Interlocal Agreements and Multilateral Institutions: Mitigating Coordination Problems of Self-Organized Collective Action

ABSTRACT

In the United States, competition among cities for economic development tends to be the norm. Cities are also collaborating more to improve their economic advantage. However, transaction costs inhibit various of interlocal agreements from being formed. This study examines the role of multilateral institutions in facilitating interlocal agreements for economic development. An analysis of survey data collected from city governments in eleven US metropolitan areas highlights the importance of regional institutions in moderating the effect of coordination problems on the formation of developmental joint venture agreements. The findings complement extant research on the governance mechanisms that mitigate transaction costs of collective action.     

Investigating Sales Tax Revenue Competition Among Principal Cities and Their Neighboring Cities in Texas

ABSTRACT

While research has explored the economic importance of principal cities on regional economies, little is known about the short-run and long-run dynamic relationships between principal cities and their neighboring cities as it pertains to their sales tax revenue elasticities and the subsequent affect this has on horizontal tax competition. Using vector error correction models on data from six principal cities in Texas, the findings of this study suggest that the relationship between principal and neighboring cities is highly dynamic and unique for each principal city. The study recommends that local economic policies should reflect these unique relationships.     

财政市场、土地资本化与异质性城市化

在以政府为主导的城市化进程中,土地财政成为了地方政府“经营城市”的重要手段。我国土地财政规模大、比例高,其形成不仅源于地方政府财权、事权不对等和地区之间、官员之间的竞争,究其质里,则是政府实现财政市场目标的行为投射。地方政府融资平台也基于相同的逻辑生成,帮助实现了土地财政的本质——资本化,弥补了地方政府的财政缺额。但是,土地的资本化提高了城市化成本,衍生出异质性,形成了空间与人口的矛盾,积累了凝结在城市中的金融、社会和道德风险,亟需引起重视。     

地方政府借贷监管体系构建的国际经验与启示

政府监管是解决市场失灵的一种有效机制。尽管世界各国的政府监管模式各有不同,构建的背景和内容也有所区别,但都是基于以矫正和解决市场失灵为目的而建立的。当下我国正处于转轨时期,虽然设立了相应的政府监管机构,但不论是理念还是职能上都偏重于传统意义上的监管,与现代意义上的监管还相差甚远。加之当前我国的市场经济体制还不健全,政府的管理理念与发展方式还保留着计划经济时期的传统,法制环境还不完善。因此,如何把我国传统的政府监管转变为现代意义的政府监管就显得尤为重要。这不仅能提高政府的监管能力,建立独立、公开、透明的现代监管体系,同时还是健全和完善市场经济体制,融入经济全球化进程的必然要求。     

Is cooperation cost reducing? An analysis of public–public partnerships and inter-municipal cooperation in Brazilian local government

ABSTRACT

In local government systems worldwide, financial pressures have obliged local authorities to focus on cost-efficient methods for providing local services, including inter-municipal agreements and public–public partnerships. However, in comparison with municipal mergers, privatisation and other approaches to the problem, the cost impact of the cooperative provision has not yet been thoroughly examined empirically. Moreover, available empirical research has largely concentrated on waste disposal in developed countries. The present paper seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on inter-municipal agreements and public–public partnerships by comparing their impact on costs with ‘stand-alone’ provision in a range of non-waste local services. In contrast to the bulk of existing studies, our analysis takes place in a developing country context by examining Brazilian local government over the period 2013/15. We found that – on the whole – cooperative provision is less expensive than the ‘stand-alone’ provision for the services studied. Our results can be explained by the size and composition of the population, together with the politics for cooperation.     

The enduring influence of electoral systems: investigating Green parties’ attention to local issues in parliament

Scholars argue that members of parliament (MPs) in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems have stronger incentives to cater to their electoral district than those in proportional representation (PR) types. Yet, few studies have explored whether MPs in PR systems or MPs from small parties engage local issues in general. I build new theory and explore its support through a case study that compares Green party behaviour in an FPTP system (the UK) to a PR system (New Zealand). Results show that MPs focus on local issues in both systems, but the distribution of attention varies in ways consistent with differing electoral incentives.     

政府环境治理工作的公众评价：央地差距与结构性制约

近年来,随着环境问题日益受到社会各界的重视,政府在环境治理工作中的表现正成为公众关注的重点。但是,我们对于目前我国政府环境治理工作公众评价的基本情况和影响因素还知之甚少。基于对中国综合社会调查2013年（CGSS2013）数据的分析,我们发现,我国公众对于中央政府环境治理工作的评价显著高于地方政府,包括受教育程度、收入水平、社会经济地位感知、政治身份、城乡差距和地区差距在内的结构性因素制约着公众对于政府环境治理工作的评价。在对研究发现进行深入讨论的基础上,进一步提炼了研究发现在政策意义上的启示。     

The 2015 Norwegian Local Elections: Support for Governing Radical Right Progress Party Plummets and Great Gains for Greens in ‘Second-Order’ Elections

Two years into the first term of the right wing Conservative/Progress Party coalition government, the 2015 Norwegian local elections displayed many features of a ‘second-order’ election: the governing parties lost considerable support, minor parties did well and voter turnout was low. For the second local elections in a row, political circumstances prevented the far right Progress Party from mobilizing on the anti-immigration issue, adding to the burdens of governing nationally for the first time. The Green Party leveraged its 2013 entry into the national parliament into record support, consolidating the progress made in the 2011 local elections. Although the elections were shaped by national politics, municipal and county variation shows that local political factors did matter.     

Making sense of the legal and judicial architectures of regional trade agreements worldwide

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) constitute one of the most important elements of the international economic order. Researchers have accordingly embarked on comparative analyses of their design. Yet one fundamental question remains unanswered: how have officials in different RTAs responded to the challenge of regulatory misalignments among the member states? In this article, I turn to 10 of the most established RTAs in the world and document three types of responses. Some RTAs rely on the principle of mutual recognition or references to existing international standards; the same agreements also rely on technical dispute resolution mechanisms. Other RTAs, by contrast, make use of extensive harmonization and permanent courts charged with interpreting law. Yet a third group exhibits a hybrid design. This heterogeneity in legislative and judicial design invites explanation. I show that there is a remarkable correspondence between the legal traditions of the member states (common vs. civil law) and the design of RTAs. This correspondence undermines the claims of world polity theorists about the nature of the international order, but is consistent with other strands of sociological institutionalism and certain elements of rationalist and neoliberal institutionalism. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of different RTA designs for the regulation of everyday life in the member states, the World Trade Organization as an international regulatory body, and national sovereignty and democracy.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.