差异无统计学意义。结论无精神病案例的智力测验结果反映这类被鉴定人的智力有轻微受损。     

Preliminary Data on the Role of Emotional Intelligence in Moderating the Link between Psychopathy and Aggression in a Nonforensic Sample

This short report presents preliminary data on the role of emotional intelligence (EI) in moderating the relationship between psychopathy and aggression in a nonforensic sample. A sample of 109 volunteer men was administered the Psychopathic Personality Inventory‐Revised (PPI‐R), the Reactive‐Proactive Aggression Questionnaire, and the Mayer‐Salovey‐Caruso emotional intelligence Test in individual sessions. Correlation and moderation analyzes showed that, at low levels of EI (in terms of strategic ability to understand and manage one's own and others’ emotions), people scoring high on the total PPI‐R and impulsivity dimension seemed to be both reactively and proactively aggressive. By contrast, at high levels of strategic ability, the relationships between psychopathy and aggression were no longer significant. These preliminary results encourage further investigation into the role of EI ability in mitigating aggressive outcomes in psychopathic subjects.