技术傻化的社会学阐述

傻化是操作技术的简易化，是用少的或浅显的知识去使用产品。“界面”(操作技术)是可以相对独立于“系统”(运行技术)的。技术傻化已渗透到日常生活的各个领域，其原因是：(1)现代社会的知识成指数函数增长，科技产品极大丰富；(2)专业化分工日益加深，制作(生产)日益与使用(消费)相分离；(3)开发商为实现其产品大众化目标，不断使其产品的操作简易化。技术傻化在发展中国家中有其重要功能。它有助于高新技术的推广普及，产生良好的社会经济效益；有助于消除现代社会中的“数字鸿沟”这一新型不平等形式；有助于丰富普通人的生活。     

试谈努力探索公安基层基础工作新机制

不断探索公安基层基础工作新机制 ,加强公安基层基础工作 ,以适应市场经济发展特别是入世后对公安工作的要求 ,具有十分重要的意义。怀化市各级公安机关进一步解放思想 ,更新观念 ,与时俱进 ,大胆探索 ,开创出了一条公安基层基础工作的新思路 ,在全市城乡普遍推行民情社情警务图管理 ,较好地服务了经济建设 ,取得了显著成效。     

An Analysis of the Joint Board or County Model as the Structural Basis for Effective Australian Local Governance

Australian policy‐makers continue to rely on municipal amalgamation as the main engine of structural reform in local government, despite strong evidence that it diminishes participation and representation without improving service efficiency. Several promising, but neglected alternative models of structural reform have been developed, including ad hoc resource sharing models, Regional Organisations of Councils, virtual local government, and agency models. In an encouraging response to the recent policy of enforced council amalgamations in NSW, the Shires Association of NSW (2004) has recently proposed a ‘Joint Board model’ of local governance and invited comment on this model. This article takes up this challenge and seeks to place the Joint Board model in conceptual context and evaluate its characteristics and simulated cost savings.     

加强党的建设 提高党的战斗力

新的历史时期,党所面临的形势和任务发生了根本性变化,对党的领导能力和领导水平提出了新的要求。加强和改善党的领导,要通过提高执政能力和执政水平来体现。提高党的执政能力是加强党的建设的重要内容,是实现党在新世纪各项任务的根本保证。     

New Requirements and Key Tasks of the 14th Five-Year Plan under the New Pattern of Modernization in the New Era

The “14th Five-Year Plan” period is a period of change in the transformation of old and new kinetic energies, and is facing a big change that has not occurred in a century. The “14th Five-Year Plan” will link the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects with the opening of a new journey of socialist modernization. In the new historical orientation, the “14th Five-Year Plan” needs to be based on the new pattern of modernization to assess its new requirements, in the planning guidance level requires deepening of the new development concept; in the planning guidance requires high-quality development of the economy, society and people's lives as the core, to achieve the goal of modernization and modernization of human development. The main lines of planning call for modernization, such as strengthening the modern economic system and modernizing the national governance system and capacity. Accordingly, the key tasks of the “14th Five-Year Plan” should include fostering new impetus for modern development, improving the modern market system, developing a modern industrial system, improving the modern mechanism for coordinated regional development and promoting ecological modernization, and then promoting China's economic and social development on the path of modernization.     

韩国零售业态发展及政府规制

一国零售业态的发展与其经济发展阶段具有明显的相关性。韩国经济经历了高速增长和市场开放及资本自由化阶段后,便利店、廉价店等新业态大量进入,给韩国以大型百货店和商品交易市场为主导业态的传统零售业态带来了冲击。新型业态基本是模仿国外业态形式或随外资进入的,大型廉价店等新业态在本土化适应过程中不断调整,形成韩国特色。将韩国零售业态置于经济发展过程来考察,会发现与日本战后经济发展的阶段性以及现代零售业态的发展轨迹和政府政策规制的方向具有极大的相似性。我国也呈现出与韩国、日本的相似性。观察韩国零售业态演进过程及其特征,给中国零售业态发展研究提供了一个参照,对总结后发展国家零售业态发展规律具有重要意义。     

犯罪现场勘查工作的几点新要求

新刑事诉讼法的颁布 ,对执法的程序要求越来越高 ,特别是庭审方式的改革 ,对现场勘查工作提出了新的要求 ,因此 ,必须改革目前的现场勘查方法 ,提高现场勘查水平 ,以适应新的要求。     

企业集团的多重利益冲突及其治理

企业集团作为一种企业合作组织形式，一方面因其制度优势而在世界经济中的地位日益重要，另一方面因其复杂结构所带来的诸多治理问题又制约了其良性发展。与单个企业相比，企业集团的组织结构复杂多变，治理问题也具有多重性。交叉持股型企业集团中应注意大股东之间的协调问题；纯粹控股型企业集团中注意要加强母公司对子公司的有效监控；而母子关系型企业集团中的治理问题最为复杂，应在母子公司之间建立一个良好的集权和分权机制，防止母公司对中小股东和债权人的利益侵害。     

农村经济系统多层局势决策方法及应用

文章围绕复杂经济系统多层局势决策问题及其在农村经济系统结构调整中的应用问题展开研究，分析了复杂系统的层次性，给出了复杂系统多层次结构描述，运用多层局势决策模型与方法进行了从县域一地区一全省的三层决策分析，对农村经济系统决策提出了建议。     

Corporate Governance in Spain (with an Application of the Power Indices Approach)

This paper describes the governance system of Spanish listed firms in the early 1990's. Although the institutional setting of the Spanish Stock Exchanges differs little from other European national markets, we found important differences in several aspects of corporate governance. In particular, some of the standard mechanisms of control (e.g. boards and institutional shareholders) do not play an active role, whereas ownership is relatively concentrated. Moreover, power indices suggest that controlling blocs of large shareholders are very likely to form. We thus conclude that the ownership of shares is a pivotal mechanism in the governance of Spanish corporations.