Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament: adding value

ABSTRACT

Legislatures appoint committees for different purposes. Both Houses of the UK Parliament separate legislative committees from non-legislative, or select, committees. Each is unusual in that it utilises select committees to engage in post-legislative scrutiny. We examine why each engages in this type of scrutiny, given competing demands for limited resources. Distributive and informational theories are utilised to explain the difference between the two chambers, identifying why the form of asymmetrical bicameralism to be found in the United Kingdom facilitates scrutiny that would otherwise not be undertaken. The genesis and impact of post-legislative scrutiny committees are considered, with a focus on the House of Lords and why the use of such committees plays to the strengths of the House.     

论媒体监督与审判独立的冲突

现阶段,媒体监督在促进司法公正、遏制司法腐败和提高国民法律素质等方面起到了积极的作用。但是另一方面由于我国目前媒体监督的运作缺少相应的法律规范,大量偏激的带有强烈导向性的新闻报道产生的舆论压力对司法机关独立公正地进行审判活动也产生了很多负面影响。为了尽可能地发挥媒体监督的合理性,不致于造成媒体、民意对司法的消极影响,有必要有效地规范和约束媒体监督,同时司法也要相应地加强体制改革,共同致力于合理地构建媒体监督与审判独立的和谐关系。     

What are MPs for?

After the expenses scandal, it is time to ask what Members of Parliament are for. The traditional formal arguments are inadequate as they fail to engage with what MPs actually do. A typology is useful in illuminating the different ways in which MPs see their role: as Lickspittles, Loyalists, Localists, Legislators, Loners and Loose Cannons. Current trends in the performance of these roles can be identified, raising questions about the nature of politics and the vitality of Parliament.     

Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) requires parliamentary accountability. At present, as CSDP-related decisions are increasingly taken in the framework of the UN or the EU, neither the European Parliament (EP) nor national parliaments are able to hold decision-makers accountable. Interparliamentary cooperation can provide added value in bringing about parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP. Nevertheless, despite an official agreement, the EP and national parliaments have different views on what such interparliamentary cooperation entails. There are five conditions – cooperation and complementarity among parliaments, conferential dialogues, coordinated agendas, and comprehensive and comparative scrutiny – that have to be fulfilled to create added value for interparliamentary cooperation on CSDP matters.     

Parliament,public engagement and legislation in Bangladesh: a case study of Domestic Violence Act of 2010

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the process of enactment of the domestic violence bill in Bangladesh. One of the distinctive features of the bill, passed in 2010, was that it originated in civil society and widespread public engagement characterised its enactment process. The paper explores the factors that encouraged different actors to agree to enact the law. There are, however, not many examples of parliament–CSO interaction in the legislative process. The paper identifies reasons that discourage engagement in other areas of public concern. Prominent among the reasons underlying weak public engagement in the legislative process are: monopoly of the government in the legislative process and its eagerness to pass laws in haste, dominance of part-timers in parliament, legal restriction on ‘independent’ voting in parliament, over-centralization of power in political parties and politicisation of CSOs.     

Evidence-informed or value-based? exploring the scrutiny of legislation in the UK Parliament

This article argues that three types of factor – process, subject and political circumstance – are likely to affect the extent to which claims of evidence are made during legislative scrutiny. It draws upon case studies of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, the Academies Act 2010 and the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, utilising interviews with those involved and information from Hansard. The article concludes that these cases highlight that while there might be potential benefits from a yet more robust legislative scrutiny process, including greater use of pre-legislative scrutiny and the ability of public bill committees to take evidence from a wider range of witnesses and on all bills, subject and political factors would be likely to mean that the use of claims of evidence would continue to vary widely.     

Legislation Under Review: An Assessment of Post-Legislative Scrutiny Recommendations in the UK Parliament

Post-legislative scrutiny allows Parliament to revisit legislation after it has been enacted to ensure that it is operating as intended. As most literature on the UK legislative process suggests that is not optimal, this is an important task that committees can undertake to ensure that any problems can be located and rectified. This paper reports the findings of a systematic study of the outcomes of post-legislative scrutiny in terms of the types of recommendations being made, whether they are being accepted by the government, and what factors impact upon the acceptance of those recommendations. It concludes that there is a bias in the legislation being selected to receive post-legislative scrutiny and that committees, on the whole, are producing weaker recommendations which are more likely to be accepted. Additionally, it concludes that the stronger the action that a recommendation calls for, the more likely it is to be rejected.     

Lord Mustill and the Courts of Tennis – Dallah v Pakistan in England,France and Utopia

This note analyses the reasoning of the English and French courts in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, in which an arbitral tribunal had accepted jurisdiction over the Government of Pakistan on the basis of an arbitration agreement concluded by a trust that was created, controlled, and then extinguished by the Government. It highlights the English courts' clarifications on the degree to which arbitral awards should benefit from the presumption of validity at the stage of enforcement and discusses how the cultural background of the English and French judges – and of the arbitrators – drove them to come to contradictory results. Moreover, it argues that both judges and arbitrators, owing to the way the parties framed their arguments, probably missed the proper solution of the case.     

The Spanish Parliament and EU Affairs in the Post Lisbon Treaty Era: All Change?

The new provisions on national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty were welcomed with scepticism by some scholars and with hope by others. Sometime after the new provisions came into force, their impact on the role of national parliaments in the EU can already be examined. This article looks into the effect of the implementation of the Early Warning Mechanism and the other provisions on the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs in Spain. It also reflects on the possible implications for the EU political system. Although the scope and actual effect of the new measures have been quite modest, the new regulations allow for a better scrutiny of EU law, a tighter control of the executive on EU affairs and closer cooperation with EU institutions.     

Judicial Review,Irrationality, and the Legitimacy of Merits-Review

The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed—the use of the proportionality principle, for example—or the context of the administrative decision under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights. The author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without limit—a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above.