有组织犯罪的刑事政策探析

有组织犯罪的本质特征在于其组织性。打击有组织犯罪的立法对策是完善刑事立法。实体法方面要修改、增设罪名 ,增加财产刑 ,打击相关犯罪 ,加大惩治力度 ;程序法方面要完善证人保护、羁押与取保候审制度、制定配套法规和反黑法律。司法对策是 :加大打击力度、反黑与反腐败同时进行 ;成立专门机构、开展专项斗争、坚持刑事、经济犯罪并案查处、加强国际间通力合作     

图腾文化元素的氏族维系功能

图腾文化是一种产生于原始时代的十分奇特复杂的文化现象,图腾观念、图腾禁忌及图腾艺术等构成图腾文化的主要元素。本文试阐述这些元素在氏族这一最早的社会组织中所发挥的维系功能。     

试论我国洗钱犯罪的立法完善

洗钱犯罪是任何有组织犯罪所具备的一个基本要素 ,洗钱犯罪的过程往往伴随着贪污腐化现象的滋生。进入新世纪以来 ,此现象尤为突出。有效制止和打击洗钱犯罪 ,对于有效遏制腐败 ,切实打击金融领域的经济犯罪和跨国经济犯罪 ,从而保障国家安全和社会经济的健康发展都具有重要意义。为此 ,借鉴世界各国的立法实践 ,探讨打击洗钱犯罪的具体表现形式 ,并在立法上予以完善是非常紧迫和必要的。     

An electoral calculus? Dual incentives and committee assignment in the UK’s mixed-member legislatures

Although mixed-member electoral systems offer an apparent opportunity to observe how different rules shape politicians’ behaviour, ‘contamination’ between the SMD and PR-list tiers has frequently confounded academic work. Investigating Scotland and Wales’ mixed-member legislatures by exploiting their different chamber sizes and an unusual dual candidacy prohibition in Wales, modelling of committee assignments uncovers a split finding. Controlling for membership of the lead governing party, list members have a higher committee workload than their constituency colleagues, and members with previous employment experience in justice and health are more likely to be assigned to the corresponding subject committee once elected. Elsewhere, expectations that members might seek assignments that best suit theorized re-election interests are not found. The hypothesized influence of electoral rules is strongly conditioned by the small size of the legislature in Wales.     

股东查阅权行使机制的司法政策选择

股东查阅权作为一种工具性、救济性权利,其行使规则蕴含股东和公司之间某种恰当尺度的利益平衡,但立法过于原则化使得这一尺度趋于模糊。意在增强查阅权行使的可操作性、可救济性而制订的司法解释,关于诸环节的具体规范不全然是技术性的,而是包含了若干价值判断和对于当前司法救济现实需求的判断。为此,须在肯定我国现行公司法所确立的价值选择和基本法理框架的范围内作出正确的司法政策选择,并在此基础上明确有关股东查阅权行使与救济的诸具体规范。     

Confidence and Caretakers: Some Less‐Obvious Implications of the Fixed‐Term Parliaments Act

This article explores the 2011 Fixed‐term Parliaments Act's less‐obvious implications. First, it discusses why Theresa May found calling the 2017 election so straightforward, and notes what this implies for how FTPA works. Second, it looks at executive–legislative relations. FTPA removed the government's ability to designate controversial parliamentary votes as matters of confidence, and introduced a fourteen‐day cushion between a no‐confidence vote and Parliament's dissolution. In the process, it shifted the balance of power from ministers to backbenchers, to an extent potentially greater than most observers recognise. Third, it considers the more outlandish possibilities raised by FTPA's imposition of a fourteen‐day waiting period after a government's defeat on a no‐confidence motion before a new election can be called. It is possible, for example, for rebel MPs from the governing party to use the no‐confidence procedure to force concessions from the cabinet. Finally, it assesses FTPA's long‐term survival prospects, and what repeal would involve.     

Towards parliamentarisation of foreign and security policy?

Abstract

It is customary to argue that foreign policy is very much dominated by the executive, with parliaments wielding limited influence. However, with the exception of the US Congress, legislative?executive relations in the realm of foreign and security policy have attracted remarkably little scholarly attention. Drawing on a principal?agent framework, this collection scrutinises the conventional wisdom of ‘executive autonomy’ in foreign affairs, indicating that even though parliaments have arguably become more involved in foreign and security policy over time, any notions of parliamentarisation need to be treated with caution. While expectations of consensus in the name of the national interest continue to play an important role in foreign policy decision-making, the papers highlight the role of party-political contestation structuring parliamentary debates and votes in this increasingly politicised issue area. This introductory paper introduces the analytical framework and hypotheses guiding the contributions in this collection, summarises their main findings and suggests avenues for future research.     

Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Do prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Influential theories of parliamentary governance and legislative bargaining assume that the use of the confidence vote procedure – parliamentary governments’ most powerful legislative weapon – entails an electoral cost, but evidence on this important claim has been scarce. This article provides the first estimates of how prime ministers’ public approval responds to their use of the confidence vote. Analysing time series data from France 1979–2008, it is found that prime ministers experience a considerable drop in approval after their use of the confidence vote that is not accounted for by standard economic and political covariates. The effect size is similar to a 1 per cent decline in economic growth. The findings help explain French prime ministers’ selective use of the confidence vote procedure. They also suggest that political costs constrain the bargaining power conferred by the confidence vote.     

试论卢梭的立法思想

法律思想在卢梭的整个思想中占有举足轻重的地位,而立法理论又是其中最为重要的组成部分。卢梭认为,法律是公意的体现,立法是为了实现正义,而立法是来自于人民的非凡人物,他们制定法律时应遵循自由与平等的原则。     

论我国中小企业存在的问题及立法对策

本文针对中小企业立法大大滞后于中小企业发展的实际情况,借鉴外国立法的经验,提出制定专门调整中小企业的法律即《中小企业促进法》的立法建议。