Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies this article shows that commitment, not expertise is the primary driver of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of the findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.     

电子货币的若干法律问题探析

随着互联网的发展和全球金融一体化步伐的加速,电子货币必将以其独特的优势成为全球范围内,特别是国际交往中的一种主要的支付手段.但是,电子货币在带来巨大的潜在利益的同时,其出现也对现有金融体系的安全造成了众多潜在的威胁.本文拟就电子货币的法律性质以及发行和监管方面进行粗略的探讨.