Ideological identity,issue-based ideology and bipolar affective polarization in multiparty systems: The cases of Argentina,Chile, Italy,Portugal and Spain

In multiparty contexts, we know that affective polarization tends to cluster in ideological blocs, although the factors driving this process are still quite unexplored. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in the literature by exploring the capacity of ideological identity vis-à-vis issue-based ideology to polarize sentiments towards party voters into two opposing left-right blocs. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that affective attachments to ideological labels increase the affective distance between ideological blocs to a greater extent than issue extremity and issue consistency. These bipolarizing effects of ideological identity persist even when the identity is inconsistent with issue-based ideology. Additionally, we show that bipolar affective polarization exerts little reverse influence on ideological identity. We support these arguments using an original survey from the TRI-POL project carried out in five multiparty systems: Argentina, Chile, Italy, Portugal and Spain.     

Camps,not just parties. The dynamic foundations of affective polarization in multi-party systems

Concerns over affective polarization in Western democracies are growing. But which broader political distinctions are also affective demarcations? As inter-party cooperation is the rule in multi-party democracies, explaining affective polarization beyond partisan divisions is crucial. I argue that demarcations between political camps deepen affective polarization, and country-level factors influence the relevance of these affective divides. Based on survey data from 23 Western democracies (1996–2019), I demonstrate that affect is most polarized between Left and Right camps, and between the Radical Right and other camps. Further, these divides are dynamic and depend on different country-level outcomes. The Left/Right divide disappears when Left and Right parties govern together, while the Radical Right divide is fortified with Radical Right electoral success. These findings highlight that affective polarization’s group foundations extend beyond partisanship, and that affective polarization could even act as a defence mechanism against radical challengers.     

The U.S. Coptic Diaspora and the Limit of Polarization

ABSTRACT

After briefly presenting the main characteristics of the Coptic diaspora in the United States and of its attempts at gaining political clout since the 1990s, the article examines the impact of the election of President Obama and of the 2011 Egyptian revolution on the rhetoric and strategy of the main Coptic organizations in the United States. I also examine the changing relation between Copts in Egypt and Copts in the United States.     

“Ethnic polarization and the limits of democratic practice”

While several scholars have speculated that ethnic bipolarity, as a particular type of diversity, is related to the weakness of democracy in multiethnic states there exist few studies that test this relationship. This article suggests that ethnic bipolarity, measured as the size difference of the largest politically relevant ethnic communities and as ethno-political polarization, is related to whether a state exhibits tendencies to limit democratic participation. In cases where the size difference between groups is small or polarization is high there exist incentives to limit full democratic contestation. In the face of international and domestic pressures to politically liberalize, numerically dominant yet demographically insecure groups will seek to democratize only enough to satisfy the minimum needs of transparency while preserving their incumbent position. Using a panel of 121 countries between 1991 and 2014, the results of this analysis suggest that ethnic bipolarity and polarization are a strong predictor of whether a state institutionalizes procedures associated with competitive authoritarian regimes.     

Can there be food sovereignty here?

A central figure in the food sovereignty movement is the ‘middle peasant’, a cautious figure who balances food with cash-crop production, guided by a strong aversion to ecological and market risk. Drawing on long-term field research in highland Sulawesi, Indonesia, this article explains why farmers switched from food to mono-crop cacao production, and a stable middle peasantry did not emerge. It outlines their reasons for the switch, their struggles to make ends meet on small plots of poor-quality land, and the rapid polarization that soon arose. Ironically, their farm-dependence increased their vulnerability. Unlike farmers in many parts of the world who appear to be autonomous but are actually supported by state transfers, remittances or wage work, these farmers were on their own. Competitive capitalist relations quickly emerged and took on an especially virulent, almost textbook form. These relations were compulsory. Farmers with inadequate plots of land, and newly landless highlanders, could not opt out, challenging notions of food sovereignty framed in terms of liberal notions of choice. Even when small-scale farmers are untouched by land grabbing or corporate schemes, as in this case, expanding their capacity to exercise control over their food, their farms and their futures is still a huge challenge.     

The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments

We report the results of an experiment designed to replicate and extend recent findings on motivated political reasoning. In particular, we are interested in disconfirmation biases—the tendency to counter-argue or discount information with which one disagrees—in the processing of political arguments on policy issues. Our experiment examines 8 issues, including some of local relevance and some of national relevance, and manipulates the presentation format of the policy arguments. We find strong support for our basic disconfirmation hypothesis: people seem unable to ignore their prior beliefs when processing arguments or evidence. We also find that this bias is moderated by political sophistication and strength of prior attitude. We do not find, however, that argument type matters, suggesting that motivated biases are quite robust to changes in argument format. Finally, we find strong support for the polarization of attitudes as a consequence of biased processing.

The Spanish electoral cycle of 2019: a tale of two countries

Abstract

In 2019 alone, Spanish citizens went to the polls at least four times – two general elections, European elections, local elections and, for some, regional elections. Moreover, in the 2016–19 legislature, the country witnessed a successful vote of no confidence that replaced a Conservative prime minister with a Socialist one; experienced an important constitutional crisis over the 2017 referendum on Catalan independence; observed the emergence for the first time of a viable far-right party; and ended with the first coalition government in the modern democratic history. The November 2019 election, the last in this long electoral cycle, left a fragmented and polarized political landscape and a left-wing cabinet – PSOE and Podemos – that does not have a majority in the chamber. This article presents the background, the results of the different elections and discusses how and why Spanish politics experienced a radical transformation likely to have an impact in the next years.     

Political polarization,voting and democratic representativeness: Too much or too little?

This contribution evaluates the mediating role of different political contexts and levels of democratic consolidation on the effect of party system polarization on ideological vote and discusses how this relationship enhances democratic representativeness. The influence of party system polarization on ideological voting is analyzed in two areas: the voters' competence in identifying parties' ideological positions; and the voters’ tendency to vote for the most ideologically proximate party, which is one of the key features of the spatial theories of voting. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) from 1996 to 2019 and multilevel modelling techniques, the paper compares how those features vary across different types of countries, particularly older and newer democracies, and different regions of the world.     

How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world

We explore how partisan affect shapes citizens' views of party ideology and political competition. We argue that voters' affective ties to parties (both positive and negative) lead them to perceive the ideological positions of those parties as more extreme. Further, when voters are "affectively polarized," i.e., they strongly like some parties and dislike others, they are more likely to view politics as high stakes competition, where ideological polarization is rampant, participation is crucial, and electoral outcomes are highly consequential. Using cross-national survey data covering 43 elections in 34 countries, we show that partisan affect indeed impacts perceptions of party ideology and that affective polarization alters beliefs about the nature of political competition.     

Politician hate speech and domestic terrorism

ABSTRACT

Does hate speech – rhetoric that targets, vilifies or is intended to intimidate minorities and other groups in society – fuel domestic terrorism? This question is, unfortunately, relevant given the convergence of the use of hate speech by political figures and domestic terrorist incidents in a variety of countries, including the United States. In this study I theorize that hate speech by politicians deepens political polarization and that this, in turn, produces conditions under which domestic terrorism increases. I test this proposition using terrorism and hate speech data for 135 to 163 countries for the period 2000 to 2017. I produce two findings. First, hate speech by political figures boosts domestic terrorism. Second, the impact of political hate speech on domestic terrorism is mediated through increased political polarization.